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This thesis addresses the analysis of new or very recent marketing data and the intro -
duction of new marketing models. We present a collection of models that are useful to
analyze (1) the optimal launch time of new and dominant technologies, (2) the triggers,
speed and timing of new products’ price landings, (3) the consumer heterogeneity that
drives substitution patterns present in aggregate data, and (4) the influential locations that
drive the diffusion of new technologies. The econometric approaches that we apply are
diverse but they are predominantly Bayesian methods. We use Bayesian mixture modelling,
Bayesian variable selection techniques, Bayesian spatial models and we put forward a new
Bayesian approach for the random coefficient logit model. The data that we analyze
consist of unique and large datasets of video-game prices, video-game consoles’ sales,
aggregate sales data for consumer products and Google’s online search data. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Thesis Road-map
In this thesis we address the marketing of new products using mathematical and econometric
models. We present a collection of models that are useful to study the following topics: (1) The
optimal launch time of new and dominant technologies, (2) The triggers, speed and timing of
new products’ price landings, (3) The consumer heterogeneity that drives substitutions patterns.
And, (4) the inﬂuential locations that drive the diﬀusion of new technologies.
These topics are explored in depth in the next four chapters and the topics of the chapters
follow the order introduced above. Each chapter is self-contained and can be read independently
from the others. However, the four chapters share a similar structure. That is, each chapter
consists of an executive summary, a literature review, the modeling and econometric approach
and its own conclusions or discussion.
The econometric approaches that we apply are diverse but they are mainly Bayesian. The
exception is the second chapter where we apply non-linear least squares and simulation methods.
The third chapter involves Bayesian mixture modeling. In the fourth chapter we present a new
Bayesian approach for the random coeﬃcient logit model. Finally, the study in the ﬁfth chapter
is based on Bayesian variable selection techniques and Bayesian spatial models.
In the next section we introduce the topics that we will explore in the next four chapters and
we aim to give an impression and short overview of some of the important aspects related to the
marketing of new products. The overview is based on Apple because the marketing techniques
of this company oﬀer a great setting related to the topics covered in this thesis. Note, however,
2 Introduction
that this thesis’ research is not applied to Apple’s products. After the overview, we conclude
this introductory chapter with a summary of the academic contributions of this thesis.
The perfect marketing for new products?
When will Steve Jobs launch the next generation of the iPhone, the iPhone 4G? Hopefully for
those working in marketing, Steve Jobs will prefer to launch the iPhone 4G at the time indicated
by Apple’s Vice-President (VP) of Marketing and at a time after the engineers and designers
at Apple ﬁnished its technological development. But what will be the timing suggested by
Apple’s Marketing VP? Is it likely that the Marketing VP will strive to ﬁnd the launch date
that could result in the greatest consumer demand possible at all dates after the iPhone 4G
launch? The question now seems to be when consumers, both current owners and non-owners of
the iPhone, will purchase the iPhone 4G. Will they be anxiously waiting to purchase it as soon
as it is available online or at their local Apple shop? Or will consumers wait some time after its
introduction or will they even wait to leap-forward to a superior iPhone a couple of generations
ahead, say, to the iPhone XG?
Currently, the iPhone is the leading and dominant technology in the smart-phone segment.
One of the closest competitors of the iPhone is the BlackBerry produced by Research in Motion
(RIM). How much do we know about the BlackBerry’s “generations”? RIM managers decided
to manage their products in a very complex generational series. Consumers have the option
to buy the BlackBerry Bold 9700, the BlackBerry Storm2 9550, the Storm2 9530, the Black-
Berry Curve 8900, the Curve 8500, the Curve 8300, the Bold 9000, the Tour 9630 and so on.
Surprisingly, a similar generational marketing strategy is used by Nokia, Samsung and other
phone manufacturers. That is, the current iPhone is competing against dozens of products. Is
the communications market the only market where the iPhone is competing? The answer is no.
The iPhone is the top ranking camera in Flickr and hence it may be the most popular device
to make photos worldwide. The next most popular device in Flickr is the Canon EOS Digital
Rebel, that is a Canon digital SLR!1 Moreover, the iPhone is becoming a popular gaming plat-
1See http://www.flickr.com/cameras/ for the Flick rankings and http://na.blackberry.com/
eng/devices/ for the latest list of RIM devices.
3form and it is competing also against the Nintendo DS and the PlayStation Portable. Each new
market expands the market potential of the iPhone while at the same time each new market may
be a call for tougher competition and retaliation. Later, we will refer to technologies that ﬁght
for dominance as alpha technologies because these markets resemble the struggle for dominance
between, for example, alpha chimpanzees. The iPhone faces a market where it may be classiﬁed
as the dominant and only alpha technology in the smart phone segment. However, a common
setting consists of several alpha technologies all of which have the potential to become the mar-
ket leader. That is the setting that we study in the second chapter. In the second chapter of this
thesis we present a multi-generation model for new and dominant technologies. We speciﬁcally
focus on the topic of the launch timing of alpha technologies and its optimality.
In all ways, Apple is doing a great eﬀort to increase the desirability of its products much
before their market launch and in fact, during all their life-cycles. If the marketing strategy
is eﬀective then the VP of Marketing could pick a launch date, for example, and then do her
best to set an introductory price and launch Apple’s product at a good timing relative to its
marketing and advertising campaigns. The launch of the iPad has brought attention to Apple’s
pricing strategy. Not surprisingly, Apple aims to convince its consumers that the iPad is “a
magical and revolutionary product at an unbelievable price”. That is exactly the current main
welcome message at www.apple.com. Of course, prices play an important marketing role and
Apple has tried to manage the timing and depth of price cuts carefully. In general, prices of
high-tech products show sudden transitions from initial high levels to permanent much lower
levels. There may be many diﬀerent reasons behind a price cut, like demand, competition,
products release schedule or seasons, and Apple is adapting each of its products´pricing to
their speciﬁc competitive and demand settings. Later, we will refer to these transitions as price
landings. In the third chapter of this thesis we present an empirical study of price landings and
their potential triggers. More speciﬁcally, we study the heterogeneity of price landings and our
modeling approach uncovers the relative importance of diﬀerent landing triggers.
The focus of Apple’s marketing eﬀorts varies per product. Recently, the advertising of Mac
computers was focused on its product features, the technology. The “Hello, I’m a Mac” ads
made special emphasis on the superiority of Mac computers relative to PC’s. In contrast, the
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marketing for the iPhone was based on its applications (“Apps”) while the Apps were not really
an Apple’s product. However, the ﬂexibility, diversity and immense capabilities of these Apps
was featured as the main product to advertise in the marketing campaign “There is an App for
That”. That is, the Marketing VP might have realized that network eﬀects and the demand for
software could increase the demand for the iPhone. The third example is the recent marketing
campaign for the iPod and this time the focus were its users. The “dancing silhouettes” campaign
featured only color silhouettes of iPod users dancing diﬀerent types of music or it featured
bands and their music, like U2 playing Vertigo. In summary, Apple is addressing consumer
heterogeneity with brand-speciﬁc campaigns. In the fourth chapter we present a methodology
that is useful to capture consumer heterogeneity and preference evolution based on aggregate
sales data. Speciﬁcally, we present an approach that augments previous Bayesian analysis of the
random coeﬃcient logit model. We present a modeling approach that is new because it adds
market-speciﬁc and global priors, time varying preferences and ﬁnally we model heterogeneity
with a novel structure.
Overall, Apple’s is known as a ﬁrm aiming to provide the best consumer experience and it
is usually mentioned as a company with great customer service. There are, however, groups of
customers that receive greater attention and these are Apple’s fans. Steve Jobs manages and
talks to this inﬂuential and selected group of consumers at diﬀerent moments. The last time that
Steve Jobs appeared on stage as key-note speaker was on January 27th of 2010 and he devoted a
complete event to describe the features of the iPad to Apple fans and to the press. In addition,
he announced the pricing for the iPad and its launch date. The iPad will be available at Apple
stores on April 3rd 2010 and it can be pre-ordered since March 12th 2010. Inﬂuentials are people
who have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the behavior of others and they might be the engine of diﬀusion
at diﬀerent moments and locations. Hence, it is key to manage inﬂuentials and convince them
about the marvels of products much before everyone else. Steve Jobs key-notes are always based
in San Francisco but Apple fans are everywhere. Are these fans always inﬂuential? Do they
play diﬀerent roles during the life-cycle of new technologies? In the ﬁfth chapter of this thesis
we present an approach to ﬁnd the inﬂuential locations that drive the diﬀusion of technologies
5in aggregate sales data and in location-speciﬁc online search data. We further provide insights
on how the inﬂuential locations distribute in space and how they evolve in time.
Summary and Academic Contributions
The novelty of this thesis consists of the analysis of new or very recent data and the introduction
of new marketing models.
The second chapter introduces a new diﬀusion model that is useful to analyze the optimal
introduction timing of multi-generational technologies. Special focus is given to ﬁrms’ alpha,
that is the ability of a ﬁrm to transfer users of its old technologies to their new generations,
and the eﬀects of the ﬁrms’ alpha on the introduction dates of potential dominant technologies.
This same chapter’s analyses are based on recent weekly data of game consoles and video-games
and we provide new insights about the optimality of the launch timing of the Nintendo Wii and
the PlayStation 3. Chapter 2 is joint work with Philip Hans Franses.
Next, in the third chapter, we present a new mathematical model for sudden price transitions.
Surprisingly, we are the ﬁrst to empirically model speciﬁcally these transitions, what we call
price landings, and their triggers, timing and speed. Furthermore, our analysis is based in a new
dataset containing almost 1200 recently introduced products. Our contribution oﬀer insights
into the heterogeneity of price landings and the untangling of the most likely triggers of price
landings based on Bayesian mixture modeling. Chapter 3 is joint work with Dennis Fok and
Philip Hans Franses.
The contribution in the fourth chapter is mainly the introduction of an augmented version
of recent Bayesian analysis of the random coeﬃcient logit model. The practical application of
the Bayesian random coeﬃcient model, speciﬁcally to large datasets, requires novel approaches
and model formulations. We apply our new approach to both simulated data and to a unique
and very large dataset of aggregate sales and our approach proves to be promising. Chapter 4
is joint work with Dennis Fok.
Finally, in the ﬁfth chapter of the thesis we analyze new data collected from Google Insight
and we apply recent Bayesian econometric approaches to identify inﬂuentials. We focus our
analysis on the identiﬁcation of the inﬂuential locations that drive the aggregate sales of new
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technologies. The speciﬁc techniques that we apply in this chapter, Bayesian variable selection
and multivariate spatial models, are new to the marketing literature. Hence, our contribution
consists of the illustration of how these techniques can be applied to study marketing problems
while at the same time we provide insights about the time variation and spatial clustering of
inﬂuentials.
Chapter 2
The Launch Timing of New and
Dominant Multi-Generation
Technologies
In this chaper we introduce a model that is suitable to study the diﬀusion of new and domi-
nant multi-generation technologies. Examples are computer operating systems, mobile phone
standards, video game consoles. Our model incorporates three main features. First, we add the
ability of a ﬁrm to transfer users of its old technologies to the new generations, what we call
ﬁrms’ alpha. Second, we add competitive relations between market technologies. Third, the
launch strategies diagnosed by our model cover, as special cases, the now or never strategies
and hence it is suitable to study intermediate launch strategies.
We state the relationship of our model to previous research both in terms of the model for-
mulation and in terms of some of its analytical solutions. Speciﬁcally, the model may reduce to
the Bass or the Norton and Bass models. Regarding the analytical solutions, we ﬁnd that the
launch never strategy arises when there are late product introductions by competitors, when a
ﬁrm’s alpha is very low, or when the competition is intense while the launch now strategy arises
only when a ﬁrm’s alpha is zero.
In addition, we evaluate diﬀerent launch strategies and the optimality of launch timings in
two detailed case studies on the video game systems market. We study the portable systems
(PS) and the video game consoles (VGC) industry. We present several insights from our analysis
and we ﬁnd interesting explanations for the pacing strategy in this market, for which we also
provide a historical perspective.
We ﬁnd that the appropriate timing of a new technology depends heavily on both the ﬁrms’
alphas and on the competitive positioning of their products. In the VGC case we ﬁnd that the
Nintendo Wii was launched at an appropriate moment while the Sony PS3 perhaps should have
never been launched.
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2.1 Introduction
In a well-known study on the behavior of chimpanzees Jane Goodall writes:
“In 1963 Goliath, a powerful and aggressive male in his prime (perhaps about 25 years
of age) was the alpha male. He had a spectacular charging display during which he covered
the ground very fast indeed, dragging and occasionally hurling branches. Early in 1964,
however, Goliath was displaced from his top-ranking position in the community by an older
and much less robust male, Mike... Unlike Goliath, who had maintained a very high ranking
position for several years after losing his alpha rank, Mike dropped rapidly to a low position
in the hierarchy... In chimpanzee society, dominance is something of a conundrum. The
usual interpretation of the phenomenon is that it enables a high-ranking individual to have
prior access to desirable foods, females, or resting places.” (van Lawick-Goodall, 1973)
We believe that Goodall’s description of dominance in the chimpanzee society directly applies
to new technologies and their markets. Speciﬁcally, markets of new technologies formed by a
few ﬁrms and products and by a single or a few dominant alpha technologies are analogous to
the few chimpanzee males that ﬁght for the alpha rank. Examples of products in this type of
industries are operating systems, mobile phone standards, video game consoles, smart phones,
and so on.
Many technology ﬁrms, like Apple or Microsoft, launch several versions of their products,
what we know as product generations. Each time a new generation product is introduced to the
market some or many of the users of the old generations switch to the new one, at the same time
new users may adopt the new generation product while other users may switch from one ﬁrm´s
products to another ﬁrm´s products after a new introduction. That is, each product generation
cannibalizes its previous generation and each ﬁrm has a diﬀerent capacity of transferring the
users of the old technology to the new one. For example, we know that Apple has been very
successful transferring the users of its old technologies to the new ones. Linux, even though it is
a smaller player, is a second example of a technology with a high alpha. In contrast, it was widely
documented how Microsoft users were hesitant to switch from Windows XP to Windows Vista.
Some Windows users stickied to Windows XP while others switched to alternative operating
systems. In this chapter we will refer to the ﬁrms capacity of cannibalizing and transferring
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users of old technologies to new ones as the ﬁrm’s alpha. In our example, Apple would be the
player with a high alpha.
In this chapter we extend the Norton and Bass (1987) model by incorporating three new
elements that have not been addressed simultaneously in previous literature. These are the ﬁrm’s
ability of transferring its users to new technologies (the ﬁrm’s alpha), the competitive interaction
between ﬁrms in the market, and a new solution to the timing of new technologies. Our model is
suitable to study the timing of new generation products in industries that are characterized by
a relatively slow pace of introductions and a few ﬁrms launching new technologies. In addition,
we test our model empirically under diﬀerent settings and based on the new model we provide
insights into the launch-timing strategies and into the optimality of launch timings.
Previous empirical literature has addressed the diﬀusion of new multi-generation technolo-
gies, like Norton and Bass (1987), Kim and Lee (2005), Danaher et al. (2001) and Kim et al.
(2000), but they do not cover the topic of introduction timing. Two exceptions are Norton and
Bass (1987) and Mahajan and Muller (1996). These last authors introduce the timing of new
products into their models and tested them empirically. However, both the Norton and Bass
(1987) and the Mahajan and Muller (1996) models suggest to launch new technology either now
or never. Other analytical studies have addressed speciﬁcally the timing of new technologies,
like Wilson and Norton (1989), Joshi et al. (2009), Bayus et al. (1997), Souza et al. (2004) and
Morgan et al. (2001), but these later authors models have not been tested empirically and in
most cases their models are suitable for industries with a fast pace of technology introductions,
an exception being Joshi et al. (2009). More importantly, these studies do not incorporate the
three new elements we address simultaneously.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 we present our literature review. In
Section 2.3 we present our model for the duopoly and triopoly case (sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2,
respectively), we discuss its relationship to previous models (section 2.3.3) and the analytical
properties that distinguish it from previous models (section 2.3.4). In Section 2.4 we introduce
the market context and our data. In Section 2.5 we motivate the model assumptions and the
estimation procedure. In Section 3.5 we discuss the estimation results. In the next two sections
we use our model to study the industry. In Section 2.7 we study the portable system market and
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we give insights about diﬀerent launch strategies. Next, in Section 2.8, we study the main video
game console market, composed of Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo, and we focus our analysis in
the latest console race. We further provide insights into how diﬀerent introduction timings may
be optimal. Finally, in Section 3.6 we present our discussion and conclusions.
2.2 Literature Review
To our knowledge, Wilson and Norton (1989) and Mahajan and Muller (1996) are the two
key studies concerned with the question of when it is optimal for a monopoly to launch multi-
generation products. According to Wilson and Norton (1989) there are three critical issues
which aﬀect the optimal introduction time of a new generation. These are the interrelationship
of sales of the two products, their proﬁt margins and the planning horizon. Surprisingly, their
model provides two optimal solutions regardless of the relevance of these factors. They conclude
that diﬀerent generations of a product should be introduced either all at the same time or se-
quentially and not overlapping. In a similar vein, Mahajan and Muller (1996) conclude that a
new generation should be introduced as soon as it is available (if its market potential is larger
than the preceding one) or it should be delayed to a much later stage, that is, to the maturity of
the previous generation. Their ﬁndings seem special cases of the solutions proposed by Kamien
and Schwartz (1972). Kamien and Schwartz (1972) suggest to never launch a technology only
under extreme competition and to launch now only if the ﬁrm needs to take advantage of a
proﬁt stream that would otherwise be smaller once competitors come in.
More recently, Joshi et al. (2009) study the problem of product launch timings across diﬀerent
markets. They characterize situations, depending on social inﬂuence, where it is optimal to
launch before maturity or after the maturity of the ﬁrst generation product. However, Joshi
et al. (2009) do not incorporate competition and their model is only useful to study the in-
teraction of products across markets (same product in two geographies, for example). Souza
et al. (2004) study the new product introduction strategy and its relation to industry clock
speed. They provide analytical evidence that a time-pacing strategy (launching products every
n time periods) performs relatively well compared to the optimal strategy. Their model applies
2.2 Literature Review 11
to settings with a high frequency of product introductions. The studies of Morgan et al. (2001)
and Bayus et al. (1997) analyze how the trade-oﬀs between quality or product performance
(measured by development costs) interact with the introduction timing decision. In contrast, we
study the relationship between cannibalization and competition with the introduction timing
decisions.
The literature on multi-generation products is very extensive. Padmanabhan and Bass
(1993a) and Bayus (1992) propose models to price successive generations of products, Danaher
et al. (2001) analyze the relation between the marketing mix and diﬀusion of multi-generation
products, Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) examine the diﬀusion of complementary innovations,
Kim et al. (2001), Chatterjee and Eliashberg (1990), Kim and Srinivasan (2001), Jun and Park
(1999), Vakratsas and Bass (2002) and Bayus (1991) study how and when consumers decide to
upgrade to improved products’ versions. Islam and Meade (2000), Islam and Meade (1997) and
Olson and Joi (1985) propose models for diﬀusion and replacement of products, while Purohit
(1994), Robertson et al. (1995) and Prasad et al. (2004) analyze the introduction strategies of
multi-generations products or the release of single products in multiple channels. Finally, Kim
et al. (2000), Kim and Lee (2005), Peterson and Mahajan (1978) and Islam and Meade (1997)
present alternative diﬀusion models for successive generations of products.
Our contributions to this literature are as follows. First, we propose a model that incor-
porates competition and cannibalization (ﬁrm’s alpha) based on a duopolistic and triopolistic
market. Second, our model parameters are simple to estimate or to calibrate with secondary
quantitative or qualitative information and it is possible to ﬁnd intermediate solutions to the
introduction timing problem. Third, we provide two detailed case studies about the timing
of game systems that are not documented in the literature. Finally, we present new insights
regarding diﬀerent launch strategies and the optimality of timing decisions.
Next we brieﬂy discuss the Norton and Bass Model (NBM) as it is our departing point and
it is essential in our model development.
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2.2.1 The Norton and Bass Model
In this chapter we overcome three limitations of the NBM model that have not been jointly
addressed in previous research. Denote S1(τ1, τ2) as the ﬁrst generation sales, S2(τ1, τ2) as
the second generation sales and denote τ1 and τ2 as the launch moment of these generations,
respectively. The ﬁrst limitation is that ∂(S1(τ1, τ2) + S2(τ1, τ2))/∂τ2 = 0 is obtained when
τ2 = 0 or when τ2 =∞. Sg(τ1, τ2) are the sales of generation g given the introduction timings of
the ﬁrst and second generation products, τ1 and τ2, respectively. Therefore, the basic Norton
and Bass (1987) model is not helpful to derive an intermediate optimal introduction timing
apart of these two solutions. The second limitation is that it assumes that all the sales of the
previous generation are captured by the second generation. Finally, the NBM does not consider
the diﬀusion of competing products.
In the NBM cumulative sales are proportional to the cumulative distribution function of
the adoption rate F (t) and the market potential m. When a second generation is introduced,
substitution and adoption eﬀects should be added to the previous equation. For the case of two
generations, Norton and Bass posit that the ﬁrst generation cumulative sales follow
S1(τ1, τ2) = m1F1(τ1)[1− F2(τ2)], for t > 0, (2.1)
and that the second generation follows
S2(τ1, τ2) = F2(τ2)[m2 + F1(τ1)m1], for t > τ2 (2.2)
where we use Sg(τ1, τ2) to refer to the vector [Sg(τ1, τ2; t = 0), . . . , Sg(τ1, τ2; t = Tp)] and
S1(τ1, τ2; t) is equal to m1F1(τ1; t)[1 − F2(τ2; t)] while S2(τ1, τ2; t) is equal to F2(τ2; t)[m2 +
F1(τ1; t)m1]. The introduction date of the ﬁrst generation (g = 1) is τ1 and the introduction
date of the second generation (g = 2) is τ2. Tp is the planning horizon, which is set as ∞ in
Norton and Bass (1987). Fi(τi; t) is the cumulative sales function of generation g deﬁned as
Fg(τg; t) = [1 − e
−bi(t−τg)/1 + aie
−bg(t−τg)] for t > τg and ag=qg/pg and bg = pg + qg, g = 1, 2.
We use Fg(τg) to refer to the vector [Fg(τg; t = 0), . . . , Fg(τg; t = Tp)]. Slightly stricter notation
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would use Fg(τg; t, θ) where θ = (pg, qg,mg) but we use the former as we focus on the timing
parameters in this study. Note that in the Norton and Bass (1987) τ1 is assumed to be ﬁxed at
some value (possibly at t = 0) and they do not focus on its value.
The equations of the NBM posit that after the second generation is introduced at time τ2,
the ﬁrst generation’s cumulative sales S1(τ1, τ2) become proportional to its cumulative adoption
function F1(τ1), its market potential m1, and the sales not captured by the second generation
[1− F2(τ2)] after τ2. The sales of the second generation S2(τ1, τ2) are proportional to their own
market potential m2 and to the cumulative sales of the ﬁrst generation F1(τ1)m1 after τ2.
If the NBM equation (2.1) would contain only the term m1F1(τ1), then the sales S1(τ1, τ2)
will be equivalent to the model of Bass (1969). However, in the Norton and Bass (1987) model
a fraction F2(τ2) of m1F1(τ1) is captured by the second generation. Consequently, there is a
moment in time when F2(τ2) will become 1 and all of the ﬁrst generation sales are transferred to
the second generation and the last element of S1(τ1, τ2) becomes 0. At the same time S2(τ1, τ2) =
m2F2(τ2) + F2(τ2)F1(τ1)m1 and therefore, m1 + m2 is the last element of the vector S2(τ1, τ2),
given in equation (2.2).
In the next section we present a model that is a generalized version of the NBM and we
believe this new general model overcomes all the three limitations of the NBM.
2.3 A Multi-Product Diﬀusion Model with Compe-
tition
This section is divided in four subsections. In the ﬁrst (subsection 2.3.1) we extend the NBM
to the duopoly case and in the second (subsection 2.3.2) we extend the model to the triopoly
case. Both extensions are based on the same assumptions and we present the duopoly case
ﬁrst for ease of exposition. In the third section we present the relationship of our model to
previous models proposed in the literature (section 2.3.3). Finally, in the fourth (subsection
2.3.4) we present the intuition and the analytical properties that make our speciﬁcation suitable
to optimize and study the launch timing of new dominant technologies.
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2.3.1 Duopoly Multi-Generation Model
In order to expand the Norton and Bass (1987) model and add a second ﬁrm or a second
competing product, we should make assumptions about the relationship between the ﬁrms’
products. Here we make the assumption that the relationship between the two generations
products of a ﬁrm are related in a very similar but more ﬂexible way than in the NBM, and
that is where the alpha parameter comes in. Additionally, we will assume that the sales that go
from one product to a competitor’s version are proportional to the cumulative sales function of
the competitor’s products.
Formally, if the market is composed of two ﬁrms s and n, the cumulative sales of ﬁrm s are
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The cumulative sales of ﬁrm n are
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Finally we have that
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g)]× I(τ ig ≥ t) for t > 0 (2.9)
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2 ) represent the sales of generation g of ﬁrm i achieved by launching its
ﬁrst and second generation products at τ i1 and τ
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products at τ s1 and τ
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g > t) is an indicator function that
equals 1 when the introduction time of generation g of ﬁrm i, τ ig, is larger than or equal to
t and zero otherwise. The term φijgk refers to the substitution (or loyalty) parameter between
the generation g of ﬁrm i and the generation k of ﬁrm j. We use F ig(τ
i
g) to represent the
vector [F ig(τ
i
g; t = 0), . . . , F
i
g(τ
i
g; t = Tp)]. Again, stricter notation would use F
i
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g; t, θ) where
θ is a vector that collects all other parameters in the model. The parameters pig and q
i
g are
the innovation and imitation parameters of generation g and ﬁrm i, respectively, g = 1, 2 and
i = n, s.
We may refer occasionally to φ as the vector (φ1, . . . , φN ) where N is the number of products
and to α as the vector (α1, . . . , αI) where I is the number of ﬁrms. Equations 2.3 to 2.9 allow for
a wide variety of relationships given the sign and size of what we call the loyalty parameters or
φ and the values of the the alpha cannibalization parameters (α). The role of the α parameter
is to relax the assumption of the NBM that all the sales of the ﬁrst generation of a ﬁrm are
transferred to the second generation. Note that the last elements of the vector in
˜
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be equal to mi2 + αm
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1 and the last element of S˜
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2) is equal to m
j
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1. Therefore α can
be interpreted as the proportion of sales that the ﬁrst generation transfers to the next when
t = Tp and Tp is of course suﬃciently long.
In Figure 2.1 we sketch the relationship between product generations in the duopoly model.
Basically, there is substitution between all products but substitution starts at diﬀerent points
in time. The ﬁrst generation is launched at t = 0 and it is the only product in the market up to
t = T1. At this moment the ﬁrst generation of the second ﬁrm is launched and the substitution
between these two products (represented by the blank continuous line) starts too. The rest
of the products are launched at time t = T2 and t = T3 and the substitution between them
and the products launched before them start at these times. Note that the model allows for
the possibility of never launching a product if we set its launch date at t = Tp. This ﬁgure
represents a hypothetical case of launch dates but we can evaluate any launch-timing in the
model. For example, we could evaluate the result of launching the products in reverse order
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or in any order. In practice the second generation arrives after the ﬁrst one, but any other
combination is allowed. Finally, note that there is only one single arrow between the products
in the ﬁgure. That is, we assume symmetric competitive parameters. If the relationship between
products is not symmetric then we would need two arrows connecting any pair of products in
Figure 2.1.
Next we present the triopoly model and at the end of next section we discuss how both the
duopoly and the triopoly models are related to previous research.
2.3.2 Triopoly Multi-Generation Model
In this section we extend the duopoly model and set the sales equations for ﬁrms s, n and x and
we hold the assumption that each ﬁrm sells two generations of the same product.
The cumulative sales equations for ﬁrm x are:
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The cumulative sales equations for ﬁrm s are:
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and
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And, the cumulative sales equations for ﬁrm n are:
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where S˜i1 and S˜
i
2 are deﬁned as
S˜i1(τ
i
1, τ
i
2) = m
i
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i
1(τ
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1)[1− αiF
i
2(τ
i
2)] for i = n or s or x (2.16)
and
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1)m
i
1] for j = n or s or x (2.17)
and
F ig(τ
i
g) = [1− e
−big(t−τ
i
g)/1 + aige
−big(t−τ
i
g)]× I(τ ig ≥ t) for t > 0 (2.18)
where aig = q
i
g/p
i
g and b
i
g = p
i
g + q
i
g and I(τ
i
g > t) is an indicator function that equals 1 when the
introduction time of generation g of ﬁrm i, τ ig, is larger than or equal to t and zero otherwise.
The term φijgk is the competitive parameter that relates the generation g of ﬁrm i with the
generation k of ﬁrm j. The parameters pig and q
i
g are the innovation and imitation parameters
of generation g, respectively, g = 1, 2.
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The speciﬁcation of (2.10) to (2.18) is similar to the duopoly case but now we allow for
substitution between three market players x, s, and n and each of their products. The duopoly
model consists of four launch-timing parameters, eight φ parameters, two α parameters, four
p and q parameters and four m parameters. That is in total 26 parameters in four equations.
The triopoly model consists of 45 parameters (six τ , 24 φ, six p and q, three α and six m) in
six equations. In the estimation section 2.5 we describe how we calibrate both models and the
parameter restrictions and assumptions we use. Next we describe the relationship of our model
with previous models.
2.3.3 Links with Other Models
In Figure 2.2 we summarize the relationship of this general NBM with previous models based
on diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations. It is useful to see the nodes at the top of the ﬁgure as
possible cases for each ﬁrm in our model. We start with the left node. If the α parameter,
in one of the ﬁrm’s equations, is equal to zero then there exists no cannibalization between
a speciﬁc ﬁrm generations and the diﬀusion of each of its generations follows an independent
Bass Model. However, in this case if some of the φ parameters are diﬀerent from zero then we
have independent Bass Models but we add inter-generation competition (or what is the same
as between ﬁrms competition); otherwise they follow independent Bass models. On the right
hand side of the ﬁgure we see the case when the α parameter is set to 1 and this means that the
relationship of generations within ﬁrms follows the NBM speciﬁcation. As in the previous node
the φ parameters may add inter-generation competition between ﬁrms (note that is not within
the same ﬁrm). Finally, in the central node we have the case when α is diﬀerent from both 0
and 1. In this last case, the model allows cannibalization within a ﬁrm’s generations but the
cannibalization is diﬀerent from the NBM. Therefore we call this a second type of cannibalization.
As before, for this node the φ parameters may add inter-generation competition between ﬁrms.
At the bottom of Figure 2.2 we give three boxes representing ﬁrms and the arrows correspond
to two hypothetical speciﬁcations (case 1 and 2) for each ﬁrm. In the ﬁrst case, ﬁrm 1 products
follow a NBM with second type of cannibalization, ﬁrm 2 products follow independent Bass
Models while ﬁrm 3 products follow the NBM. That is, in this case the only ﬁrm facing the
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eﬀects of competition is ﬁrm 2. In the second case we set a diﬀerent combination and our
intention is to illustrate that the model parameters allow a diverse set of diﬀusion patters
among ﬁrms and products. A similar speciﬁcation for the NBM is possible when either the p
or q of any of the generations is equal to 0. Note that each ﬁrm launches two generations of
products within the planning horizon but the triopoly model may reduce to the duopoly model
in case a ﬁrm sets the launch date at the end of the planning horizon (what we refer as Tp) for
its two generations. A diﬀerent speciﬁcation happens when each ﬁrm launches a single product
by setting one of its generations launch-timing equal to Tp. Hence, our model is ﬂexible enough
to allow diﬀerent substitution patterns between ﬁrms’ products and within ﬁrm generations. At
the same time the triopoly case might reduce to diﬀerent number of ﬁrms or products depending
on the parameter values.
2.3.4 Why Our Model Works
In this subsection we present the intuition of why our model is useful to ﬁnd intermediates dates
rather than τ = 0 or τ =∞ solutions of the NBM. The intermediate solutions are possible due to
the trade-oﬀ between competitive interaction between products and the cannibalization within
a ﬁrm’s generations. For example, if the ﬁrm n launches a product at time τc and this product
might enhance/deter the sales of one of the products of ﬁrm s after this time. Then the ﬁrm
s has the incentive to advance/postpone the launch of its product relative to the launch of the
competing product. In this way, ﬁrm s could maximize/minimize the positive/negative eﬀects
of competition. That is, the timing decision depends on the sign and size of the eﬀect of ﬁrm’s
n product on the sales of ﬁrm’s s products. In addition, there is a trade-oﬀ between maximizing
or minimizing the eﬀect of competition and the eﬀects on ﬁrm s previous generation product.
Therefore, by launching the second generation sooner the previous generation might lose sales
to the second generation earlier in time. In summary, the optimization of the competitive eﬀects
and the own cannibalization eﬀects is possible in our speciﬁcation while it is not possible to
optimize them in the NBM.
Here we present a simpliﬁed version of the duopoly model and assume that one of the
competing ﬁrms launches only one product at τc while the second ﬁrm s sells two products and
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these are launched at τ1 and τ2. We further assume that the competitive eﬀects are measured
by the coeﬃcients φ1 and φ2. Formally, the equations of ﬁrm s are
Ss1(τ1, τ2|τc) = m1F
s
1 (τ1)[1− αsF
s
2 (τ2)][1− φ1F
c
1 (τc)], for t > 0, (2.19)
and
Ss2(τ1, τ2|τc) = F
s
2 (τ2)[m2 + αsF
s
1 (τ1)m1][1− φ2F
c
1 (τc)], for t > τ2 (2.20)
That is, the ﬁrst and second generation sales of ﬁrm s, Ss1(τ1, τ2|τc) and S
s
2(τ1, τ2|τc), are now
related to the competing product by the loyalty parameters φ1 and φ2. It is easy to show that
the sales gained or lost by adding competition to the NBM (with cannibalization of type 2) are
Δs =
[
αs(φ2 − φ1)m1F
s
1 (τ1)F
s
2 (τ2)+
φ1m1F
s
1 (τ1) + φ2m2F
s
2 (τ2)
]
F c1 (τc), for t ≥ τc (2.21)
Δs is the sales change due to the introduction of a competing product and it depends on
the parameters αs, φ1 and φ2 and on the introduction timings τ1 and τ2 relative to τc. The
terms φ1m1F
s
1 (τ1) and φ2m2F
s
2 (τ2) measure the share of each product of ﬁrm s that might be
transferred/received to/from a competing product and the shares are φ1 and φ2. The term
αs(φ2−φ1)m1F
s
1 (τ1)F
s
2 (τ2) reﬂects the share of the cannibalized sales that might be transferred
to a competing product and this share is αs × (φ2 − φ1). Note that αs is the share transferred
between generations of the ﬁrm s while αs × (φ2 − φ1) is the share that might be transfer to
a competing product. If αs = 0 this implies no cannibalization and we are back to the NBM
speciﬁcation with competition. Finally, all terms belonging to ﬁrm s interact with the diﬀusion
of the competing product F c1 (τc) after τc. This last term exists only after t > τc and hence ﬁrm
s decision should take into account that after time τc their products will gain or lose some share
to the competing product. Note that equation (2.21) uses a simpliﬁed version of the duopoly
model and that in our application below we use the complete duopoly and triopoly model.
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The following lemmas cover a few interesting optimal timing scenarios. We include them
because they illustrate some extreme cases where the launch now or never strategy may be valid
and they illustrate the ﬂexibility of our model speciﬁcation.
Lemma 1 The optimal introduction timing of both the ﬁrst and second generation products is
equal to zero when there is no cannibalization (αs = 0), when the φ1 < 0 and φ2 < 0 and there
is one competitive introduction at τc.
From (2.21) it follows that if αs = 0, one has Δs = −(φ1m1F
s
1 (τ1) + φ2m2F
s
2 (τ2))F
c
1 (τc). It is
clear that both products should be introduced at t = 0 given that they face competition after τc,
that is, the earlier they are both introduced, the better. Hence, in the case of no cannibalization
with competition the option of launch now is the optimal solution. If there is no competition
and cannibalization we are back to the solutions of the Norton and Bass model. This lemma is
in line with Kamien and Schwartz (1972).
Lemma 2 The optimal introduction timing of the ﬁrst and second generation products (τ1 and
τ2) are equal to τc when there is no cannibalization (αs = 0), when the φ1 > 0 or the φ2 > 0,
respectively, and when a competitive introduction happens at τc.
Introducing at time τc produces a positive Δs and it is clear that a ﬁrm should choose a time
closer to τc. If both products are launched before τc the sales stream is smaller between τ1 and τc
for the ﬁrst generation, and they are smaller between time τ2 and τc for the second generation.
On the other hand, if they are launched after τc they do not beneﬁt from competition for τ1− τc
or τ2−τc periods, respectively. This lemma implies that imitation may be optimal under certain
conditions. As before, the strategy of launch never is discarded because there are positive returns
to launch at dates closer to competitors. This lemma may be modiﬁed easily to the situation
where imitation is optimal for only one generation, for example if φ1 = 0 and φ2 > 0. In our
application below we will conduct a numerical exercise (in section 2.7.2) where this lemma is at
work.
Lemma 3 It is optimal to never launch the second generation when Ss2(τ1, τ2|τc) +Δs < 0.
When the returns on introducing the new product Δs outweigh the unit sales of S
s
2(τ1, τ2|τc)
then it is optimal not to introduce it. Hence, the launch never strategy arises when there is stiﬀ
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competition as in Kamien and Schwartz (1972). In our case study (section 2.8.2) we evaluate
the parameter space that leads to this lemma.
There are other interesting possibilities of intermediate launch-timings when there is canni-
balization and competition either for the ﬁrst or second generation given diﬀerent values for the
φ1, φ2 and α parameters. In our case studies we explore numerically other possibilities for the α
parameter and the optimal timing of products and explore the parameter space that may lead
to any of these lemmas or to the launch now or never strategy.
2.4 The Video Game Hardware Market
The hardware market for video games can be split in two sub-markets: hardware for portable
systems (PS) and hardware for video game consoles (VGC). In this chapter we treat these
markets to be independent of each other. Indeed, most press articles indicate that the markets
of PS and VGC are independent. See for example The Herald (2005), Financial Times (2004),
The Economist (2004) and The Washington Post (2008). The reader may be familiar with
the video game console wars between Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo (BusinessWeek, 2008b;
The Washington Post, 2006). At the moment (September 2009) these three companies are the
main market players in the hardware market. Microsoft does not sell any PS while the three
companies sell competing video game consoles. Sega stopped producing game consoles in 2001
(San Francisco Chronicle, 2001) and Apple and Microsoft are seen as potential new competitors
of Sony and Nintendo in the PS market. (BusinessWeek, 2008a; Wall Street Journal, 2006).
2.4.1 Some Basic Figures
In Table 2.1 we report the release dates of the main PS hardware since 1998 for three main
markets: North America, Japan and Europe. The release dates for PS seem almost arbitrary
and they occur in months that range from February to December for all three regions. However,
when we look at the time between releases within companies we discover a diﬀerent pattern.
Table 2.2 shows an average of two-year intervals between releases.
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In Table 2.3 we report the release dates on all major VGC since 1987. Clearly, the VGC
market is quite diﬀerent from the PS market. The release dates in North America are mainly
chosen to be close to November while in Japan and Europe most releases occur also in other
months of the last quarter of the year. If we look at Table 2.4 we can see that there is an
additional regularity around the VGC releases. They occur approximately every ﬁve years.
Only the Sony PS3 took more than 6 years to be released and this was due to a delay in the
development of the blu-ray technology added to the PS3. See The New York Times (2006) for
more details on this story.
In Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 we report the estimates of single-generation Bass models for
PS and VGC. Portable systems have very similar innovation parameters (p) but quite diﬀerent
imitation parameters (q). We computed simple statistics on the Bass models and in most cases
they ﬁt the data quite well. We discuss more details on our data next.
2.4.2 Data and Data Cleaning
Our data for the duopoly and triopoly NBM models consists of weekly time series of sales at the
USA for the last two PS of Nintendo and Sony and the last two generations of consoles released
by Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo. The portable systems are the Nintendo DS, the Nintendo DS
Lite, the Sony PlayStation Portable (PSP) and the Sony PSP Slim. The video game consoles
are the Microsoft Xbox, Microsoft Xbox 360, Sony PS2, Sony PS3, Nintendo GameCube and
Nintendo Wii. In addition, we obtained the corresponding release dates for all products from
diﬀerent news sources and for all cases the release dates matched the date of the ﬁrst week that
we observed in our data. We used a script to download our data from www.vgchartz.com and
the site admins authorized us to use their data. Our data for all systems cover the period since
their release week up to January 2009. That is, our data covers a period of almost 9 years and
10 systems.
Before we plug our data into the estimation routines we control for indirect network eﬀects,
seasonality and price. It has been documented that indirect network eﬀects might play a role
in the video game market (see for example, Chintagunta et al. (2009), Clements and Ohashi
(2005) or Shankar and Bayus (2003)). Furthermore, Binken and Stremersch (2009) show that
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it is mainly super star software what drives indirect network eﬀects in the video game systems
market. Therefore, in this chapter we use a simpliﬁed version of the model proposed by Binken
and Stremersch (2009) to clean our data from indirect network eﬀects and price. We use the
following equation
Yt = αYt−1 +
∑
j=1...52
βjWDj +
∑
l=t...t−L
λlPCDl +
∑
k=t...t−K
δkSSIk + t (2.22)
where Yt are the system sales at week t; WDj refers to the week j dummies; PCDl is the price
cut dummies with L total lags and it indicates the week when prices were cut; SSIk is the total
number of super star software introduced at week k. To create the independent variables in
equation (2.22) we collected release dates and quality ratings on the most popular video games
for the systems in our sample. For each system we found approximately 120 video games to
construct the SSI variable. In total we collected data for 1200 video games. These data come
from many diﬀerent online sources. Furthermore, we use many diﬀerent news services to ﬁnd the
price cut timing for all consoles in our sample. We estimated equation (2.22) for each console
in our sample and then we subtracted the terms
∑
k=t...t−K δkSSIk and
∑
l=t...t−L λlPCDl from
the consoles sales Yt only if they are signiﬁcant. We report in Table 2.7 the sales percentage that
indirect network eﬀects represent for each console and the number of lags for the SSIk variable
that we used. We chose the number of lags in the same way as Binken and Stremersch (2009).
Interestingly, despite our model is a much simpler version of that of Binken and Stremersch
(2009) we ﬁnd that indirect network eﬀects represent on average a 13% of the consoles sales
while Binken and Stremersch (2009) found that percentage to be 14%. That is, our results
conﬁrm their ﬁndings. In contrast, we use weekly data, they use monthly, and we ﬁnd that on
average the number of lags correspond to approximately 7 weeks (that is less than 2 months)
while they report signiﬁcant lags up to 5 months. In terms of weeks 5 months represent 20
weeks. We tested lag numbers up to 20 weeks but we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects further than
14 weeks (see Table 2.7). Note that the number of lags in the Table should be read with caution
because not all lags were found signiﬁcant and as Binken and Stremersch (2009) we include the
last non signiﬁcant lag to avoid bias. An additional diﬀerence is that we estimate the equation
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(2.22) separately for each system while they use a panel approach and that their SSI variable
is monthly while we trace software introduction per week. Our guess is that they use a panel
approach because they consider much shorter time series and the panel approach helped them
to identify their model parameters. However, they warn about considerable heterogeneity of the
network eﬀects and their result of 14% is therefore close to an average of network eﬀects across
systems. Our long time series of weekly data allows us estimate the model for each system and
the ﬁt we achieve is very good for all systems (R2 close to 0.80). A ﬁnal diﬀerence in our approach
is that we use the 120 most popular video games per system while they use on average the 10
superstar software video games per system. We estimated a second version of the system models
by including only the highly rated video games (the superstars), as do Binken and Stremersch
(2009), in the SSI variable. Binken and Stremersch (2009) do not report the percentile they
use as a selection heuristic and we selected the video games with a quality rating in the top 25
percentile. In this case, the average network eﬀects jumps up to 15%, while it is also close to
their reported number. That is, higher quality video games might have higher network eﬀects
although the diﬀerence between 13% and 15% can hardly be considered as signiﬁcant.
The resulting adjusted series without network and price eﬀects still needs to be cleaned from
seasonality and for this latter purpose we use the TRAMO/SEATS methodology (Gomez and
Maravall, 2001, chap. 8). We further control for all major holidays in the USA and for Easter.
In sum, the series we plug in our estimation routine are the seasonally adjusted series without
indirect network and price eﬀects. We use this series because the competitive parameters on our
model could pick up the correlation caused by indirect network eﬀects, price and seasonality if
we do not control for them.
Our data covers 10 gaming systems and therefore we estimated 20 models (10 for the network
eﬀects and 10 for the seasonal adjustment). We do not report these results but they are available
from the authors upon request. In addition, we estimate both the duopoly and triopoly models
with the original data and the parameter estimates remain very similar. However, the ﬁt is
better when we use the clean data.
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2.5 Estimation and Parameter Assumptions
We use the systems NLS estimator described in Cameron and Trivedi (2005, Chap. 6, page
217) to estimate the parameters.
The duopoly multi-generation model consists of 26 parameters and in our estimation routine
we use 16 free parameters. This number reﬂects the assumptions that the innovation and
imitation coeﬃcient, p and q, vary across ﬁrms and products and that the loyalty eﬀects are
symmetric. That is, we assume that φijgk is equal to −φ
ji
kg. The τ
i
g parameters are the introduction
date of each product and we keep the real launch dates in our estimation routine.
The triopoly model consists of 45 parameters and in the estimation routine we have 21 free
parameters. This number reﬂects the assumptions that the p and q parameters vary across ﬁrms,
that the loyalty parameters are symmetric, and that αi for i = x, s, n are ﬁxed at some value.
The main reduction comes from the assumption that φijgk = −φ
ji
kg as it reduces the number of
free parameters by 12. Note this is the symmetry assumption we described earlier when we
discussed Figure 2.1. Finally, we use the real introduction dates as values for the τ ig (g = 1, 2
and i = x, s, n) parameters.
An important assumption in the estimation routine is the value of the α parameters and we
need an assumption on them. As we mentioned earlier, the α parameter is simply the share of
the sales that the ﬁrst generation transfers to the second generation. The reason why we need
to make an assumption regarding α is that there is a direct relationship between the α and the
m parameters with the realized cumulative sales. We know that the realized cumulative market
sales are ﬁxed at some value, call it M , and it depends on both α and m. Of course, the realized
M depends on all other parameters but specially the α and the m are very closely related to
it. If we increase α then we need a lower m to keep the realized sales at M or if we lower
α we need a higher m. This means that we can not simultaneously identify both parameters.
This is a limitation and at the same time an advantage of our model because we can obtain
the α parameter easily from experts opinions, managers, store sales data, or surveys. All we
need to know is what percentage of the ﬁrst generation sales (of an speciﬁc ﬁrm) is transferred
to its second generation and that is α. However, in case the α is not available then we could
make assumptions on the market potentials and estimate the α together with all other free
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parameters in the model. We know that market potential assumptions are quite common in the
new products diﬀusion literature and they are straightforward to construct.
In the estimation routine ﬁrst we assume the α = 1 for all ﬁrms in both the duopoly and
triopoly model. Then, as an illustration, we ask an expert opinion on the size of α for each ﬁrm
in our triopoly model. We contacted a local store manager and asked him about the α parameter
of Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo according to his experience. His information is that the α of
Microsoft is 0.3, the α of Sony is 0.1 and the α of Nintendo is 1.1. These numbers imply that
Nintendo is able to get 1.1 sold unit of Wii for each sold unit of the GameCube, Sony achieves
the lowest with a 0.1 of PS2 unit sales going into the PS3, while Microsoft is in between with
an α of 0.3.
To estimate both models we use the systems NLS estimator but due to the large number of
parameters we split estimation in three steps. First we estimate the six innovation and imitation
coeﬃcients p and q given all other parameters ﬁxed. Next we estimate the loyalty coeﬃcients
φ given all other parameters are ﬁxed at their most recent estimated values. We iterate these
two steps until convergence and at the end of the routine we estimate the six market potentials
given all other parameters. Chintagunta et al. (2009) apply a similar estimation approach. In
the estimation routine we constrained the φ coeﬃcients setting their lower and upper limits at
−4 and +4, respectively. However, all parameter estimates are within these limits as we report
in Section 3.5. All our routines are programmed in R (R Development Core Team, 2005).
2.6 Estimation Results
We report the parameter estimates for the duopoly model in Table 2.8. In this model we
consider two companies, Nintendo and Sony, and their portable gaming systems. The systems
are the Nintendo DS and DS Lite and the Sony PlayStation Portable (PSP) and PSP Slim. We
notice that the parameter estimates for the innovation and imitation parameters, p and q, are
lower in the multi-generation model than in the independent Bass model reported in Table 2.5.
In addition, the market potentials are remarkably lower in the multi-generation model. Two
factors explain the lower estimates. First, the multi-generation model allows the ﬁrst generation
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to transfer a percentage α of its sales to the second generation. Hence, the second generation
market potential has a lower m estimate but note that the realized market potential in the
multi-generation model may be higher than the m estimate after adding the competition and
cannibalization eﬀects. These results are in line with the ﬁndings of Norton and Bass (1987)
regarding the size of the market potentials of the second generation products; see (Norton and
Bass, 1987, footnote 2, page 1074). Finally, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant φ parameters and this is evidence
supporting the idea that the portable systems compete against each other. For example, we see
that the Nintendo DS is losing share to the Sony PSP (see the −0.57 estimate) and it is losing
more to the second generation of Sony, the PSP Slim (see the −2.39 estimate). On the other
hand, the Nintendo DS Lite is receiving a share from the PSP Slim (see the 0.66 estimate). We
report the model ﬁt in Figure 2.3 and we can see the ﬁt is reasonably good.
In Table 2.9 we report the triopoly model parameter estimates with the assumption that all
ﬁrm’s α = 1. In Table 2.10 we present the parameter estimates when we use 0.3, 0.1 and 1.1
as the α parameters for Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo, respectively. Finally, in Table 2.11 we
present the φ and α parameters reported in Table 2.9 in a easy to read format.
For the triopoly case it is the q parameter estimates that are much lower than in the Bass
model reported in Table 2.6 while the p parameters remain very similar. An interesting result is
that the Microsoft Xbox market potential is around 19 million units while the Xbox 360 market
potential is a much lower value of 813 thousand units. A similar drop in market potential occurs
from the Sony PS2 to the Sony PS3. The exception is Nintendo. The market potentials for
both the Nintendo GameCube and the Nintendo Wii stay around the same level (17 million
units). This ﬁnding is in line with the results of Shankar and Bayus (2003). Shankar and
Bayus (2003) analyze the video game market between 1993 and 1995 and the two main players
at that time where Nintendo and Sega. Note that in Table 2.3 we report the history of console
releases since 1985 and that they analyzed the last three years of the 4th generation systems.
They argue that Nintendo had a higher network strength than Sega and consequently Nintendo
sales overtook those of Sega. Recently, the Nintendo Wii is overtaking the sales of the largest
player, Sony, and our parameter estimates seem to capture this overtake.
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In Table 2.10 we report the model with our expert’s values on the α parameters. As we antic-
ipated, the parameter estimates of the market potential m are higher for the second generation
of Microsoft and Sony because we assumed a much lower α for them (0.1 and 0.3, respectively).
The market potential for the Xbox360 goes from 813 thousand units in the ﬁrst model up to
2, 685 thousand units in the second, that is 3.3 times higher. The PS3 m in the second model is
2.14 times higher than in the ﬁrst. Finally, the market potential of Nintendo’s second generation,
the Wii, is 1.161 million units lower in the second model relative to the ﬁrst because of the higher
α. Surprisingly, the market potential of both generations of Nintendo are still high relative to
each other despite the fact that Nintendo can transfer more consumers from the GameCube to
the Wii (it has the highest α among the three companies). The rest of the parameters in Table
2.10, with very few exceptions, remain very close to the model parameters of Table 2.9. We are
certain that there are other ways to retrieve the α parameters from experts, surveys or data we
stress that this estimation exercise is just an illustration.
In Table 2.11 we arrange the φ and α parameters in two six by six tables. We numbered
the estimated φ parameters in the top table and in the bottom we report their estimates using
bold face for parameters with t-values higher than 1. We can see that the Wii is getting some
share from the Xbox console (see the 2.39 parameter of the phi[4]) and that is is not competing
against the PS3 (see the −0.02 of the phi[12]). This conﬁrms what has been argued in the press
that these two consoles are not substitutes for each other. A surprising result is that the Wii
has a positive inﬂuence on PS2 (see the −0.60 estimate of the phi[8]). The PS3 is losing some
share to the Xbox 360 and the GameCube (see the phi[6] and phi[11] estimates) according to
the sign of the parameters but they are not signiﬁcant. At the same time, the PS2 received
share from the Xbox 360 and the GameCube. Most parameter estimates are in line with our
anecdotal evidence and what we read in the press.
Finally, we plot the observed and ﬁtted values of the triopoly model in Figure 2.4 and again
the model ﬁts the data reasonably well. Note that the real cumulative sales of the ﬁrst gener-
ation products, the graphs in the left of Figure 2.4, stabilize after they reach their maximum.
However, our model forecasts a decline in their number of cumulative units after reaching the
maximum and this is a consequence of the substitution that takes place after new generations
30 The Launch Timing of New and Dominant Multi-Generation Technologies
are introduced. Hence, the ﬁt after the maximum is not really the same as the ﬁt before the
maximum of the cumulative sales given that we do not have data on substitution or un-adoption
of these products. An interesting feature of the left-hand graphs is that the foreseen decline is
faster for the Xbox and the GameCube while it is very slow for the PS2.
2.7 Duopoly Case Study: The Portable System Race
In this section we use our model to analyze the portable system market. We take the duopoly
model and its parameter estimates and with them we simulate four diﬀerent strategies for both
Nintendo and Sony. We use a planning horizon Tp = 90 months and this number is long enough
relative to the average pace of two years we report in Table 2.2. Next we describe the strategies
we simulate and afterwards we present the insights gained by our numerical exercises. At the
end of the section we present the sensitivity analysis to diﬀerent parameter estimates.
2.7.1 Simulating Plausible Strategies
A strategy is a complete contingent plan for all market players. (Watson, 2002, pg. 26).
That is, we deﬁne the actions of Nintendo as a response to any of Sony’s actions and viceversa.
In all of the strategies, except the ﬁrst, we let Nintendo be the leader and Sony the follower.
We reversed their roles in our numerical exercises and our insights remain without signiﬁcant
changes. Furthermore, the leader-follower assumption is common in the literature, see for
example Bayus et al. (1997, p. 56). Finally, we assume that the order of entry does not modify
the competitive relationship between products, just as in Kamien and Schwartz (1972), but
note that we will provide sensitivity analysis to diﬀerent parameter values in the next section.
The four strategies we consider are:
1. Random Date Selection: In this strategy both Nintendo and Sony randomly select a
launch date for their two product generations at the beginning of the planning horizon.
That is, both ﬁrms ignore each other’s actions and the interaction among their competing
products.
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2. Imitation: In this strategy Nintendo selects the launch-timing for its two generation
products and Sony imitates Nintendo. That is, Sony launches its PS2 console at the same
time as the GameCube and it launches the PS3 at the same time as the Nintendo Wii.
3. Pre-commitment and Optimization: In this strategy Nintendo pre-commits to the
launch date of their two generation products while Sony, with perfect foresight, optimizes
the launch dates of its two generation products based on Nintendo pre-commitment dates.
4. Uncertain Dates and Stochastic Optimization: In this strategy Nintendo does not
pre-commit to a launch date for its two generation products. However, Sony assigns a
probability to each of the possible launch-timings of the GameCube and the Wii and based
on this information it optimizes the launch-timing of the PS2 and the PS3.
We give the details of each strategy in the Appendix 2.A. We simulate these four strategies and
we compute the outcome in terms of the maximum cumulative sales of Sony, Nintendo and the
sum of both ﬁrms’ maximum cumulative sales. We repeat the simulation of each strategy until
we cover all the combinations possible of the launch-timing selected by Sony and Nintendo that
each strategy implies. In this way we recover the distribution of the sales that both players may
achieve by following each of the four strategies. We summarize these distributions in Table 2.12
and Figure 2.5.
In Table 2.12 we report six quantiles of the distribution of the sales for Sony, Nintendo and
their sum and for each of the four strategies while in Figure 2.5 we plot their percentiles. The
purpose of Table 2.12 and Figure 2.5 is to help us rank the strategies in terms of the likelihood
of their sales outcomes. For example, in Table 2.12 we see that for Sony the sales achieved by
imitating are lower than the sales achieved by randomly selecting its dates, see the second and
fourth lines in the table.
In the right-hand side of Figure 2.5 we see that the strategy that results in higher sales
for Sony is the third and that is the strategy in which Sony knows the exact launch dates of
Nintendo’s products. Only at the very ﬁrst percentiles (from 0 to around 20%) the stochastic
optimization strategy is better. In the graph it is clear that the second best strategy results
when Sony applies stochastic optimization. As we can notice, this strategy puts a lower and
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upper limit to the sales of Sony, see the ﬂat areas of the uncertain dates line at the ﬁrst and
last percentiles. Surprisingly, imitation is the worst strategy Sony could follow and it performs
slightly worse than when Sony randomly selects its dates.
In the left-hand side of Figure 2.5 we see the quantiles of the distribution of sales achieved by
Nintendo. Note that Nintendo is the leader and the outcomes are therefore not a mirror of the
results obtained by Sony. For Nintendo the results are mixed. We see that before the percentile
50 the best outcome is achieved when Sony is imitating (interestingly this is not a good option
for Sony) and that after the 50 percentile the best outcome is achieved by not announcing its
launch dates and by not precommiting to them (see the uncertain dates line). On the other hand,
before the 50 percentile the lowest sales are achieved when Sony uses stochastic optimization
and above the 50% the lowest sales are either random selection of dates or pre-commitment.
Note that Nintendo does not behave strategically in our simulations. That is, Nintendo does
not know that Sony is following one of the four strategies. Given that Nintendo knows which
strategy Sony is playing then it is straightforward for Nintendo to strategically select its launch
dates and achieve high sales. This implies that if Nintendo strategically chooses its launch dates
then playing the uncertain dates strategy can result in high sales while if Nintendo acts not
strategically then pre-commitment is a reasonable strategy. Of course, we are not using very
strict criteria to rank Nintendo’s strategies but it is straightforward to rank the strategies using
diﬀerent criteria given we know their corresponding outcomes in terms of sales distributions.
2.7.2 Sensitivity Analysis of the Launch Strategies
The above results are sensitive to the parameter values we plug in the duopoly model. In all
previous exercises we used the values we obtained from our estimation routine. To know how the
sales outcome may change we compute the expected value of the sales achieved by playing the
second strategy (imitation) and the third strategy (optimization) when we plug in a diﬀerent
set of parameter values in the model. First we evaluate the strategy by simulating diﬀerent
combinations for the phi[1] and phi[2] parameters, the phi[3] and phi[4] parameters and ﬁnally
for the phi[1] and the alpha parameter of Nintendo. The phi[1] and phi[2] are the φ parameters
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between the Nintendo DS and the PSP and the PSP Slim, respectively. The phi[3] and phi[4] are
the φ parameters between the Nintendo DS Lite and the PSP and the PSP Slim, respectively.
In Figure 2.6 we report the log of the ratio of the expected sales of Nintendo and Sony
given all possible combinations of these parameters, take two at a time, for the imitation and
pre-commitment strategies. In the ratio Nintendo’s expected sales is the numerator. This is a
numerical intensive exercise in the sense that for each parameter combination we compute all
possible combinations of launch-timings implied by each strategy and based on the outcome (in
terms of their maximum cumulative sales) we compute the expected value for the sales of both
players. In the graphs we report the log of the ratio of the expected maximum cumulative sales
between the two ﬁrms. Note that we apply the log transformation to the ﬁnal values because
the log of the expected value is not the same as the expected value of the logs.
The graphs in Figure 2.6 provide a unifying message. Both strategies might yield high sales
if a ﬁrm’s products are superior (in terms of the φ) parameters or if a ﬁrm’s ability to transfer
users of old technologies to new ones is high (that is equivalent to a high alpha). If both φ
parameters tend to be positive the ratio goes up and therefore Nintendo sells more relative to
Sony. The ratio increases in a similar way when the alpha of Nintendo is higher. Earlier we
concluded that the imitation strategy is the worst among the four strategies we evaluated for
Sony. However, if Sony had superior products the imitation strategy may yield high sales, see
how the log ratio goes up to -3 and -2 in the left-most and center upper panel graphs. This is
evidence supporting Lemma 2. However, we can easily notice that despite the unifying message
the surfaces have diﬀerent slopes. That is, achieving higher sales by raising or decreasing each
of the φ parameters does not yield the same increase/decrease in expected sales. We conducted
the same sensitivity analysis for the random dates and the stochastic optimization strategies
and the results are very similar.
The main lesson of this sensitivity analysis is that the outcome of any launch-timing strategy
varies radically and it depends heavily on the competitive positioning of the ﬁrms’ products and
on the ﬁrms’ ability to transfer users of their old technologies to the new ones.
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2.8 Triopoly Case Study: The Video Game Console
Race
In this section we present a diﬀerent set of numerical sensitivity analyses and we will focus on
the launch-timing of the Sony PlayStation 3 and the Nintendo Wii relative to their previous
generations and relative to their competitors. In this section we focus on answering what if
questions rather than studying the strategic interaction of ﬁrms, like in the previous subsection.
We use the parameters estimates we obtained from our estimation routine to answer the what
if questions and we assume a planning horizon Tp = 150 months. That is we assume 12.5 years
as planning horizon and this is in line with a recent interview statement of the President of
Sony Computer Entertainment in America, see Fast Company Blog (2009). In addition, we
illustrate the sensitivity of the optimal launch-timing to diﬀerent competitive and cannibalization
parameters.
In Table 2.3 we reported the release dates of all major video game systems. It easy to
notice that historically the phenomena of a launch race in a single year is relatively a recent
experience for system manufacturers. This is interesting given that the number of systems
manufacturers has stayed relatively constant since the early nineties. We observed for example
that the Nintendo Wii was launched at the same time as the PlayStation 3 in North America
three years ago. The GameCube and the Xbox were launched simultaneously in 2001. The other
close to simultaneous launch cases occurred between the Wii and PS3 in Japan and between the
Xbox and GameCube in Europe in 2006 and 2002, respectively. The average timing between
releases is approximately ﬁve years (5.09 years), and the standard deviation of this average is
almost one year (0.90 years), see Table 2.4. Hence, we believe that there is a need for insights
about whether these launch-timing were chosen optimally or what could make them optimal.
The optimization situations that we consider next are much simpler than the optimization
situations that we encounter in practice. They are simpler because of mainly two reasons. First,
we do not consider the strategic interaction between ﬁrms as in previous section. Second, we
do not consider price as part of the optimization problem because we focus on analyzing the
launch-timing decision relative to diﬀerent cannibalization and competitive settings. However,
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the timing decision can be considered as a sub-game of the price and timing game. That is, our
analysis has no assumption regarding the price of the consoles and we focus on the eﬀects of
timing dates on the unit sales of the systems. This assumption is in line with similar studies to
ours, see for example Joshi et al. (2009) and the work cited by (Souza et al., 2004, p. 538)
regarding pricing assumptions. However, we do not consider this a very strong assumption in
terms of our model estimation because of the cleaning procedure of our data. Nonetheless, if
we had a reasonable assumption about the price for all six systems in our triopoly or duopoly
model, and how the prices of all systems are strategically related to each other, then it is
straightforward to introduce it in the optimization problem. Still, our results will be valid as
price would possibly work as a discounting factor in the optimization problem. Of course, the
eﬀect of price on demand is not a straightforward introduction into our diﬀusion model and we
consider this an area of further research.
2.8.1 Simulating What If Questions
The ﬁrst what if question we answer is: What would be the maximum cumulative sales of the
Nintendo and Sony if they would have launched their consoles at diﬀerent dates and leaving
everything else constant? That is, we answer how either the sum of the maximum of equation
(2.12) and (2.13) for Sony and the sum of the maximum of equation (2.14) and (2.15) for
Nintendo are maximized. In Figure 2.7 we plot the total sales of Nintendo (summing up the
maximum cumulative sales of the Wii and the GameCube) achieved by launching at diﬀerent
dates. The maximum cumulative sales are reached when the Wii is launched at the month 64
(that is April 2005) and the GameCube at month 1 (January 2000). That is 5.33 years between
their releases. The real release time between these two consoles was 5.01 years in North America,
5.22 years in Japan and 4.60 in Europe. The real launch dates happened at November 2006
(month 83 in the graph) and November 2001 (month 23 in the graph). Surprisingly, Nintendo
is not launching that far from the optimal dates and according to this surface the diﬀerence of
sales between real and optimal dates is 3, 858.62 thousand units (66, 431.66 thousand units at
the optimal and 62, 573.04 at their real launch dates). The story is diﬀerent for Sony. In Figure
2.8 the maximum is reached when the PS2 is launched at month 1 (January 2000) and with
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the PS3 not launched. Note that setting the month of launch equal to the end of the planning
horizon is equivalent to not launching. This is a radical scenario but it is explained by the fact
that the PS2 is receiving sales from both the Xbox 360 and the Nintendo Wii according to our
model estimates while the PS3 competitive parameters are not very favorable, see Table 2.11.
The real launch dates of the PS2 and PS3 are the months 10 (October, 2000) and 84 (December,
2006), respectively. The total sales of Sony at these last pair of dates is 59.988 million units, in
Figure 2.8 all the sales surface is graphed for all possible launch dates. We know that up to the
ﬁrst week of August 2009 the PS2 has sold 50.767 million units (source vgchartz.com). Hence
according to our model the realized sales of PS3 will be around 9.22 (±2.14) million units while
up to date the Sony PS3 has sold 9.018 million units. The 2.14 million units is the average
derivative of the surface at the real launch dates, the point (10, 84) in Figure 2.8. Therefore,
our model is not very optimistic about the PS3.
The next questions we answer are: what is the optimal launch time of the Nintendo Wii
given the launch times of the Sony PS3? and what is the optimal time of the Sony PS3 given
the launch times of the Wii? We can answer these questions by looking at Figure 2.9. In this
ﬁgure we present two contour graphs (or heat maps). The lighter (yellow) areas represent higher
total sales and the darker (red) areas represent lower sales. We call these graphs sales reaction
surfaces because we can derive the best reaction function of either Nintendo or Sony given each
other introduction timings. A reaction function maps any launch-timing of a ﬁrm to the best
launch-timing of a second ﬁrm. We use the same deﬁnition of reaction functions as in Section
2.7. For example, in the left-hand graph we see that the maximum of Nintendo’s sales is on
month 73 given Sony launched its PS3 in month 1. From Table 2.11 we know that the PS3
and the Wii are not close competitors and not surprisingly the optimal launch date of the Wii
given any introduction date of the PS3 remains close to the month 73 (January 2006) for any
introduction timing of the PS3. What is surprising is that Nintendo launched 11 months later
than its optimal timing. In the right-hand graph we see that the optimal launch dates of Sony
are not very sensitive to those of the Nintendo Wii. For example, if the Wii were launched from
month 1 up to the month 60 (that is from January 2000 up to December 2004) then the optimal
month for the PS3 remains very close to the month 126 (June 2010). However, if the Wii is
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launched after the month 80 then the optimal action for Sony is to set the introduction date of
the PS3 at month 150, the end of the planning horizon. Hence, the best strategy for Sony if the
Wii is launched after month 80, is not to launch the PS3.
2.8.2 Sensitivity Analysis of the Optimal Launch-Timing
In the previous subsection we answered what if questions assuming our model parameter values
are the ones resulting from the estimation routine. However, the optimal timing is sensitive to
the parameter values and in this subsection we present how sensitive it is to diﬀerent competitive
and cannibalization settings.
First we present the sensitivity of the optimal launch date of the Sony PS3 to the compet-
itive parameters that relate this console to the Xbox 360 and the Wii, the phi[6] and phi[12]
respectively, for six diﬀerent scenarios. In each of these scenarios we assume an early, a late,
and an intermediate introduction timing of the Xbox 360 and the Wii. That is, we present three
scenarios for each last generation console that competes against the PS3. Second, we present
the sensitivity of the optimal launch date of the Sony PS3 given diﬀerent cannibalization and
competitive parameters using these same six possible scenarios. We present these results in
Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 respectively.
In Figure 2.10 we present the scenarios for early (month 40), intermediate (month 84) and
late (month 120) introduction timings of the Microsoft Xbox 360 at the upper graphs. In the
graphs at the bottom we present the scenarios with the Nintendo Wii launched at the same set of
introduction timings. For all six scenarios we leave all other introduction timings and parameters
at their real or estimated values, respectively. Note that we only use the φ parameters that relate
the three systems in our scenarios and set the others at their estimated values.
The ﬁrst lesson we derive from Figure 2.10 is that the optimal timing of the PS3 depends on
how it is competitively related to its two main competitors and not to only one of them. The
second insight is that there is a parameter space for which it is better not to launch the PS3
(that is the ﬂat top area in all graphs). Therefore, we can visualize the parameter space where
Lemma 3 holds, these are the ﬂat top don’t launch areas in Figure 2.10. Hence, the launch
never might be optimal depending on the competitive positioning of the PS3. Similarly, there
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is a parameter space for which there are earlier optimal introduction timings for the PS3. The
third insight is that, the parameter space that is suitable for an earlier introduction gets reduced
when the competing consoles are launched at later stages. See how the ﬂat surface (the don’t
launch area) is larger for the center and right graphs relative to the left most graph. The fourth
insight is that even when the competitive parameters are very favorable for the Sony PS3, its
earliest optimal introduction timing happens at the month 60 (December 2004) and that would
imply a 4.16 years diﬀerence between the PS2 and the PS3. That is, the launch now solution
is not part of a very favorable set of parameter values. Note that this time diﬀerence between
consoles is on the low side of the time between actual releases for all the major video game
systems reported in Table 2.4.
This last result may point that the 4 year time between releases could be a good introduction
pacing strategy when the product is superior relative to its competitors. Interestingly, the time
between releases are in the low side for third and fourth generation consoles and they are in
the high side for the the six and seventh generation systems. We do not have data on the
earlier systems but our intuition is that the fourth generation consoles were superior to the
third generation consoles and they were better positioned relative to its competitors. This may
be the case, for example, of the Sega Genesis and the Sega Dreamcast launched 4.33 and 3.25
years after their previous generation, respectively. According to our discussions with some hard-
core gamers that seems to have been the case indeed. In contrast, we have read in the press
that the relative positioning of the Sony PS3 and the Xbox 360, for example, is not very strong
relative to each other and this coincides both with longer time between releases diagnosed by
our model and with the longer time between releases we document in Table 2.4 for the latest
product generations.
In Figure 2.11 we present the sensitivity analysis of the optimal launch-timing of the PS3 to
diﬀerent cannibalization and competitive parameters, that is concerning the α and φ parameters.
The upper graphs show the optimal timing of the PS3 for three scenarios of the launch-timing
of the Xbox 360, similar as previous graphs. In the bottom graphs we present the scenarios
with diﬀerent introduction timings of the Nintendo Wii. The main diﬀerence between this and
the previous ﬁgure is that one of the axis is now replaced by Sony’s alpha. In the upper graphs
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we consider the cannibalization parameter of Sony and the φ parameter (phi[6]) that relates the
Xbox 360 and the PS3. In the bottom graphs we use the same cannibalization parameter of
Sony and the φ parameter that relates the Wii and the PS3, the phi[12]. The range we use for
the α cannibalization goes from 0 up to 3. A higher number than 1 would imply that Sony is
able to get more than one unit sale of the PS3 for each PS2 sold.
The ﬁrst insight we derive from Figure 2.11 is that the optimal introduction timing of the
PS3 depends on both the relative positioning to its competitors and to the cannibalization
between Sony’s generations. The second insight is that, as before, there is a parameter space for
which it is optimal not to launch the PS3 (the top ﬂat don’t launch areas) and this space seems
larger when competitors launch their consoles at late introduction dates. The third new insight
is that the larger Sony’s α is, the sooner it is optimal to introduce the PS3. If there is little
cannibalization, for example for α values between 0 and 0.5, then it is optimal for Sony to set the
launch-timing of the PS3 closer to the end of the planning horizon. For example, in the leftmost
bottom graph the optimal timing for a low α values ranges between the month 100 (April 2008)
and 129 (January 2010), when the phi[12] value is equal to 2. However, if the α value is larger
(near 3 in the same graph) the optimal timing stabilizes at 81 (September 2006). The middle
bottom graph corresponds to the scenario that considers the real introduction date for the Wii
and in this graph the optimal timing stabilizes at month 65 (May 2005) when both the phi[12]
and the α parameter are very favorable to Sony. The optimal timing stabilizes in all graphs
around the month 64 (April 2005) and this month implies 4.5 years between releases. Therefore,
the launch now strategy is not a result of very favorable competitive and alpha parameters.
The real launch of the PS3 occurred in month 84 and this month is optimal only when the α
is much larger than 1 and with a phi[12] approximately near 1. This may indicate that Sony’s
management might have been very optimistic about the PS3 when they chose that month, at
least according to our model.
Finally, the last insight is that when there is no cannibalization the optimal timing of the
PS3 is at time 0, that is the launch now strategy is covered only as a special case when there is
no cannibalization between generations, (Lemma 1). In all the graphs of Figure 2.11 we can see
that the don’t launch area does not reach the α = 0 and at this parameter value the optimal
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timing drops rapidly to the very start of the planning horizon. See the little empty space between
the don’t launch area and the back wall in all graphs. Visually, it is easier to detect how the
surface drops to zero in the upper graphs.
To summarize, the launch now strategy results only when there is no cannibalization between
a ﬁrm’s product while the launch never strategy results when there are late product introductions
by competitors, when a ﬁrm’s alpha is very low, or when the competition is intense in terms of
the φ parameters. In addition, we ﬁnd that very favorable competitive and alpha parameters
do not imply the launch now strategy as we discovered that the optimal launch-timing seems
to reach a limit of 4 years between generations. Finally, we ﬁnd that the higher a ﬁrm’s ability
to transfer its old technologies users to the new ones, the earlier it is optimal for it to introduce
new generation products.
2.9 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter we presented a new model that is helpful to analyze diﬀerent launch-timing
strategies and optimal introduction timings. It is straightforward to estimate the model param-
eters and to analyze diﬀerent interesting competitive and ﬁrms’ alpha scenarios. Our model is
suitable to study settings where there are just a few market players or products and when there
are some dominant alpha technologies in the market.
The insights we gained is that the launch now or never strategies may arise depending on
the competitive parameters and the relationship between the products in the market. Specif-
ically, the launch now or never strategies arise when there are late product introductions by
competitors, when a ﬁrm’s alpha is very low, or when competition is intense.
For the ﬁrst time in the academic literature we provide some insights into the introduction
strategy of the main players in the studied industry and we document their introductions since
the late eighties. We ﬁnd that the launch strategy of each 4 years seems appropriate when there
is a better product positioning or very high alphas. That seemed to be the case at the early
stages of the game systems industry while it is not any more so now.
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According to our model, Nintendo launched the Wii at an appropriate moment while the
Sony PS3 perhaps should have never been launched. Moreover, we ﬁnd that diﬀerent strategic
interactions between ﬁrms lead to diﬀerent sales levels and we argue that the strategy should
be chosen relative to the ﬁrms’ alpha and relative to the competitive setting that its products
face. For example, the imitation strategy returns are higher for certain competitive parameters,
speciﬁcally when the product is superior.
The managerial implications are clear. According to our insights the managers in industries
with alpha technologies should pay not only attention to the competition but also to the ability
of their ﬁrms to transfer users of old technologies to new ones. In our case study we pointed out
that the outlook for PS3 is not very promising, it may reach maximum a 12 million unit sales
according to our estimates. However, if Sony’s managers work in new ways to increase Sony’s
alpha or its competitive positioning the outlook for the PS3 could improve.
The higher a ﬁrm’s ability to transfer its old technologies users to the new ones, the earlier
it is optimal for it to introduce new generation products. Think of the situation where the ﬁrst
generation product of a ﬁrm may face stiﬀ competition after a point in time while its second
generation is better equipped to ﬁght against the new entrant. In this scenario, the best and
perhaps the only surviving strategy would be to transfer its users of old technologies to the new
ones as soon as possible and before competitive entry. We speculate then that the ability to
survive in such market depends partially but heavily on the ﬁrm’s alphas.
In our view, the technology markets mimic some of the competitive behavior of the alpha
chimpanzees. The alpha rank for a chimpanzee means access to desirable foods, females or resting
places while for companies the alpha rank means access to the users of their own old technologies.
However, note that in the chapter we assumed non-cooperative behavior between ﬁrms while it
has been documented that alpha males in the chimpanzee society may form temporal alliances
to overcome the current dominant alpha male (Nishida, 1983). This is a situation we do not
study and that we may encounter in the future of the game systems markets. For example, the
recent search alliance between Yahoo and Microsoft and the alliance between Toshiba and Sony
regarding the blu-ray standard seem to be in line with the cooperative behavior of chimpanzees
reported by Nishida (1983). On the other hand, the potential entrance of Apple and Microsoft
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in the portable gaming systems market points towards the arrival of more alpha technologies
and hence perhaps more competition. Finally, we left out other aspects of the marketing mix
that may prove important in the timing of new dominant technologies. We consider all these
extensions interesting avenues for further research.
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Firm Portable System North America Japan Europe
Nintendo DS Lite June 11, 2006 March 2, 2006 June 23, 2006
DS November 21, 2004 December 2, 2004 March 11, 2005
GameBoy Advance SP February 15, 2003 February 14, 2003 March 28, 2003
GameBoy Advance June 11, 2001 March 21, 2001 June 22, 2001
GameBoy Color November 19, 1998 October 21, 1998 November 23, 1998
GameBoy August 15, 1989 April 21, 1989 1990
Sony PSP Slim Lite September 5, 2007 September 13, 2007 September 5, 2007
PSP March 24, 2005 December 12, 2004 September 1, 2005
Source: VGchartz, Wikipedia & online press articles. Notes: We report the year of introduction when the exact date is not available.
Table 2.1: Release Dates of Portable Systems
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Firm Transition to/from North America Japan Europe
Nintendo DS - DSLite 1.55 1.25 1.28
GBA SP - DS 1.77 1.80 1.96
GBA - GBA SP 1.68 1.90 1.76
GBC - GBA 2.56 2.42 2.58
GB - GBC 9.27 9.51 –
Sony PSP Slim - PSP 2.45 2.75 2.01
Table 2.2: Release Time Between Portable Systems (in Years)
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Generation Firm Console North America Japan Europe
7th generation Nintendo Wii November 19, 2006 December 2, 2006 December 8, 2006
Sony PlayStation 3 November 17, 2006 November 11, 2006 March 23, 2007
Microsoft Xbox 360 November 22, 2005 December 10, 2005 December 2, 2005
6th generation Nintendo GameCube November 18, 2001 September 14, 2001 May 3, 2002
Sony PlayStation 2 October 26, 2000 March 4, 2000 November 24, 2000
Microsoft Xbox November 15, 2001 February 22, 2002 March 14, 2002
Sega Dreamcast September 9, 1999 November 27, 1998 October 14, 1999
5th generation Nintendo N64 September 29, 1996 June 29, 1996 March 1, 1997
Sony PlayStation September 9, 1995 December 3, 1994 September 29, 1995
Sega Saturn May 11, 1995 November 22, 1994 July 8, 1995
Atari Jaguar November 18, 1993 – –
4th generation Nintendo Super Nintendo August 13, 1991 November 21, 1990 April 11, 1992
Sega Genesis September 15, 1989 October 29, 1988 November 30, 1990
3rd generation Nintendo Nintendo October 18, 1985 July 15, 1983 –
Sega Master System June 15, 1986 1985 1987
Source: VGChartz, Wikipedia & online press articles. Notes: We report the year of introduction when the exact date is not available.
Table 2.3: Release Dates of Major Video Game Consoles
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Firm Transition to/from North America Japan Europe
Nintendo Wii - GameCube 5.01 5.22 4.60
GameCube -N64 5.14 5.21 5.18
N64 - SNES 5.13 5.61 4.89
SNES - Nintendo 5.82 7.36 –
Sony PS3 - PS2 6.06 6.69 6.33
PS2 - PS1 5.13 5.25 5.16
Microsoft Xbox 360 - Xbox 4.02 3.80 3.72
Sega Dreamcast - Saturn 4.33 4.02 4.27
Saturn - Genesis 5.65 6.07 4.61
Genesis - Master Sys 3.25 – –
Table 2.4: Time Between Major VGC Releases (in years).
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Video Game Console m (thousand units) p q Sample
Nintendo DS 6799.3447** 0.0140** 0.1789** Nov 2004 - June 08
(1975.3660) (0.0056) (0.0543)
Nintendo DS Lite 27972.9479** 0.0403** 1.9922** June 2006 - Jan 2009
(1130.8544) (0.0146) (0.2999)
PSP 9717.9772** 0.0109** 0.1500** Mar 2005 - Sep 2007
(1525.7210) (0.0026) (0.0389)
PSP Slim Lite 7068.5424** 0.0184* 0.2449* Sep 2007 - Jan 2009
(2579.1973) (0.0091) (0.1168)
Note: standard error in parentheses; *,** mean that the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant with 95% and 99% conﬁdence respectively
Table 2.5: Bass Model Estimates for Portable Systems
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Video Game Console m p q Sample
Xbox 16157.4500** 0.0058** 0.0993** Nov 2001 - Aug 2007
(699.5485) (0.0009) (0.0132)
Xbox 360 16312.2600** 0.0054** 0.1272** Nov 2005 - Jan 2009
(2826.5520) (0.0012) (0.0304)
PlayStation2 47847.1300** 0.0037** 0.0619** Oct 2000 - Jan 2009
(4520.1510) (0.0007) (0.0149)
PlayStation3 8190.0120** 0.0075** 0.1789** Nov 2006 - Jan 2009
(1173.5730) (0.0014) (0.0333)
GameCube 12716.7600** 0.0058** 0.0959** Nov 2001 - Apr 2008
(527.1293) (0.0009) (0.0142)
Wii 23353.9300** 0.0063** 0.1672** Nov 2006 - Jan 2009
(4673.3370) (0.0014) (0.0340)
Note: standard error in parentheses; ** mean that coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant with 99% conﬁdence.
Table 2.6: Bass Model Estimates for Video Game Consoles
2.10 Tables and Figures 49
System Model Lags % Network Eﬀects
Nintendo GameCube 4 15.77%
Nintendo Wii 11 23.33%
Sony PlayStation2 – –
Sony PlayStation3 5 2.28%
Microsoft Xbox 3 3.60%
Microsoft Xbox 360 7 6.69%
Nintendo DS 14 37.24%
Sony PSP 9 2.28%
All Systems 7.57 13.03%
Table 2.7: Video Game Eﬀects on Game Systems
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Coeﬃcient System Estimate s.e. t-value
p DS 0.01189 (0.0018) 6.56
DS Lite 0.03243 (0.0040) 8.12
PSP 0.05556 (0.0106) 5.25
PSP Slim 0.02843 (0.0076) 3.74
q DS 0.07897 (0.0406) 1.94
DS Lite 0.08174 (0.0353) 2.31
PSP -0.08717 (0.0918) -0.95
PSP Slim 0.12453 (0.0358) 3.48
phis (1) -0.57882 (0.6478) -0.89
(2) -2.39516 (1.9112) -1.25
(3) -0.41831 (0.2109) -1.98
(4) 0.66457 (0.2196) 3.03
m DS 15991.8 (530.0378) 30.17
DS Lite 10980.7 (486.4696) 22.57
PSP 10498.0 (169.4519) 61.95
PSP Slim 1012.0 (205.1027) 4.93
Note: phis (1) is the substitution coeﬃcient between DS and PSP,
phi(2) between DS and PSP Slim, phi(3) between DS Lite and PSP,
and phi(4) between DS Lite and PSP Slim; s.e. stands for standard
error.
Table 2.8: Multi-Generation Model for Portable Systems
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Coeﬃcient Console Estimate s.e. t-value
p Microsoft 0.00943 (0.0025) 3.79
Sony 0.00980 (0.0011) 8.56
Nintendo 0.01156 (0.0021) 5.63
q Microsoft 0.06115 (0.0143) 4.27
Sony 0.03881 (0.0051) 7.55
Nintendo 0.05381 (0.0144) 3.74
phis [1] -0.00512 (0.2087) -0.02
[2] -0.07195 (0.8990) -0.08
[3] 0.02003 (0.2270) 0.09
[4] -2.39045 (1.0587) -2.26
[5] -0.28843 (0.1261) -2.29
[6] 0.31218 (0.8135) 0.38
[7] 0.62241 (0.2734) 2.28
[8] -0.20223 (0.6419) -0.32
[9] 0.11293 (0.2238) 0.50
[10] 0.60116 (0.1576) 3.81
[11] -0.42376 (0.5037) -0.84
[12] 0.02402 (0.9240) 0.03
m Xbox 19135.29 (1132.2) 16.90
Xbox 360 813.10 (1884.7) 0.43
PS2 41135.91 (848.8) 48.46
PS3 987.54 (6416.3) 0.15
GameCube 16382.92 (1194.1) 13.72
Wii 17385.63 (2029.2) 8.57
Notes: m is in thousand units
Table 2.9: Multi-Generation Model for Video Game Consoles (Microsoft α = 1, Sony
α = 1, Nintendo α = 1)
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Coeﬃcient Console Estimate s.e. t-value
p Microsoft 0.01220 (0.0043) 2.82
Sony 0.01142 (0.0021) 5.49
Nintendo 0.00809 (0.0016) 5.06
q Microsoft 0.05423 (0.0201) 2.69
Sony 0.03216 (0.0078) 4.13
Nintendo 0.06670 (0.0151) 4.43
phis [1] -0.09294 (0.2166) -0.43
[2] -2.13156 (1.5318) -1.39
[3] 0.04654 (0.2377) 0.20
[4] -3.08154 (1.6084) -1.92
[5] 0.13089 (0.1357) 0.96
[6] 0.40535 (0.5606) 0.72
[7] 0.90676 (0.2681) 3.38
[8] 0.37551 (0.5191) 0.72
[9] 0.09675 (0.2246) 0.43
[10] 0.43943 (0.2651) 1.66
[11] 0.36342 (0.7003) 0.52
[12] 0.15694 (1.0118) 0.16
m Xbox 18908.97 (1346.3) 14.05
Xbox 360 2685.35 (874.9) 3.07
PS2 40409.41 (1002.8) 40.30
PS3 2117.23 (1142.5) 1.85
GameCube 17665.16 (1570.8) 11.25
Wii 16224.15 (2706.9) 5.99
Notes: m is in thousand units
Table 2.10: Multi-Generation Model for Video Game Consoles (Microsoft α = 0.3, Sony
α = 0.1, Nintendo α = 1.1)
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Xbox X360 PS2 PS3 GC Wii
Xbox x -1 [1] [2] [3] [4]
X360 1 x [5] [6] [7] [8]
PS2 -[1] -[5] x -1 [9] [10]
PS3 -[2] -[6] 1 x [11] [12]
GC -[3] -[7] -[9] -[11] x -1
Wii -[4] -[8] -[10] -[12] 1 x
Xbox x -1 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 -2.39
X360 1 x -0.29 0.31 0.62 -0.20
PS2 0.01 0.29 x -1 0.11 0.60
PS3 0.07 -0.31 1 x -0.42 0.02
GC -0.02 -0.62 -0.11 0.42 x -1
Wii 2.39 0.20 -0.60 -0.02 1 x
Notes: the numbers between brackets represent the phi coef-
ﬁcients of the multi-generation model reported in table 2.9.
The bold coeﬃcients have t-values greater than 1.
Table 2.11: Competitive Parameters
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2.A Strategy Simulation Methodology
In this section we provide the details of each of the four strategies we use in our application.
Random Date Selection
In this strategy ﬁrm 1 selects τ11 and τ
1
2 randomly and ﬁrm 2 selects τ
2
1 and τ
2
2 in the same way.
We discretize the planning horizon in Tp periods. Hence the possible launch dates τ
g
i (where i
stands for ﬁrm i while g stands for the system generation) might be at any t within t = 1, . . . , Tp;
we denote the length of the planning horizon p. We consider a 90 month planning horizon that
is 7.5 years. This time frame is long enough given the average life-cycle of the portable systems
is 2.5 years. With this planning horizon we evaluate the maximum of the cumulative sales for
each system of both ﬁrms given all the feasible launch dates τ gi for i = 1, 2 and g = 1, 2. That is,
ﬁrm 1 might select one out of the p2 possible launch-timings but we restrict the combinations to
the set where τ2i ≥ τ
1
i . This means that we restrict that the second generation product for both
ﬁrms is launched at a date either at the same time or after the ﬁrst generation. The feasible set
reduces from p2 to (p+1)×p/2 feasible combinations for each player. Note that we use Tp = 90
and we set p = 45. In the duopoly case i = 1 refers to Nintendo and i = 2 refers to Sony.
We evaluate equations (2.3) to (2.6) with the feasible set of launch-timing and we compute the
maximum cumulative sales achieved by each product generation for both ﬁrms. That is we com-
pute max(SSonyg (τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 |τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 )) for g = 1, 2 and max(S
Nin
g (τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 |τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 ))
for g = 1, 2. The g = 1 product of Sony is the Sony PSP and the g = 2 product of Sony is
PSP Slim; for Nintendo the g = 1 product is the DS and the g = 2 product is the DS Lite.
In table 2.12 we report the quantiles of the total sales of Sony achieved by this strategy, that
is
∑
g max(S
Sony
g (τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 |τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 )) and
∑
g max(S
Nin
g (τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 |τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 )) and the
total sales of both players (the sum of the last two terms).
Imitation
In this strategy ﬁrm 1 pre-commits to a launch-timing for its two product generations while
ﬁrm 2 imitates the launch-timing of ﬁrm 1. That is, both ﬁrms launch at the same time each of
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their product generations. In our application we set Nintendo the be the ﬁrm that pre-commits
to a certain launch date and Sony to be the ﬁrm that imitates. We assume that Nintendo
pre-commits to a randomly chosen pair of dates τNin1 and τ
Nin
2 and Sony sets τ
Sony
1 = τ
Nin
1 and
τSony2 = τ
Nin
2 . In this strategy we assume Nintendo ignores that Sony will imitate and we do
not assume Nintendo might pre-commit strategically to the best pair of dates. However, it is
straightforward to identify the best pre-commitment dates of Nintendo given Sony is imitating.
Pre-commitment and Optimization
In this strategy ﬁrm 1 pre-commits to a launch-timing for its two product generations while ﬁrm
2 optimizes its launch-timings given the launch dates of ﬁrm 1. As before, we set Nintendo the be
the ﬁrm that pre-commits to a certain launch date and Sony to be the ﬁrm that optimizes. We
assume that Nintendo pre-commits to a randomly chosen pair of dates τNin1 and τ
Nin
2 and Sony
sets τSony1 and τ
Sony
2 such that
∑
g max(S
Sony
g (τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 |τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 )) is maximized. In this
strategy we assume Nintendo ignores that Sony will optimize and we do not assume Nintendo
might pre-commit strategically to the best pair of dates. However, it is straightforward to
identify the equilibrium if both ﬁrms are optimizing. Finally, we note that pre-commitment and
perfect foresight are usual assumptions in the literature, for examples see Reinganum (1981)
and Bayus et al. (1997).
Uncertain Launch Dates and Stochastic Optimization
In this strategy ﬁrm 1 selects a pair of launch dates for its two generation products but does not
reveal these dates to ﬁrm 2. However, we assume ﬁrm 2 can derive the best response of ﬁrm 1
given any pair of dates assigned by ﬁrm 2 to its own products. That is, ﬁrm 2 has knowledge on
the reaction function of ﬁrm 1 however ﬁrm 2 does not know which date launch will be picked
for certain by ﬁrm 1. The reaction function is a function that maps any launch-timing of ﬁrm 2
to the best launch-timing of ﬁrm 1. In our application, the best reaction function of Nintendo
f(τSony1 , τ
Sony
2 ) = Ω
(
max
τNin1 ,τ
Nin
2
(
∑
g
SNing (τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 |τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 ))
)
(2.23)
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Ω() returns a pair of dates τNin1 and τ
Nin
2 that maximize the sales of Nintendo given the launch
dates of Sony (τSony1 and τ
Sony
2 ). We further assume that ﬁrm 2 assigns a probability that ﬁrm
1 will launch on dates τ11 and τ
1
2 proportional to the sales achieved by selecting these two dates.
That is,
p(τNin1 , τ
Nin
2 ) =
∑
g max(S
Nin
g (τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 |τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 ))∑
(τNin1 ,τ
Nin
2 )∈f(τ
Sony
1 ,τ
Sony
2 )
∑
g max(S
Nin
g (τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 |τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 ))
(2.24)
Note that τ11 and τ
1
2 should belong to the set of dates given by the reaction function of ﬁrm 1
and that is why they should be contained in the reaction function f(τSony1 , τ
Sony
2 ); otherwise the
strategy is not considered. Given these assumptions the strategy of ﬁrm 2 is to select the pair
of launch dates that maximize its expected sales. The best reaction function of Sony is
f(τNin1 , τ
Nin
2 ) = Ω
(
max
τSony1 ,τ
Sony
2
(
∑
g
SSonyg (τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 |τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 ))
)
(2.25)
and hence Sony selects τSony1 and τ
Sony
2 such that
p(τNin1 , τ
Nin
2 )×
∑
g
max(SSonyg (τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 |τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 ))(τSony1 ,τ
Sony
2 )∈f(τ
Nin
1 ,τ
Nin
2 )
(2.26)
is maximized.
Chapter 3
The Timing and Speed of New
Product Price Landings
Many high-tech products and durable goods exhibit exactly one signiﬁcant price cut some time
after their launch. We call this sudden transition from high to low prices the price landing. In
this chapter we present a new model that describes two important features of price landings:
their timing and their speed.
Prior literature suggests that prices might be driven by sales, product line pricing, competi-
tor’s sales or simply by time. We propose a model using mixture components that identiﬁes
which of these explanations is the most likely trigger of price landings. We deﬁne triggers as
thresholds after which prices are signiﬁcantly cut. In addition, price landings might diﬀer across
products and therefore we model their heterogeneity with a hierarchical structure that depends
mainly on ﬁrm, product type and seasonal eﬀects.
We estimate our model parameters applying Bayesian methodology and we use a rich dataset
containing the sales and prices of 1195 newly released video games (VG’s). In contrast with pre-
vious literature, we ﬁnd that competition and time itself are the main triggers of price landings
while past sales and product line are less likely triggers. Moreover, we ﬁnd substantial hetero-
geneity in the timing and speed of price landing across ﬁrms and product types.
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3.1 Introduction
“Don’t get us wrong – price cuts are a good thing”
Wired.com (2007)
It is well known that prices of new products exhibit one or several important price cuts
during their life-cycle. Nowadays, we are witnessing how many new high-technology products
are introduced at an initial high price and after a certain moment their prices are cut to a
permanent and much lower level. This practice is commonly followed by manufacturers of
products like video games, apparel, PCs, movies, and so on. Moreover, scholars have recognized
and studied this type of pricing strategy. For example, studies like Feng and Gallego (1995) and
Gupta et al. (2006) point that managers at apparel retailers in New York City report the timing
and depth of price cuts are important decision variables and the depth of the price cut in this
industry is typically between 25 and 50%. In this chapter, we will call this sudden transition
from an initially high price to a lower price level the price landing.
We are not aware of any empirical study of price landings. This is quite a surprise because the
timing of a permanent price cut for a new product is without a doubt an important managerial
decision. During the ﬁrst half of 2007 thousands of American customers purchased Apple’s
iPhone and they witnessed a $200 price drop just 66 days after its release. Consumers were
outraged by the sudden price drop and Apple apologized and issued a $100 store credit to
everyone who purchased the iPhone before April 2007. More recently, the forthcoming market
launch of Apple’s iPad has brought attention to the pricing strategy that the Apple Store will
apply to e-books. According to journalists, Apple is pushing the industry to apply “variable
pricing which apparently is triggered by sales volume and not just pricing whim”, see Wired
Magazine (2010). In some instances Apple’s timing of price cuts have been judged too early
if they happened short time before the Christmas season and in other instances the price cuts
have been judged as occurring too late to stimulate further sales or to ﬁght competition. See
BusinessWeek Online (2007) and BusinessWeek Online (2008) for more details on Apple’s story.
In this chapter we present a new model for price landings and the estimation approach
we present is particularly useful to describe the moment and speed at which the price landing
3.2 Literature Review 71
occurs and to simultaneously ﬁnd the triggers of these sudden price transitions. Our work
oﬀers a complement to studies like those of Tellis et al. (2003) and Golder and Tellis (1997)
because we characterize and describe pricing patters of new products while these latter authors
have studied and characterized new products’ sales patterns. On the other hand, our modeling
approach goes further than a description of price patterns because it allows us to ﬁnd what are
the most likely triggers of price landings. We apply our model to the market of video games
and to a rich data set that concerns 1195 newly released video games.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2 we present our literature review. In
Section 3.3 we present our data and market context. Next in Section 3.4 we present our modeling
approach and in Section 3.5 we present our results. We present our conclusions in Section 3.6.
All ﬁgures and tables are presented in Appendix 3.7. We present the estimation approach in
Appendix 3.A.
3.2 Literature Review
In this section we review the studies concerned with the video-game industry in subsection 3.2.1
and next in subsection 3.2.2 we review the literature related to new products pricing.
3.2.1 Research on Video-Games
Three empirical studies closely related to our work are Clements and Ohashi (2005), Nair
(2007) and Chintagunta et al. (2009).
Clements and Ohashi (2005) study the indirect network eﬀects between video game consoles
and video games and the eﬀects of consoles’ prices on their own sales. Their ﬁndings suggest
that price elasticity is low at the beginning and high at the end of the life cycle of video game
consoles. Chintagunta et al. (2009) investigate the eﬀects of software availability and prices
on the sales of video game consoles. They propose an econometric approach that accounts for
the endogeneity of price and sales and they ﬁnd time varying price elasticities. In contrast with
Clements and Ohashi (2005), Chintagunta et al. (2009) ﬁnd some evidence of both declining
and increasing elasticities. Other studies, like Parker (1992) and Simon (1979), report that
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elasticities may show diverse time proﬁles across products, like U or inverted U shapes. See
Parker (1992, Table 4, page 365).
Nair (2007) studies the video-game software market and he proposes a model that takes into
account the interaction between publishers of video-games and two consumer segments formed
by high and low valuation gamers. His ﬁndings suggest that the optimal pricing by publishers
should exhibit declining prices. The price cut rate (that is the slope of the price function) in
Nair (2007) depends on the relative size of each of the consumer segments while the overall and
initial level of the optimal price depends on the utility discounting factor and the interaction of
consumers and ﬁrms.
Our study diﬀers markedly from Clements and Ohashi (2005), Nair (2007) and Chintagunta
et al. (2009) because our objective is to introduce a model that is ﬂexible enough to capture
many diﬀerent and detailed theoretical features of prices that have been documented in the
literature or observed empirically. In this respect, our price model is a generalization based on
previous research. In addition, we oﬀer the ﬁrst empirical study that focuses on price landings
and their triggers, timing and speed.
Finally, the methods of Clements and Ohashi (2005), Chintagunta et al. (2009) and Nair
(2007) are considered structural while our model may be classiﬁed as a reduced form model.
A main advantage of our reduced form is that we do not need assumptions regarding supply
and demand side interactions or consumer behavior. A disadvantage of our approach is that we
can not draw inferences regarding consumer behavior or consumer-ﬁrm interactions and that we
need assumptions on the form of the price equation. However, the assumptions we will use for
the price equation are more ﬂexible than the assumptions of Nair (2007) and Chintagunta et al.
(2009). Nair assumes that consumers form expectations based on an auto-regressive process of
order one while Chintagunta and colleagues assume that prices are stationary. In contrast, we
present a very ﬂexible equation that can capture sudden breaks (non-stationarity) and it allows
us investigate what is triggering these breaks. Hence, we oﬀer novel ﬁndings and we are the ﬁrst
to measure quantitatively empirical features of prices that have not been documented before
in the literature. In addition, our econometric approach is computationally simple. Therefore,
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we can use our method to study relatively large databases of prices. This may be a technical
advantage over structural models that are usually much more computationally demanding.
3.2.2 Research on New Products Pricing
The literature dealing with pricing strategy is extensive and in this section we focus our attention
to a set of empirical and analytical studies concerned mainly with new product prices. We present
the studies we surveyed in Table 3.1.
In Table 3.1, we see that 24 out of 32 studies are analytical while 8 are empirical. Out of
these eight empirical studies only Clements and Ohashi (2005), Chintagunta et al. (2009) and
Nair (2007) were published recently and only the study of Nair (2007) is focused on pricing
policies for new products. To our knowledge, Nair (2007) and our work are the only empirical
studies concerned with price patterns. A likely reason of such lack of empirical studies on prices
is the scarcity of detailed price data.
We draw the following generalizations the literature in Table 3.1: 1. Prices show gradual
or sudden transition from high to low states. Both empirical and theoretical studies have doc-
umented such transitions. 2. Prices show transitions that rarely mimic the S-shape of sales
or that increase over time (8 studies). 3. Prices respond to competition, changes in consumer
valuations across time, consumer heterogeneity, new product releases, learning curves on costs
and market saturation.
The ﬁrst generalization tell us that prices of new products rarely stay constant. We note
that some studies, like Schmalen (1982), Ferguson and Koenigsberg (2007) and Eliashberg
and Jeuland (1986), have shown when it is optimal to keep prices of new products constant. On
the other hand, we could hardly draw a consensus about how fast price transitions should be or
how they look empirically. Some studies explicitly report the optimal price decrease rate, like
in Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (1996), Raman and Chatterjee (1995) and Bayus (1994) while
many other studies give less attention speciﬁcally to the speed of price transitions. Much more
is known about the shape of price transitions. Many studies, like Robinson and Lakhani (1975),
Kalish (1983), Dolan and Jeuland (1981), Bayus (1992), show that the optimal policy is for
prices to decline over time. Other studies show the optimal mark-down (or optimal sudden price
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discount) based on the length of the season, the perishability of the product or drastic seasonal
changes in consumer valuations or demand. See for example Ferguson and Koenigsberg (2007),
Gupta et al. (2006), Rajan et al. (1992) and Feng and Gallego (1995). Finally, diﬀusion
studies, like Rao and Bass (1985), conﬁrm that the declining pattern is an empirical regularity
and recent studies, following Bass et al. (1994), usually incorporate the declining price eﬀect
on diﬀusion.
The literature suggests the generalization that prices should change (in most cases drop) once
an event modiﬁes the market and that these price drops occur in synchrony with the movements
of price drivers. These events are usually related to the drivers listed in the last column of
Table 3.1. In general terms, previous empirical literature suggests that x drives y when x is an
important underlying variable causing the variance in y. In contrast, many analytical studies
integrate trigger variables into their models where x is deﬁned as a trigger of y if it has an eﬀect
on y only after a certain threshold, for example after x > xo becomes true where x > xo might
mean, for example, competitive entry, the end of a season or the limit of market potential. For
example, Feng and Gallego (1995) and Gupta et al. (2006) incorporate thresholds after which
prices should be marked down. We believe there is a disconnect between analytical studies that
allow non-linearities and sudden price breaks and empirical studies that assume in most cases
linear price functions without structural breaks.
The objective of this chapter is to ﬁll the literature gaps between empirical and analytical
studies of new products’ prices. First, our model, together with the econometric approach
we use, will allow us describe the theoretical features of prices based on a large database of
prices. We focus speciﬁcally on the speed and timing of sudden price transitions, what we call
price landings. Second, we test the relative importance of diﬀerent price triggers suggested by
theoretical and empirical studies simultaneously. We test whether saturation, market entry,
time (a products’ age) or the release schedule of ﬁrms trigger the price landing for each of the
1195 products in our data set. In this way, we put to an empirical test the theoretical properties
of prices discussed in analytical studies and we connect both streams of research.
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3.3 Video Game Prices
In this section we ﬁrst describe our data and next we present a brief description of the video
game market.
3.3.1 Data
The database we analyze consists of monthly time series of unit sales and prices for 1195 PlaySta-
tion2 (PS2) video games released between September 1995 and February 2002 in the US. This
data was collected by NPD Group from retailers that account for 65% of the US market. We
used the ﬁrst two years of data for each video game and left out VG’s with less than 12 monthly
observations. This time frame is justiﬁed by the fact that most VG’s stay on store shelves for
less than two years and their sales drop very rapidly to zero afterwards. Binken and Stremer-
sch (2009) use the same data and they assume that a video game is in a so-called dead regime
after its sales drop below 5000 units. Therefore, Binken and Stremersch (2009) do not use any
observation after this cut-oﬀ point which leaves out 32 % of their observations. In our case the
24 month cut-oﬀ point leaves out 38 % of the observations. We compared our results against a
30 and a 36 month cut-oﬀ point that leave out 28 and 20 % of the observations, respectively,
and our results are qualitatively the same. Our ﬁnal sample consists of 1075 video games.
In Figure 3.1 we show the price landing of 50 randomly selected video games. This ﬁgure
clearly shows the great diversity of price patterns but it is easy to see of the common feature
across games: their price drops at a certain moment in time. The introductory prices range
from 40 to approximately 60 USD while their landing level is between 15 and 30 USD. Similarly,
there is great diversity in the timing of price landings. It is easy to notice that some VG’s prices
drop right after the second month while others land around the 10th, 12th or 15th month or
even later. Finally we notice that some prices drop very fast, see the lines almost parallel to the
vertical axis, while in many other cases they land at slower rates and with more noise around
them.
In Figure 3.2 we show the price landing of one of the most popular VG’s, the Spider-Man
game. We plot the price of the Spider-Man game on the vertical axis but in each of the panels we
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use a diﬀerent scale on the horizontal axis. In the upper-left panel we use time on the horizontal
axis, in the upper right panel we use the cumulative sales of Spider-Man and in the lower panel
we use the cumulative number of VG’s launched to the market after the introduction of Spider-
Man. We choose these axes because later we will identify each of these variables as a potential
trigger of price landings. More details on this are given in Section 3.4.3. These graphs of course
show very similar price patterns. That is, we could say that the price cut of the Spider-Man
occurred approximately at the 10th month after its introduction (upper-left panel); or just after
reaching 600 thousand unit sales (upper-right panel); or after 250 VG’s were launched (lower
panel). The price landings in these ﬁgures are similar but the interpretation of the diﬀerent
thresholds is very diﬀerent. In all cases, these thresholds represent an event after which prices
drop, that is the timing of price landings. Finally, if we look closely at the diﬀerent price landing
patterns we discover that the speed of landing varies across these panels. Prices seem to drop
much faster when we use cumulative sales than when we use time on the horizontal axis.
In the analysis that follows we show how we select one of these potential price landing
triggers for each of the products in our sample. Speciﬁcally, in Section 3.4.3 we present how
we use our mixture speciﬁcation and the underlying distributions of price landings to select
among potentially correlated price landing triggers. Developing a joint model for prices, sales
and competitive entry is beyond the scope of this chapter and we consider it as an area for
future research. We explain more details on our modeling approach in Section 3.4 and in this
section we continue with a presentation of the market context of our application.
3.3.2 The Video Game Market
The video game market is highly competitive and there are 78 video game publishers who design
games for PS2. On average, they released 29 new video games per month between 1992 and
2005. The main publisher of these VG’s is Sony and it has a market share of 16%. Acclaim and
Electronic Arts follow Sony with market shares of 11% and 6%, respectively. In the upper left
panel of Figure 3.3 we present the distribution of the market shares across all publishers. We
notice that 20 publishers have about 80% of the market while the 58 remaining publishers cover
the next 20% of the market. In the upper right panel of Figure 3.3 we depict the monthly time
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series of the number of newly released video games. There is an upward trend in the number
of VG’s being released. In 1996 less than 11 VG’s were released per month while in 2002 this
volume has increased to 40 monthly releases.
The bottom left panel of Figure 3.3 shows the industry’s sales pattern. Total VG’s sales
are extremely seasonal and they peak every December when they may reach numbers like 14
million copies. This last number is especially high if we compare it against the 24.1 million
units of PS2 consoles sold between 1995 and 2002. Finally, in the lower right panel we show the
average number of video games released from 1995 to 2002 and the average sales per month.
An interesting fact is that most new VG’s are released during November and January but sales
peak in between these two months. From 1995 to 2002, December VG’s unit sales are on average
14 million and in January sales decrease to less than 3 million copies while on average 18 new
VG’s are released on December, 27 in November and 34 in January. In Figure 3.4 we can see
the distribution of the type of video games sold. For example, sports games account for 21.5 %,
Action 14 % while Strategy games account for 4 % of all VG’s in our data.
The consumers in this market concern 40 million US-based consumers who buy video games
each year. Figure 3.5 shows a histogram of the total sales across all VG’s. Preferences clearly
diﬀer across VG’s as we observe substantial heterogeneity in the market potential across the
video games. We follow the tradition of diﬀusion research by labeling the cumulative sales
reached by a video game as the market potential. From Figure 3.5 we can learn that sales above
one million units for a single game seem to occur only rarely. The average market potential for
the video games in our sample is around 254.75 thousand units. However, approximately for
half of the VG’s in our sample (to be precise: for 504 video games) the market potential is less
than 66 thousand units.
3.4 Price Landing: Modeling
In this section we present our modeling approach. The model and econometric approach we
present allow us measure quantitatively the theoretical features of prices discussed in our lit-
erature review. Speciﬁcally, the equation we propose allows us describe the speed and timing
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of price transitions while we use mixture modeling to test the relative importance of diﬀerent
price landing triggers. Finally, we apply a hierarchical structure to describe the empirical dis-
tributions of the timing and speed of price transitions and at the same time to identify the most
likely price triggers.
Our model consists of two parts. First we present an equation to describe the price landing,
that is the underlying price of product i at time t, which we call P ∗i (t). Next we specify an
equation that relates the pricing landing to the actually observed prices, what we call Pi(t). As
we observe in Figure 3.1, prices follow a general inverse S-shape but they do not follow it very
smoothly and in most cases the prices we observe are noisy. Hence, in the ﬁrst equation we
capture the price landing and its main two features (timing and speed) and in the second we
capture deviations from it. In Section 3.4.1 we present these two equations. Each video-game is
allowed to have its own price landing speed, timing, initial price and landing price parameters.
In Section 3.4.2 we therefore specify how we model this heterogeneity. In Section 3.4.3 we brieﬂy
discuss the mixture speciﬁcation that allows us to identify the trigger of the price landing for
each video game. In Section 3.4.4 we discuss heterogeneity in mixture probabilities. In Section
3.4.5 we present details regarding the co-variates in the hierarchical structure of the model.
3.4.1 Price Landing Model
The price landing of game i is P ∗i (t) and we assume it depends on a trigger denoted by Di(t).
That is, prices change according to
dP ∗i (t)
dDi(t)
=
(P ∗i (t)− κi)(ρi − P
∗
i (t))
(κi − ρi)νi
, (3.1)
where ρi is the starting price level, κi is the ﬁnal pricing level, and νi a constant that moderates
the rate of change dP ∗i (t)/dDi(t). For ease of interpretation, Di(t) might be for example time
and then dP ∗i (t)/dDi(t) = dP
∗
i (t)/dt. Di(t) can be set to be any trigger variable that we are
interested in, like sales or competition. From (3.1) we see that a smaller νi implies a faster
rate of change. Here, the time index t will in each case be relative to the launch date of the
particular product. In other words for each product t = 0 corresponds to the time of launch. In
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the numerator of (1) we have that the closer P ∗i (t) is to its initial or ﬁnal levels, the slower prices
would change and that if P ∗i (t) < ρi, νi > 0, P
∗
i (t) > κi, ρi > κi for all t then dP
∗
i (t)/dDi(t) < 0.
These last conditions describe very closely the price patterns that are common among high-tech
products.
Equation (3.1) may be unusual in the sense that it models dP/dD instead of dD/dP . How-
ever, in our application we will use diﬀerent trigger variables for D and hence dD/dP would
not have the common interpretation we ﬁnd in the literature when D are sales; for example, D
could be competitive introductions. The former is the typical solution proposed by analytical
studies while the latter is the typical form assumed in empirical studies. One of the possible
reasons why empirical studies have assumed this latter form is that many of them focus on a
single ﬁrm, usually a monopolist that sets prices. In contrast, in our study we observe the
dP ∗i (t)
dDi(t)
for hundredths of products launched by 78 ﬁrms that are price setters. Hence, our objective is
to characterize the heterogeneity of
dP ∗i (t)
dDi(t)
across products and to capture two of its features,
the timing (λi) and speed (νi) of signiﬁcant price cuts. In addition, the advantage of equation
(3.1) is that we can solve it analytically and test it empirically. In fact, it can be shown that
(3.1) is a separable diﬀerential equation and that its solution is
P ∗i (t) = κi + (ρi − κi)hi(t), (3.2)
with
hi(t) = 1−
e
“
Di(t)−λi
νi
”
1 + e
“
Di(t)−λi
νi
” . (3.3)
That is, we propose that the price of product i is composed of two parts, a ﬁxed landing price
(κi) plus a mark-up (ρi − κi) that evolves over time proportionally to hi(t). The function hi(t)
gives the percentage of the markup at time t and it is bounded between 0 and 1. The function
(3.3) for hi(t) follows a logistic shape and λi can be interpreted as the location of the price
landing for product i in terms of the trigger Di(t) while νi is the speed at which the landing
occurs. That is, we observe a price drop after Di(t) reaches its threshold λi and this is why we
call Di(t) the trigger variable.
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The advantage of a logistic function for the pricing equation is that we can interpret its
parameters in a natural way in our application. We plot equation (3.1) for Di(t) = t and
diﬀerent values of λi and νi in Figure 3.6. As can be noticed from the graph, the eﬀect of an
increase (decrease) of λi is to shift the complete function to the right (left) and νi has the role of
smoothing the function or steepening the function. That is, νi is a parameter that determines
how fast prices are falling and λi captures the moment (event) when prices are dropping.
In principle, Di(t) can be any variable that increases monotonously. The simplest choice for
Di(t) is simply time (Di(t) = t). It is important to notice that the interpretation of λi and νi
depend on the choice of Di(t). If we set Di(t) to be the cumulative sales of product i then λi
is simply the number of items sold at high prices. We might interpret this limit as a proxy for
the size of the segment that buys at high prices; what some call the hard-core gamer segment.
This is a natural interpretation for λi but we do not claim that this model really identiﬁes who
and how many are the real hard-core gamers. Furthermore, if we deﬁne Di(t) as the number
of products introduced after launch of product i then λi becomes a competitive threshold after
which prices are cut. In all cases νi is a scaling constant that marks the transition speed of prices
as we set in equation (3.1) and it of course depends on the scale of Di(t). Notice that Di(t)
might be a combination of diﬀerent trigger variables. The interpretation of the λi parameters
then becomes troublesome with such speciﬁcation.
As discussed above, P ∗i (t) aims to capture the underlying price pattern of product i, that
we call price landing. For actual data we observe this pattern plus noise. The observed prices
may therefore diﬀer from P ∗i (t). Furthermore, we only observe the prices at regularly spaced
intervals. We adopt the convention that we observe the prices for product i at t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Ti.
We denote the observed price at time t by Pi(t). We model the relation between the observed
prices and price landing pattern using a ﬁrst order auto-regressive speciﬁcation. In terms of the
observed price this gives
Pi(t) = P
∗
i (t) + αi[Pi(t− 1)− P
∗
i (t− 1)] + εi(t) t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , Ti, (3.4)
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where εi(t) denotes the source of the random deviation at time t from the underlying price
landing pattern, and αi determines the memory in the deviations from the underlying pattern.
We assume that εi(t) ∼ N(0, σ
2
i ) for t = 0, 1, . . . , Ti. If αi = 0 there is no memory, and (3.4)
then states that the deviations are independent over time. If αi > 0, a positive deviation at
time t is likely to induce a positive deviation at time t+ 1. For the ﬁrst observation we set
Pi(0) = P
∗
i (0) +
√
1
1− α2
× εi(0). (3.5)
The variance factor is set such that the variance of the random term equals the unconditional
variance of Pi(t) in (3.4).
3.4.2 Heterogeneity in Main Parameters
In the above discussion of the model we have explicitly allowed for heterogeneity, that is, all
parameters and the price cut trigger Di(t) are product-speciﬁc. In this section we discuss how
we model the heterogeneity in all parameters.
In the model we will allow for K diﬀerent triggers, which are denoted by D1i(t), D2i(t),
. . ., DKi(t). The relationship between the observed price and the price landing in (3.2) remains
unchanged. In addition, we deﬁne a diﬀerent price landing equation P ∗ki(t) for each trigger
variable k, that is,
P ∗ki(t) = κi + (ρi − κi)hki(t)
hki(t) = 1−
e
“
Dki(t)−λki
νki
”
1 + e
“
Dki(t)−λki
νki
” .
(3.6)
Note that this deﬁnition is very similar to that in (3.2) and (3.3). However, the parameters λki
and νki are now trigger (k) and product (i) speciﬁc. Note that the price starting and landing
level ρi and κi are the same across all k possible triggers.
The landing level (κi), the initial price level (ρi), the threshold value (λki) and the speed of
adjustment (νki) are deﬁned to vary across products. For each of these parameters we specify a
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second-level model. For the price landing level and the launch prices we specify
κi = Z
′
iγ
κ + ωκi
ρi = Z
′
iγ
ρ + ωρi
with (ωκi , ω
ρ
i ) ∼ N(0,Σ), (3.7)
where Zi denotes a vector of dimension M of product speciﬁc characteristics, γ
κ and γρ are
coeﬃcient vectors (dimension M × 1) common across all i products. The error terms ωκi and
ωρi are assumed to be normal with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ. The Zi in our model will
include mainly product type, manufacturer variables and seasonal dummies. We deﬁne the Zi
variables with more detail in Section 3.4.5. We specify a similar form for the speed and timing
parameters. That is, for each trigger variable k we deﬁne
lnλki = Z
′
iγ
λ
k + η
λ
ki
ln νki = Z
′
iγ
ν
k + η
ν
ki
with (ηλki, η
ν
ki)
′ ∼ N(0,Ωk). (3.8)
where ηλki and η
ν
ki are the error terms and they are assumed to be normal with mean 0 and
covariance matrix Ωk. The γ
λ
k and γ
ν
k are coeﬃcients vectors (dimension M) and Zi are the
same group of group of covariates as in the equations for κi and ρi. The log transformation in
(3.8) is used to ensure that λki and νki are positive. If it is the case that the timing and the
speed of price landings are correlated we will capture this correlation with the matrix Ωk. For
example, it might be that when prices fall at a slower rate (νki ) they are cut at an earlier time
(λki ).
3.4.3 Choice of Trigger and Mixture Speciﬁcation
The actual trigger of the price landing for each product is of course unobserved to the researcher.
We denote this (unobserved) variable as Si, that is, we denote Si = k if the trigger variable k
is selected for product i. We complete this part of the model by specifying probabilities for
each trigger, that is, the trigger k is selected with probability πk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. In our
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application k = 1 would mean that time is the trigger, k = 2 means that cumulative sales are
the trigger and k = 3 means that cumulative competitive introductions are the main trigger of
equation (3.2). In the four-trigger version of our model k = 4 means that the release schedule of
ﬁrms are the main trigger. We provide more details on how we measure each trigger variable in
subsection 3.4.5. The probabilities πk will reﬂect the overall likelihood of each of the diﬀerent
triggers. However, note that conditionally on the observed prices, the probability of Si = k is
diﬀerent across games.
In Figure 3.7 we describe the intuition about how triggers are selected and statistically identi-
ﬁed. For this purpose we need two main elements. The ﬁrst element consists of the distributions
of the threshold parameters for each of the diﬀerent triggers. That is, the distribution of λki
and νki across all i and for each k. For example, if we collect the parameter λ1i for all i we
obtain the distribution of λ for the ﬁrst trigger variable. As we deﬁned in equation (3.8), the
distribution of λki and νki depend on co-variates Zi and hyper-parameters γk and the variance
term associated to them. The second element we need is the match between the price landing
of game i and the distributions of λki and νki for k = 1, . . . ,K.
In Figure 3.7 we plot again the price of the Spider-Man. In addition, we plot a hypothet-
ical distribution of the threshold parameters λki for each of the mixture components k. The
distribution of λ1i in the upper left panel, λ2i in the upper right panel and λ3i in the lower left
panel. Note that λ1i is the time (in months) after which the price drops (if Di(t) is time, that is
when k = 1). In the same way, if Di(t) is cumulative sales then λ2i is the cumulative number of
sales after which the price drops and λ3i is the cumulative number of competitive introductions
after which the price drops when Di(t) amounts to competitive introductions. We notice that
the λˆ1i ≈ 11 months, that λˆ2i ≈ 600 thousand units and that λˆ3i ≈ 250 units. Given the λki
thresholds we can now compare them against the corresponding distributions. In this case we
see that the λˆ2i is the closest to the mode of its corresponding distribution. Hence, the most
likely trigger of the Spider-Man price landing is sales. The least likely trigger is competition
and next is time. Of course, in our model we take into account the distribution of λki and νki
simultaneously when we draw the most likely trigger for each video game in our sample. All
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technical details about trigger selection are given in the Appendix 3.A. Next we describe how
we model heterogeneity in the mixture components.
3.4.4 Heterogeneity in Mixture Probabilities
We suspect that there also might be heterogeneity in the mixture probabilities across games.
For example, the games of some publishers may be more likely to belong to the time mixture.
Hence, as an extension to the model we allow the probabilities of Si = k to depend on a set of
product speciﬁc variables. To model this dependence we specify a Multinomial Probit Model
for Si. Hence, we introduce additional latent variables y
∗
i for i = 1, . . . , N and k = 1, . . . ,K.
These latent variables are related to Si by
Si = k if and only if y
∗
ki = max(y
∗
li
l=1...K
). (3.9)
We specify y∗ki as
y∗ki = Z
′
iδk + ϑik with ϑi ∼ N(0, I), (3.10)
where ϑi = (ϑ1i,ϑ2i,, ..., ϑKi) and we set δ1 = 0 for identiﬁcation. In principle the set of variables
used in this speciﬁcation may diﬀer from that in (6) and (7). The probability that the trigger k
is used for product i now becomes
πki = Pr[y
∗
ki = max(y
∗
li)
l=1...K
]. (3.11)
This concludes our model speciﬁcation. For inference we will rely on MCMC and Bayesian
analysis and treat all product speciﬁc parameters as latent variables and we sample these together
with the parameters in (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8). A complete description of the sampling steps in
this Markov Chain can be found in the Appendix 3.A.
3.4.5 Model Speciﬁcs for Video Games Pricing Model
We consider two versions of our model. The ﬁrst version uses three trigger variables and the
second uses four trigger variables. We deﬁne Dki(t), for k = 1, 2, 3, 4 where D1i(t) = Ai(t) ,
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D2i(t) = Ci(t) and D3i(t) = Ii(t) and D4i(t) = Ri(t) . Ai(t) is deﬁned as the age of a video game
in months, that is, the time between launch and t. Ci(t) is the cumulative sales of video game i
between release date and t. Ii(t) is deﬁned as the cumulative number of video games introduced
between the launch date of video game i and t. Ri(t) is deﬁned as the release schedule of the
ﬁrm that released product i. We know the number of games a ﬁrm released at every point in
time. To create Ri(t), we use a time window that sums the introductions from the introduction
of game i up to the next three months after t.
The interpretation of λki and νki varies depending on the trigger k. Hence, λ1i can be
interpreted as the price landing time, λ2i as a competitive threshold, λ3i as the hard-core gamer
segment size and λ4i as a release limit after which we observe a price drop. For each of these
triggers, the parameter νki for k = 1, 2, 3, 4 can be interpreted as a scaling constant that changes
the speed at which the price landing occurs.
In all what follows in this section we focus on the model with three triggers, that is k = 1, 2, 3
and we leave out Ri(t). The reason for this is that Ri(t) is selected with a probability very close
to zero when we include it as the fourth trigger variable. We present the discussion regarding
the fourth trigger in our results in section 3.5.2.
The hierarchical structure of the corresponding threshold λki, speed νki and ρi and κi pa-
rameters for each mixture component will depend on a set of Zi variables that contain game
type, publisher and seasonal eﬀects plus the launch price and the time to the introduction of
a new game consoles as co-variates. Seasonal dummies are deﬁned by the month of launch of
each video game i. The launch price is the observed price of video game i at launch time, that
is at t = 0. We include this variable in order to test if our co-variates remain signiﬁcant after
including past prices in the equation for the timing and speed of launch. It might be that the
price at launch of a VG might contain information regarding the timing of the price landing and
its speed. In addition, we believe it is reasonable to include the launch price because of the very
likely uni-directional relationship between launch price and timing of price landing. That is, it
is very hard to argue that a ﬁrm decides how to price a VG’s based on its decision on when to
permanently cut its price; on the other hand, it might be that ﬁrms decide to cut prices based
on the launch price. For example, ﬁrms might cut the price of expensive games after longer time
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than the time they wait to cut the price of cheaper VG’s. Moreover, the launch price is a proxy
for quality and hence we test if our covariates remain signiﬁcant after we control for them.
The time to console launch measures the time (in months) between a video game release
and the launch of the VG’s console that is being released after the video game introduction. For
example, the PlayStation2 with DS controllers was introduced in June 1998 and other versions
of the PS2 console were released in February 1999 and January 2002. This means that a video
game released in January 1998 will face a console introduction after 6 months; a video game
released in January 1997 will face a release in 18 months, and so on. For each video game we
calculate the time between its release and the forthcoming console at the video game release
date. We include this variable to test whether the price landing pattern varies relative to the
release date of video game consoles. Our results do not signiﬁcantly change if we leave both
time to console launch and launch price out of the Zi covariates.
From the seasonal ﬁxed eﬀects we excluded January, from the game types we excluded
Adventure games. The remaining game type categories are: Action, Arcade, Children, Driving,
Family, Fighting, Role playing, Shooter, Sports, Strategy and Compilations. The remaining
publisher dummies are Electronic Arts, Acclaim, Infogames, Konami, Activision, Midway, Eidos
Interactive, THQ, Capcom, Namco, Agetec, Interplay, Hasbro, 2nd group, 3rd group and 4th
group. The 2nd group is composed by six publishers that each have at least 1% market share,
the 3nd group is composed by 14 publishers that account for the next 10% market share and
the 4th group is composed by 43 publishers that account for less than 1% of the market share
in total. In all our tables we sorted publishers by their market share and in descending order.
The main publishers (EA, Acclaim, etc.) account for 80% of the VG’s in our sample while the
dummies for 2nd, 3rd and 4th publishers group the next 20% of the market share. We set Sony
as the reference publisher.
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3.5 Results
In this section we present our results in three subsections. In the ﬁrst we present results regarding
the heterogeneity of the parameters. Next we present the results regarding trigger selection and
ﬁnally we discuss the model performance.
3.5.1 Heterogeneity of Landing Time and Speed
Our results indicate that there indeed exists heterogeneity in the model parameters. The ﬁrst
contribution we have to oﬀer is that we ﬁnd signiﬁcant ﬁrm eﬀects on both the timing and speed
parameters across all mixtures. That is, ﬁrms might be deciding not only on when to cut the
price but also on how fast to cut it. To our knowledge, this result is new and we are the ﬁrst
to show it empirically. In Table 3.2 and in Table 3.3 we can see the diﬀerent ﬁrm eﬀects across
mixtures and model parameters. For example, Acclaim’s landing time (λi) coeﬃcient in the time
mixture is −0.196 and this means that VG’s of Acclaim face a price drop 17.8% earlier relative
to Sony. In addition, we ﬁnd several of the ﬁrm eﬀects on the landing speed (νi) to be signiﬁcant.
For example, Electronic Arts has a ν that is 91.7 % higher than Sony while Agetec has a slower
landing speed with a ν parameter that is 3.81 times higher than Sony. An interesting feature of
the time mixture parameters is that most of the ﬁrm eﬀects log(λ1i) are negative while the ﬁrm
eﬀects for the log(ν1i) are positive. That is, it seems that the video game prices of most ﬁrms
are cut at earlier dates than Sony but most ﬁrms cut prices at slower speed relative to Sony.
In the last four columns of Table 3.3 we report the results for the hierarchical speciﬁcation of
the initial and landing price levels, (3.7). In both cases we observe very important ﬁrm eﬀects.
For example, Konami sets the landing prices 2.535 USD above the landing prices of Sony, 17.34
USD, while the launch prices of Konami are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than those of Sony that
start at 40.49.
We give a histogram of the posterior mean of the game-speciﬁc parameters of the three-
mixture model in Figure 3.8, Figure 3.9 and for the auto-regressive term of equation (3.4) in
Figure 3.10. The dispersion in the timing and speed parameters is reported in Figure 3.9. We
can see that each mixture has quite diﬀerent thresholds and speeds. For example, the time
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mixture mean is around 7 months. That is, ﬁrms cut VG’s prices mainly in the 7th month after
their release. The timing parameters for all mixtures are graphed in the left frames while in the
right frames we present the speed parameter distribution. We note that if the speed parameter
νi is close to zero then prices fall more steeply. From the histograms in the right panels of
Figure 3.9 we see that several products face sharp price cuts. In addition, in Figure 3.8 we see
the distribution of the starting price level ρi for all i in the left frame and the distribution of
the κi in the right frame. These parameters show that the starting level might be as low as 20
USD and as high as 70 USD while the landing level is as low as 5 USD and as high as 35 USD.
In summary we ﬁnd that ﬁrm eﬀects are important to describe the price landing timing and
to describe its speed, the launch and the landing prices of the VG’s in our sample. Seasonality
is more important for the starting and landing levels of prices and less so for the price landing
timing and speed. We also ﬁnd that for some mixtures the eﬀect of the launch price and the
time to launch a new console are signiﬁcant for some of the main parameters.
3.5.2 Triggers of Price Landings
Our second contribution is that we ﬁnd that the triggers that best describe price landings
are competitive introductions and time and not cumulative sales. In Figure 3.11 we report a
histogram of the posterior probability of each of the triggers across all games in the three-mixture
version of our model.
The academic convention is that sales should be an important price driver. In contrast,
we ﬁnd that the sales indicator is the least likely trigger variable of price landings and it is
useful to explain only a 12% of the video-games in our sample. Note that we do not go against
the academic convention that posits that sales are a price driver. Our results only indicate
that sales are not the main price landing trigger. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the competition
indicator, measured by competitive VG’s introductions, is the likely trigger of price landings of
approximately 25.7% of the VGs in our sample. The study of Nair (2007) ﬁnds no evidence of
important substitution patterns between video-games and hence he suggests that competition,
at the game-speciﬁc level, is not important to explain video-game prices. Our model cannot
provide insights regarding the individual level competition between diﬀerent video-games but
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we ﬁnd that competition, measured as the cummulative sum of VG’s introductions, is a likely
trigger of price landings. Finally, we ﬁnd that the most likely trigger is time itself or in other
words, the most probable trigger is simply the age of a video-game. The time mixture has a
posterior mean probability of 62.21%.
In the fourth-mixture version of our model we tested a fourth trigger without much success.
The additional mixture included the release schedule of ﬁrms as trigger. The idea was to test
whether ﬁrms release schedule could have a large probability relative to the other three trigger
variables. Firms usually have information on the dates that their new VG’s are to be released
and therefore the prices of their previously released VG’s could depend on the dates of these new
introductions. Our data include the number of games each ﬁrm released at every point in time
and therefore we also know the number of games each ﬁrm will release after each point in time.
Hence, we sum the VG’s introductions before time t up to the introductions in the next three
months after t and this sum is the value of Di(t). Note that Di(t) is then the release schedule of
the manufacturer of the video game i at time t. We decided to use a three-months time window
because most online sources of VG’s releases cover, as a maximum, the upcoming three months.
Of course, in our database we just know the release schedule perfectly. However, our results
indicate that the probability of this latter trigger mixture is on average very close zero. Our
conclusion is that price landings are better described by the entire market introductions rather
than the release schedule of any single ﬁrm. This makes some sense given that the 78 VG’s ﬁrms
in our sample face on average 29 releases per month. Consequently, ﬁrms might be more likely
to monitor all market introductions rather than their own product introductions.
3.5.3 Model with Hierarchical Speciﬁcation in the Mixture Prob-
abilities
We estimate the same speciﬁcation of our model but now we add a hierarchical speciﬁcation in
the mixture probabilities. In this section we discuss the estimates of this hierarchical speciﬁcation
and in the Appendix 3.A we provide its technical details.
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The estimates of the parameters in the hierarchical structure of the mixture probabilities
are reported in Table 3.4. In contrast with the heterogeneity in the main parameters we do
not ﬁnd substantial heterogeneity in the mixture probabilities. For example, we ﬁnd only three
signiﬁcant publisher eﬀects (Konami, Activision, Midway) in the latent utility of sales and two
signiﬁcant publisher eﬀects (Capcom and Interplay) in the latent utility of the time mixture.
That is, we know that there is heterogeneity in the timing and speed of price landings but we
do not know why a trigger is more likely than the others. We consider this an area for further
research.
3.5.4 Model Performance
We compare the out-of-sample performance of our model against two models: A naive model
for prices, that is an AR(1), and against an alternative version of our model. In this alternative
model we use the same speciﬁcation and parameters and the same number of mixtures as our
model but we replace all triggers with time. That is, Di(t) = time for all k mixture components.
We randomly selected 50 video-games and used their ﬁrst six observations to forecast their
complete series. That is, only the ﬁrst six observations of these 50 games were used for parameter
estimation while we continue to use all observations for all other games. These comparisons are
reported in Table 3.5 and in Table 3.6.
Our model preforms extremely well when compared against the AR(1) model and reasonably
well when compared against the restricted model. In Table 3.5 we see that our model forecasts
prices better than a naive AR(1) model for 40 out of the 50 randomly chosen games. We report
the root mean square forecast error and the log of the predictive density for all 50 VG’s. More
details on how we compute the predictive density are given in the Appendix 3.A. Moreover, our
model performs better than the model with three time mixtures for 19 out of the same 50 games
and in 18 other cases it performs equally well as the alternative speciﬁcation. In total 37 out
of 50 games our speciﬁcation performs at least as well as the alternative or better. This means
that there is information contained in past sales and the competition mixtures that increase our
model ﬁt.
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The AR(1) model does not capture the timing of signiﬁcant price cuts and the speed at
which the price cut occurs while our model captures these signiﬁcant price cuts. Nonetheless,
the assumption that prices follow an AR(1) pattern is common in previous marketing literature
and our evidence suggests that this model performs poorly. The main reason is that new
products face signiﬁcant price cuts during their life-cycle and hence the AR(1) is not a suitable
speciﬁcation for such price patterns. At the moment and to our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to
propose an empirical model that captures these price dynamics.
The results we presented in the previous sections are robust to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
For example, we estimated the model without the hierarchical speciﬁcations of all its parameters
and the price landing timing and speed parameters stay about the same. Furthermore, we
estimated the model without the auto-regressive structure in (3.4) and (3.5), and again the main
parameters are estimated similarly. A reason why our results stay the same is that the pricing
equation in (3.2) can accommodate many diﬀerent pricing patterns with only four parameters
and that we let these parameters to be product-speciﬁc. These four parameters are the initial
and landing price levels, ρi and κi, and the timing and speed of price landings, the λi and νi.
3.6 Conclusions
Our aim with this chapter was to model the dynamics of new product price landing patterns.
Price landings usually follow the inverse of the well known S-shape of sales. Nonetheless, we
found no empirical studies dealing with these regularities of new product prices.
In this chapter we were concerned with products that face one signiﬁcant price cut during
their life cycle. Several online price trackers report similar dynamics to a wider range of products
like mobile phones, cameras, storage media, books, etc. Our data was collected by NPD Group
but several websites like www.pricescan.com or www.streetprices.com let their users plot price
trends and indeed it is relatively easy to ﬁnd many other products facing a single and signiﬁcant
price drop during their lifetime. We believe that knowing when a price is cut or when to
signiﬁcantly cut the price of a product permanently is an exciting area of further research and
one with wide managerial implications across diﬀerent industries.
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In this chapter we provided evidence that there is heterogeneity both in the timing and speed
of price landings. We found that most of this heterogeneity is driven by ﬁrm eﬀects. Our model
captures this heterogeneity and it is ﬂexible and useful to forecast and describe the price landing
patterns in our data. Finally, we found that it is the age of a video game that is triggering the
price landings. The next most likely trigger is competition and the least likely is cumulative
sales. This latter ﬁnding goes against the academic convention that sales are the main driver
of prices. At least for our application we found convincing evidence that sales are not the most
likely trigger of signiﬁcant price cuts.
3.7 Figures and Tables 93
3.7 Figures and Tables
   







			



Figure 3.1: Price Landing Pattern for 50 Randomly Selected Games
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Figure 3.2: Typical Price Landing Pattern
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Figure 3.3: The Video Games Market
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Figure 3.4: What do publishers sell?
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Figure 3.5: Total Sales Distribution
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Figure 3.6: Main Pricing Function at Diﬀerent Parameter Values
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Figure 3.7: Identiﬁcation of Triggers
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Figure 3.8: Histogram of the Posterior Mean of Starting (ρi) and Landing Price (κi)
Parameters
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Figure 3.9: Histogram of the Posterior Mean of the Threshold (λki ) and Speed (ν
k
i ) Pa-
rameters
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Figure 3.10: Histogram of the Posterior Mean of the αi Parameters
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Figure 3.11: Histogram of the Posterior Mean of Price Triggers P (Si = k)
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Latent
Utility
of Sales
Mixture
Latent
Utility
of Time
Mixture
Intercept 3.727*** (0.579) 0.549 (0.445)
Game Type
Action 0.699* (0.360) 0.260 (0.269)
Arcade -0.032 (0.543) 0.404 (0.451)
Children 0.481 (0.479) 0.005 (0.456)
Driving 0.708* (0.402) 0.288 (0.278)
Family -0.100 (0.451) -0.577* (0.333)
Fighting 1.153*** (0.427) 0.357 (0.372)
Role playing -0.304 (0.552) -0.146 (0.355)
Shooter 0.809 (0.567) 0.716** (0.297)
Sports -0.010 (0.372) 0.057 (0.252)
Strategy 0.342 (0.613) -0.055 (0.362)
Compilations 0.930* (0.530) -0.258 (0.438)
Publisher
Electronic Arts -0.689 (0.514) -0.137 (0.239)
Acclaim -0.723 (0.583) -0.365 (0.284)
Infogames 0.723 (0.456) -0.332 (0.360)
Konami 1.110** (0.469) 0.068 (0.343)
Activision 1.060** (0.450) 0.356 (0.325)
Midway 0.884* (0.454) -0.119 (0.384)
Eidos Interactive 0.002 (0.668) 0.265 (0.365)
THQ -0.287 (0.531) -0.017 (0.459)
Capcom -0.355 (0.451) -0.821** (0.357)
Namco -0.043 (0.649) -0.503 (0.426)
Agetec 0.592 (0.558) 0.592 (0.512)
Interplay 0.648 (0.626) 0.800* (0.430)
Hasbro -0.364 (0.512) 0.303 (0.380)
2nd Publishers 0.203 (0.427) 0.387 (0.305)
3rd Publishers 0.324 (0.402) -0.025 (0.272)
4th Publishers 0.510 (0.374) 0.164 (0.301)
Season
Feb 0.159 (0.467) -0.026 (0.361)
Mar 0.002 (0.454) 0.441 (0.297)
Apr 0.448 (0.575) 0.296 (0.431)
May -0.309 (0.499) -0.361 (0.344)
Jun 0.067 (0.533) 0.709** (0.381)
Jul 0.149 (0.547) 0.007 (0.417)
Aug -0.197 (0.479) 0.355 (0.367)
Sep 0.008 (0.373) -0.214 (0.259)
Oct 0.156 (0.410) 0.285 (0.293)
Nov 0.070 (0.357) 0.069 (0.243)
Dec 0.666 (0.418) 0.329 (0.307)
Launch Info
Launch Price -0.162*** (0.013) 0.004 (0.007)
Time to Launch 0.010 (0.015) -0.012 (0.008)
Notes: Posterior standard deviation in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate zero
is not contained in the 90, 95, and 99% highest posterior density region.
Table 3.4: Results of Hierarchical Structure for Mixture Probabilities
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Game Title
Forecasted
Months
St. Dev.
Price
Forecast
RMSE
Forecast
RMSE
AR(1)
Log of
Pre-
dicted
Density
Log Like-
lihood of
predicted
AR (1)
NHL 2001 10 0.18 0.17 0.15 -0.89* -3.47
JJ’S VR FOOTBALL 98 8 2.39 1.76* 5.19 -5.06* -6.79
HIGH HEAT BSBALL 2002 18 7.14 2.18* 11.92 -10.25* -142.23
MADDEN NFL 98 12 4.56 2.55* 5.03 -11.05* -27.81
MR DOMINO 18 8.33 3.10* 12.34 -17.22* -188.45
THE CROW CITY ANGELS 18 14.53 3.24* 26.27 -12.15* -369.19
PITBALL 18 13.49 3.72* 27.92 -12.50* -264.59
FROGGER 2 18 10.48 3.86* 22.53 -12.30* -2421.81
BIG OL’ BASS 2 18 14.45 3.92* 22.63 -15.22* -485.79
MK & ASHLEY WINNER’S 18 11.88 4.11* 17.46 -11.90* -493.25
CIVILIZATION 2 18 9.73 4.25* 12.52 -8.94* -1009.23
PONG 18 11.43 4.37* 20.81 -14.54* -646.32
ROGUE TRIP 14 1.80 4.38 1.90 -16.24 -0.58
RESIDENT EVIL 3:NEMES 18 10.16 4.70* 10.34 -15.91* -71.64
ETERNAL EYES 18 8.31 4.92* 9.45 -24.18* -82.53
TEKKEN 2 18 7.39 5.13* 8.54 -15.13* -85.26
TEST DRIVE 4 18 11.50 5.39* 28.29 -12.53* -511.42
F1 WRLD GRAND PRIX 00 18 7.11 5.63* 7.52 -29.76* -50.37
FADE TO BLACK 18 9.09 5.88* 8.58 -21.99* -38.53
SHEEP RAIDER 18 9.35 6.03* 11.20 -81.57* -112.25
G POLICE2:WPN JUSTICE 9 10.79 6.04* 24.87 -8.60* -386.84
RISK 10 9.50 6.55* 12.39 -13.02* -267.31
SYNDICATE WARS 18 8.93 6.66* 12.83 -16.71* -55.53
JUGGERNAUT 18 9.33 6.71* 16.33 -51.62* -60.97
KISS PINBALL 10 8.47 6.73* 13.79 -11.21* -128.41
BACKYARD SOCCER 18 16.59 6.74* 23.35 -24.94* -652.10
OLYMPIC SUMMER GAMES 18 8.57 7.02* 12.52 -16.79* -38.77
NECTARIS:MILITARY MAD 18 13.34 7.06* 19.63 -16.75* -292.34
T.CLANCYS ROGUE SPEAR 18 5.38 7.88 4.54 -21.11 -16.62
TOCA 2 CAR CHALLENGE 18 13.75 7.97* 13.93 -23.36* -177.86
NFL XTREME 2 18 14.35 8.27* 24.53 -20.69* -467.21
ARENA FOOTBALL 17 3.40 8.35 4.08 -14.76* -23.53
FINAL FANTASY IX 13 6.23 8.43* 12.81 -10.78* -32.38
SHEEP 18 3.47 8.83 3.54 -22.08 -4.11
SIMPSON’S WRESTLING 12 8.66 8.87* 12.12 -16.69* -31.70
POCKET FIGHTER 18 10.51 9.02* 17.25 -17.09* -169.35
POWERBOAT RACING 18 10.50 9.19* 24.08 -14.13* -466.81
GRAND SLAM 97 18 11.09 9.53* 11.69 -24.66* -121.27
RAMPAGE WORLD TOUR 6 2.88 9.67 4.58 -1245.7 -6.05
EAGLE ONE: HARRIER 13 11.43 10.5* 13.02 -50.33* -847.83
STRIKER PRO 2000 9 10.66 10.6* 20.87 -10.52* -139.91
NEWMAN/HAAS RACING 16 3.88 11.31 4.63 -38.44 -4.55
DISCWRLD 2:MRTLY BYTE 18 6.31 11.42 5.95 -87.15* -41.79
CROSSROAD CRISIS 18 9.77 12.4* 15.33 -93.93* -458.48
SLAM N JAM 96 18 10.23 13.3* 19.53 -18.82* -280.41
NBA LIVE 2002 18 9.23 14.4* 21.76 -80.22* -466.39
ARMD COR 2 PRJ PNTSMA 15 8.71 15.0* 16.21 -11.77* -263.19
CRASH TEAM RACING 18 15.92 15.8* 17.91 -342.07 -117.05
DISNEY’S DINOSAUR 18 5.00 16.35 5.68 -27.82 -15.57
NFL BLITZ 2000 18 5.63 17.57 6.41 -30.46* -130.64
Notes: * Means the RMSE or the predictive likelihood is smaller in our model than in the AR(1)
Table 3.5: Forecasting Performance
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Log of Predictive Log of Predicted
Forecast St.Dev. Density (LPD) Density (LDP)
Game Title Horizon Pricea Original Model Alt. Model
NHL 2001 10 0.18 -0.89 * -0.90
JJ’S VR FOOTBALL 98 8 2.39 -5.06 * -4.89
HIGH HEAT BSBALL 2002 18 7.14 -10.25 * -9.92
MADDEN NFL 98 12 4.56 -11.05 * -11.12
MR DOMINO 18 8.33 -17.22 -15.86
THE CROW CITY ANGELS 18 14.53 -12.15 * -11.29
PITBALL 18 13.49 -12.50 * -12.06
FROGGER 2 18 10.48 -12.30 * -12.51
BIG OL’ BASS 2 18 14.45 -15.22 ** -16.29
MK & ASHLEY WINNER’S 18 11.88 -11.90 * -12.11
CIVILIZATION 2 18 9.73 -8.94 ** -11.36
PONG 18 11.43 -14.54 -13.10
ROGUE TRIP 14 1.80 -16.24 ** -30.14
RESIDENT EVIL 3:NEMES 18 10.16 -15.91 ** -17.48
ETERNAL EYES 18 8.31 -24.18 ** -25.35
TEKKEN 2 18 7.39 -15.13 ** -16.17
TEST DRIVE 4 18 11.50 -12.53 * -12.40
F1 WRLD GRAND PRIX 00 18 7.11 -29.76 -26.22
FADE TO BLACK 18 9.09 -21.99 ** -23.64
SHEEP RAIDER 18 9.35 -81.57 ** -121.60
G POLICE2:WPN JUSTICE 9 10.79 -8.60 * -8.56
RISK 10 9.50 -13.02 ** -33.94
SYNDICATE WARS 18 8.93 -16.71 -13.63
JUGGERNAUT 18 9.33 -51.62 ** -98.83
KISS PINBALL 10 8.47 -11.21 * -11.05
BACKYARD SOCCER 18 16.59 -24.94 -21.56
OLYMPIC SUMMER GAMES 18 8.57 -16.79 -14.71
NECTARIS:MILITARY MAD 18 13.34 -16.75 * -16.17
T.CLANCYS ROGUE SPEAR 18 5.38 -21.11 ** -22.90
TOCA 2 CAR CHALLENGE 18 13.75 -23.36 ** -26.08
NFL XTREME 2 18 14.35 -20.69 -17.40
ARENA FOOTBALL 17 3.40 -14.76 * -14.56
FINAL FANTASY IX 13 6.23 -10.78 -9.54
SHEEP 18 3.47 -22.08 ** -23.30
SIMPSON’S WRESTLING 12 8.66 -16.69 * -16.84
POCKET FIGHTER 18 10.51 -17.09 * -16.58
POWERBOAT RACING 18 10.50 -14.13 * -14.76
GRAND SLAM 97 18 11.09 -24.66 * -23.81
RAMPAGE WORLD TOUR 6 2.88 -1245.7 ** -2072.64
EAGLE ONE: HARRIER 13 11.43 -50.32 ** -77.20
STRIKER PRO 2000 9 10.66 -10.52 * -11.26
NEWMAN/HAAS RACING 16 3.88 -38.44 ** -54.93
DISCWRLD 2:MRTLY BYTE 18 6.31 -87.15 -38.19
CROSSROAD CRISIS 18 9.77 -93.93 -34.08
SLAM N JAM 96 18 10.23 -18.82 -15.18
NBA LIVE 2002 18 9.23 -80.22 ** -82.06
ARMD COR 2 PRJ PNTSMA 15 8.71 -11.77 ** -14.41
CRASH TEAM RACING 18 15.92 -342.07 ** -397.18
DISNEY’S DINOSAUR 18 5.00 -27.82 -18.46
NFL BLITZ 2000 18 5.63 -30.46 ** -34.48
Notes:** means that the Original Model LPD is greater than the Alternative LPD by more than
1 unit, * means that the diﬀerence between the original and alternative are less than 1 unit.
Alt. stand for Alternative and St.Dev for Standard Deviation.
Table 3.6: Comparison with Alternative Model
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3.A Estimation Methodology
To draw inference on the parameters we will rely on a Bayesian analysis and more speciﬁcally
the Gibbs sampler. Whenever possible we use Gibbs sampling with block updating and when
there are no closed form sampling distributions we rely on the Metropolis algorithm. We run a
Markov Chain for 200 thousand iterations of which the ﬁrst 100 thousand are discarded for burn-
in and we keep each tenth remaining draws. This Markov Chain has the posterior distribution
of the parameters and the latent trigger variable indicators Si i = 1, . . . , N as the stationary
distribution. We programmed all our routines in Ox (see Doornik (2007)) and our graphs in R
(see R Development Core Team (2005)).
In all what follows we collect the ﬁrst level model parameters in the blocks: τi = (ρi,κi,αi,
σi,λk,νk), ρ = (ρ1, ..., ρN ), κ = (κ1, ..., κN ), α = (α1, ..., αN ), σ
2 = (σ21 , ..., σ
2
N ), λk = (ln(λki), .
..,ln(λkN )) and ﬁnally νk = (ln(νik), ..., ln(νNk)).
We further collect all hyper-parameters in the following blocks: θ = (γP , γL,Π,Ω), where
Ω = (Ω1, ...,ΩK), Π = (π1, ..., πK). We have that γ
P = (γκ, γρ) where γκ = (γκ1 , ..., γ
κ
M ) and
γρ = (γρ1 , ..., γ
ρ
M ). Finally, γ
L = (γL1 , . . . , γ
L
K) where γ
L
k = (γ
λ
k , γ
ν
k ) and γ
λ
k = (γ
λ
k1, ..., γ
λ
kM )
and γνk = (γ
ν
k1, ..., γ
ν
kM ). M refers to the number of variables in Z, K refers to the number of
mixtures (same as number of triggers), and N refers to the total number of products. Next
Z=(Z1, ..., ZM ) and φ(x;μ, σ
2) denotes the normal pdf distribution with mean μ and variance
σ2 evaluated at x. Finally, p() denotes a general density function and IW (Ω̂, N) denotes the
inverted Whishart distribution with scale matrix Ω̂ and N degrees of freedom.
Note that in this context we treat the product speciﬁc parameters τi as latent variables.
We consider the log of λki and νki k = 1, ...K, i = 1, . . . , N as focal parameters strictly for
convenience and to impose that λki and νki are positive. This has no impact on the results. In
this Markov Chain we will sample the latent variables alongside the parameters.
The complete data likelihood for product i is
p(Pi, Si, τi|θ) = πSi × p(Pi|Si, τi, θ)× p(τi|θ), (3.12)
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where Pi = (Pi(0), ..., Pi(T )) and p(Pi|Si, τi, θ) is equal to
p(Pi(0)|Si, τi, θ)×
t=T∏
t=1
p(Pi(t)|Pi(t− 1), Si, τi, θ). (3.13)
Furthermore, we have that the ﬁrst observation likelihood is
p(Pi(0)|Si, τi, θ) = φ
(
Pi(0);P
∗
i (0),
1
1− α2
σ2i
)
, (3.14)
and all other observations have as likelihood
p(Pi(t)|Pi(t− 1), Si, τi, θ) = φ
(
Pi(t);P
∗
i (t) + αi[Pi(t− 1)− P
∗
i (t− 1)], σ
2
i
)
. (3.15)
Next, we have
p(τi|θ) = p(ρi, κi|θ)
K∏
k=1
p(λki, νki|θ), (3.16)
where
p ((ρi, κi)|θ) = φ
(
(ρi, κi)
′; γP ′Zi,Σ
)
, (3.17)
and
p ((λki, νki)|θ) = φ
(
(λki, νki)
′; γL′k Zi,Ωk
)
. (3.18)
We impose ﬂat priors on all almost all parameters, for αi we set a uniform prior on the
interval (-1,1) to impose stationarity. This completes the main model speciﬁcation and next we
discuss how we sample from the posterior distribution for all parameters.
Sampling distributions
If πk is ﬁxed across products, the density of Si conditional on Pi, τi, and θ equals a Multinomial
distribution with probabilities proportional to
πSi × p(Pi|Si, τi, θ). (3.19)
112 The Timing and Speed of New Product Price Landings
The full conditional distribution for αi is a truncated normal on the interval [-1,1], where the
mean and variance are given by applying the Ordinary Least Squares formulas to a regression
of Pi(t)-P
∗
i (t) on its lag with known variance of the disturbance term σ
2
i . A draw for σ
2
i can be
obtained using the Metropolis-Hastings sampler and taking as candidate
σ2icand =
T∑
t=1
(εˆi(t))
2
w
where w ∼ χ2(T−1), (3.20)
where εˆi(t) is the residual of equation (3.4) given all other parameters. We evaluate this candi-
date and the current draw of σ2i in the conditional distribution of the ﬁrst observation given in
equation (3.14). Hence we take the candidate as the next drawn value of σ2i with probability
min
⎛⎝1, φ
(
Pi(0);P
∗
i (0),
1
1−α2
σ2icand
)
φ
(
Pi(0);P ∗i (0),
1
1−α2
σ2icurrent
)
⎞⎠ . (3.21)
To derive the full conditional distribution of κi and ρi we ﬁrst rewrite equations (3.4) and
(3.5) as √
1− α2iPi(0) = [
√
1− α2i hSi(0)] × κi + [
√
1− α2i hSi(0)]× ρi + εi(0), (3.22)
and
Pi(t)− αiPi(t− 1) = [1− hSi(t)− αi(1− hSi(t))] × κi + [hSi(t)− αihSi(t)]× ρi + εi(t). (3.23)
These equations should be combined with the speciﬁcation of the hierarchical layer in (3.7) as
follows: ⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Yi
γρ
′
Zi
γκ
′
Zi
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
XAi X
B
i
1 0
0 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎝ ρi
κi
⎞⎟⎠+
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
εi
ωρ
ωκ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (3.24)
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where we deﬁne XAi and X
B
i as
XAi =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
√
1− α2i (1− hSi(0))
1− hSi(1)− αi(1− hSi(1))
...
1− hSi(Ti)− αi(1− hSi(Ti))
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ and
XBi =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
√
1− α2i hSi(0)
hSi(1) − αihSi(1)
...
hSi(Ti)− αihSi(Ti)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (3.25)
and Yi as
Yi =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
√
1− α2iPi(0)
Pi(1)− Pi(0)
...
Pi(T )− Pi(T − 1)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (3.26)
Finally, we can draw κi and ρi from
N
(
(W ′iΓ
−1
i Wi)
−1W ′iΓ
−1
i Yi, (W
′
iΓ
−1Wi)
−1
)
, (3.27)
where
Wi =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
XAi X
B
i
1 0
0 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ and E
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(
εi ω
ρ ωκ
)⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
εi
ωρ
ωκ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎝ σ2i I 0
0 Σ
⎞⎟⎠ = Γi. (3.28)
Due to the non-linearity in the price patterns, the conditional distributions of λk and νk
are not of a known form. We will sample each parameter one at a time using a random walk
Metropolis Hastings sampler. Given the current draw of one of these parameters we draw a
candidate by adding a draw from a normal with mean zero and a ﬁxed variance. This candidate
draw for λk and νk is accepted with probability
min
(
1,
p(λcandki |νki)
p(λcurrentki |νki)
)
and min
(
1,
p(νcandki |λki)
p(νcurrentki |λki)
)
, (3.29)
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respectively. The posterior of the i′th element of λk is
p(λki|νki) = p(Pi(0)|Si, τi, θ)
t=T∏
t=1
p(Pi(t)|Pi(t− 1)Si, τi, θ)φ
(
λki;λki|νki,Ω
λki|νki
k
)
, (3.30)
and the posterior of the i′th element of νk is
p(νki|λki) = p(Pi(0)|Si, τi, θ)
t=T∏
t=1
p(Pi(t)|Pi(t− 1)Si, τi, θ)φ
(
νki; νki|λki,Ω
νki|λki
k
)
. (3.31)
Here x|y refers to the conditional mean of x given y and σx|y refers to the conditional variance
of x given y. These are conditional posterior distributions because we allow λk and νk to be
correlated to each other. In other words, the timing of the price cut and the speed of the price
cut might be correlated and these correlation is diﬀerent across mixtures. The variance of the
proposal density is chosen such that we obtain an acceptance rate close to approximately 25%,
that is the optimal rate for high-dimensional models (see Robert and Casella (2004, page 316),
Carlin and Louis (2000, page 154) or Gamerman and Lopes (2006, page 196)).
The conditional distribution of π1,. . . , πK is a Dirichlet distribution with parameters 1 +∑
i 1[Si = 1],. . . , 1 +
∑
i 1[Si = K]; that is, we draw each πk proportional to the number of
products assigned to mixture k, that is
∑
1 1[Si = k], and naturally restrict
∑
kπk=1.
Given the latent variables in τi sampling the hyper-parameters of the hierarchical part for
the marginal costs, launch price, and price landing characteristics is relatively straightforward.
We draw γP from a normal
γP ∼ N
⎛⎜⎝ (Z′Z)−1Z ′κ
(Z ′Z)−1Z′ρ
,Σ⊗ (Z′Z)−1
⎞⎟⎠ , (3.32)
and γLk |Ωk from
N
⎛⎜⎝ 11+g (Z′Z)−1Z′λki
1
1+g (Z
′Z)−1Z′νki
,
1
1 + g
Ωk ⊗ (Z
′Z)−1
⎞⎟⎠ . (3.33)
The factor g comes from the g-prior which states that the variance of (λki, νki) is proportional
to the variance of the data. See Fernandez et al. (2001) for a detailed discussion.
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Finally, we draw Σ ∼ IW
(
Σ̂, N
)
where
Σ̂ =
⎛⎜⎝ ω̂κ
ω̂ρ
⎞⎟⎠ (ω̂κ,ω̂ρ) (3.34)
and ω̂κi = κi −Z
′
iγ
κ, ω̂ρi = ρi −Z
′
iγ
ρ and ω̂κ = (ω̂κ1 . . . ω̂
κ
N) and ω̂
ρ = (ω̂ρ1 . . . ω̂
ρ
N ). Next, we draw
Ωk ∼ IW
(
Ω̂k +G+ I2, 7 +N
)
where
Ω̂k =
⎛⎜⎝ η̂λk
η̂νk
⎞⎟⎠ (η̂λk , η̂νk), (3.35)
and η̂λk = log(λk)− Z
′γλk and η̂
ν
k = log(νk)− Z
′γνk . ﬁnally Gk is deﬁned as
Ĝk =
⎛⎜⎝ γ̂λk
γ̂νk
⎞⎟⎠ g(Z′Z)−1(γ̂λk , γ̂νk ) (3.36)
and I2 is an identity matrix size 2× 2.
Hierarchical Structure in the Mixture Probabilities
The previous steps give the methodology to analyze our model without a hierarchical speciﬁ-
cation on the mixture probabilities πk. As discussed in this chapter, the model can be easily
expanded to include a hierarchical speciﬁcation on the mixture probabilities. As before, we will
assume that πki diﬀers across products but here we test if a multinomial probit speciﬁcation
that depends on Z is useful to explain their heterogeneity. For that we need to deﬁne ﬁrst K
latent variables for each product i
y∗ki ∼ N(Z
′
iδk, 1) (3.37)
where δ1 = 0 for identiﬁcation. Product i belongs to mixture m if y
∗
mi is the largest of all y
∗
ki
k = 1, . . . ,K. Given (3.37) , we can write the conditional distribution of y∗mi given the other
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latent utilities (-m), denoted as y∗−m,i, as follows:
p(y∗mi|y
∗
−m,i, θ, τi, Si) = p(y
∗
mi > max(y
∗
−m,i))× p(Pi, Si = m, τi|θ)
+p(y∗mi < max(y
∗
−m,i))× p(Pi, Si = m
∗, τi|θ) (3.38)
where m∗ = argmax
m =k
(y∗ki ). Based on (3.38) we can apply the inverse cdf technique to draw y
∗
mi
from its full conditional distribution. Note that in this speciﬁcation the indicator variable Ski
is determined based on y∗mi and the δm parameters can be obtained from a normal with mean
(Z ′iZi)
−1Z ′iδk and variance (Z
′
iZi)
−1 for m = 2, . . . ,K.
Posterior Predictive Density
We used two measures to compare predictive performance in Table 3.5: the root mean squared
error and the log of the posterior predictive density for observations after t = 7. The predictive
density log(p(Pi(7),...,Pi(T )|Pi(1),...,Pi(6))) is deﬁned as:
log
∫ ∫ ∫
p(Pi(7),...,Pi(T )|Pi(1),...,Pi(6), Si, τi, θ)× p(Si, τi, θ|Pi(1),...,Pi(6))dSidτidθ (3.39)
That is, we compute the log of the density for the forecast sample given the six observations
included in the model and the posterior of all model parameters given these latter observations.
The posterior predictive density can easily be obtained from the MCMC output by taking the
log of the average out-of-sample likelihood over all draws.
Chapter 4
Random Coeﬃcient Logit Models for
Large Datasets
We present an approach for analyzing market shares and products´ price elasticities based
on large datasets containing aggregate sales data for many products, several markets and for
relatively long time periods. We consider the recently proposed Bayesian approach of Jiang et
al [Jiang, Renna, Machanda, Puneet and Peter Rossi, 2009. Journal of Econometrics 149 (2)
136-148] and we extend their method in four directions. First, we reduce the dimensionality of
the covariance matrix of the random eﬀects by using a factor structure. The dimension reduction
can be substantial depending on the number of common factors and the number of products.
Second, we parametrize the covariance matrix in terms of correlations and standard deviations,
like Barnard et al. [Barnard, John, McCulloch, Robert and Xiao-Li Meng, 2000. Statistica
Sinica 10 1281-1311] and we present a Metropolis sampling scheme based on this speciﬁcation.
Third, we allow for long term trends in preferences using time-varying common factors. Inference
on these factors is obtained using a simulation smoother for state space time series. Finally, we
consider an attractive combination of priors applied to each market and globally to all markets
to speed up computation time. The main advantage of this prior speciﬁcation is that it let us
estimate the random coeﬃcients based on all data available. We study both simulated data and
a real dataset containing several markets each consisting of 30 to 60 products and our method
proves to be promising with immediate practical applicability.
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4.1 Introduction
A growing number of scholars is developing estimation methods for random coeﬃcient logit
models based on aggregate sales data. Currently, the estimation methods are based on the
generalized method of moments [GMM], as in Nevo (2001) and Berry et al. (1995) (hereafter
BLP), or based on likelihood or Bayesian approaches, as in Jiang et al. (2009) (hereafter
Bayesian BLP or BBLP), Yang et al. (2003), and Park and Gupta (2009). The choice of the
estimation method depends on the modeling assumptions regarding aggregate demand shocks,
consumer heterogeneity, stability of preferences, price endogeneity and on the size and type of
data available.
Recent Bayesian and maximum likelihood-based approaches have been successfully applied
to data containing relatively long time series of weekly data (ranging from one to six years)
concerning a small number of products (usually less than 6 products) sold in a single market (
Jiang et al., 2009; Musalem et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2003). The GMM approach has been applied
to similar sized data, like in Goeree (2008). Recently, Berry and Pakes (2007) use GMM and
apply an extension of the BLP model to data consisting of both small (between 2 and 10) and
large (100) number of products. The extension of Berry and Pakes (2007) is mainly focused on
relaxing the assumption of non-zero demand shocks speciﬁcally when the market is saturated
with many products. Their speciﬁcation of null demand shocks may decrease the precision of
the BLP contraction mapping and they present new complementary routines that overcome this
issue.
One of the most challenging aspects for all methods is the estimation of the underlying
distribution of the random eﬀects that describe individual level consumer heterogeneity. As only
aggregate data is available, the heterogeneity needs to be identiﬁed based on switching patterns.
The simulation results of Jiang et al. (2009) suggest that their Bayesian method performs well
and makes a more eﬃcient use of the data relative to a GMM estimator. Nonetheless, today
still little is known about the scalability (that is the performance and adaptability) of current
methodologies to settings with many products and markets.
In this chapter we investigate the scalability of the Bayesian approach proposed by Jiang
et al. (2009) and we extend their method in four directions. First, we propose a factor structure
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for the covariance matrix of the random eﬀects. We will assume that the covariance matrix
between J products can be modeled by a group of K factors, where the factor loadings are based
on observable characteristics. Such a structure helps to keep the dimension of the heterogeneity
structure under control. That is, we make the same distributional assumptions as in Jiang et al.
(2009) regarding the heterogeneity and aggregate demand shocks but we strongly reduce the
dimension of the covariance matrix. This reduction will be especially important in applications
with a large number of products.
Second, we specify the covariance matrix following Barnard et al. (2000) as a function of
correlations and standard deviations and we propose a Metropolis sampling scheme based on
this parametrization. This parametrization has two main advantages. A technical advantage is
that splitting the covariance in variances and correlations allows for a more eﬃcient sampling
scheme. A practical advantage is that the correlation structure of the heterogeneity itself may
be most informative for managers.
The third extension in our approach is that we allow for time variation in preferences.
Preference ﬂuctuations are likely to occur over long periods of time and over seasons. In the
currently considered Random Coeﬃcient Logit Models such developments are often ignored.
One exception we are aware of is Chintagunta et al. (2005), who show that allowing for time
variation in preferences is beneﬁcial to reduce both the uncertainty regarding brand preferences
and the uncertainty regarding the sensitivity of products’ shares to marketing eﬀorts.
Finally, we consider an attractive combination of priors applied to each market and globally
to all markets. This prior speciﬁcation let us analyze all data simultaneously and it facilitates
the estimation of the underlying distribution of the random coeﬃcients based in all the data.
The Bayesian approach we use in this chapter allows for an eﬃcient implementation of the
four extensions mentioned above. One main advantage of the Bayesian approach over simulated
maximum likelihood and GMM is that inference over any function of the parameters is straight-
forward because we obtain the posterior distribution of all parameters as the MCMC output.
This for example allows for a straightforward assessment of the uncertainty in (cross) price elas-
ticities. A second main advantage of the Bayesian approach is that we can incorporate eﬃcient
sampling of time-varying parameters alongside the other model parameters. Chintagunta et al.
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(2005) use MLE and specify brand-speciﬁc time-ﬁxed eﬀects to account for time variation in
preferences. Their speciﬁcation of brand and time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects is an attractive formula-
tion but the number of ﬁxed eﬀects to estimate may increase rapidly as the number of brands
and time periods increases. As Chintagunta et al. (2005), we allow for time-variation in prefer-
ences but we use the simple and eﬃcient simulation smoother of Durbin and Koopman (2002)
to sample the time-varying parameters. The smoother is ﬂexible because it let us reduce the
model to the setting where brand preferences are ﬁxed in time and this reduction may depend
on the model’s parameter estimates or it can easily be speciﬁed a priori.
We illustrate our approach using both simulated data and a real dataset that contains sales
data for more than 20 markets each with a diﬀerent, large, number of products and brands.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the model.
Next we present the Bayesian inference (some technical details are discussed in the appendix).
Section 4.4 shows the results of a simulation experiment. In Section 4.5 we show detailed results
of the application of the model to actual data. We conclude the chapter with a discussion.
4.2 Augmented Bayesian BLP Model
In this section we present our approach and we discuss how we augment the BBLP model in the
directions discussed earlier. First in subsection 4.2.1 we present the model speciﬁcation. Next in
subsection 4.2.2 we discuss the share inversion method and the integration of the share function.
4.2.1 Model Speciﬁcation
Consider consumers who make purchases from a set of J products during T time periods in M
diﬀerent markets. In general not all products will be available in all markets. We will use the
letter J to refer to the total number of unique products available across all markets. Jm denotes
the set of products that are available in market m. The size of this set, that is, the number of
products available in market m is denoted by Jm. In each period a consumer in market m can
either choose to purchase one of the products in Jm or choose an outside good, that is, he buys
a product outside the set Jm.
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The purchase behavior of individual i in market m is based on utility maximization. We
assume that the (latent) utility for consumer i for product j at time t in market m (denoted by
umijt) contains three parts, (i) an “explained” part (w
m
ijt), (ii) a market level aggregate demand
shock (ηmjt ), and (iii) an individual level random eﬀect (
m
ijt), that is, we specify
umijt = w
m
ijt + η
m
jt + 
m
ijt, j ∈ J
m, t = 1, . . . , T. (4.1)
We make the standard assumption of a type-I extreme value distribution for mijt and we assume
ηmjt ∼ N(0, τ
2
m). We use a factor structure to further model w
m
ijt, that is we use
wmijt = f
m
it
′λmjt, j ∈ J
m, t = 1, . . . , T, (4.2)
where fmit denotes an individual-speciﬁc K
m dimensional dynamic factor, and λmjt is a (K
m× 1)
vector containing the factor loadings for product j in market m. The factor loadings are based
on observable product characteristics, such as, packaging and brand name, but also (log) price
and promotional indicators may be part of the factor loading vector. In general λmjt will contain
constant as well as time-varying elements. In principle the same factors will be used in all
markets, however, in some cases some factors may not be present in a market. For example,
a particular package may not yet be available in a market. Therefore we need to specify the
number factors to be dependent on the market.
The factor fmit gives the importance of a particular product characteristic for individual i in
market m at time t. We split this factor into a time-varying part, which is the same across the
population, and a heterogeneous part, which is constant over time, that is,
fmit = f¯
m
t + υ
m
i , where υ
m
i ∼ φ(0, A
mΨAm′), (4.3)
where Ψ denotes the variance matrix of all individual level random eﬀects and Am denotes
a selection matrix. This matrix selects the rows and columns of the variance matrix that
correspond to factors that are relevant for market m. The matrix Am can be obtained by
deleting all rows from the K dimensional identity matrix that correspond to irrelevant factors.
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Note that the variance of the random eﬀects is in principle common across markets. Together
with the factor loadings in λmjt the covariance matrix A
mΨAm′ gives a ﬂexible but parsimonious
speciﬁcation for the variance structure of the preference heterogeneity.
Note that we can write the covariance matrix of the utilities for all products in market m,
call this matrix Σm, as a function of Ψ, the selection matrices Am and the factor loadings Λmt
where Λmt = {λ
m
jt}j∈Jm . That is,
Σm = Λm′t A
m′ΨAmΛmt . (4.4)
Next we assume a particular law of motion for f¯mt , the common dynamic component of the
factor. We use the state space speciﬁcation
f¯mt+1 = Γ
m
t f¯
m
t +Π
m
t ω
m
t , (4.5)
where ωmt ∼ N(0,Ω
m) and Γmt is a known matrix. In the state space literature, Ω
m and Γmt are
usually set to be diagonal. Furthermore, if we additionally restrict the k-th diagonal element
of Γmt to be 1, we obtain a random walk for the k-th factor, that is, f¯
m
kt+1 = f¯
m
kt + ω
m
kt. If
the variance of ωmkt is set to zero (or the corresponding element of Π
m
t ), we obtain a constant
speciﬁcation for the factor, f¯mkt = f¯
m
k1. If we instead set the diagonal element of Γ
m
t to zero and
the corresponding variance to a non-zero value, we obtain independent random eﬀects over time,
f¯mk,t+1 = ω
m
kt.
We complete the model by normalizing the utility of the outside good to be 0. Based on the
complete utility speciﬁcation we can derive the purchase probabilities, or consumption share for
individual i, smijt as a function of (f
m
it
′Λmt , η
m
t ), where η
m
t is a vector with elements {η
m
jt}j∈Jm and
Λmt is a vector with elements {λ
m
jt}j∈Jm . We use {x
m
jt}j∈Jm to refer to a vector containing the
elements (xm1t, . . . , x
m
Jt) and we use j ∈ J
m to denote that the product index j is market-speciﬁc
and hence it covers only the products in the set Jm. Using the properties of the extreme value
distribution we obtain
smijt(f
m
it
′Λmt , η
m
t ) =
exp(fmit
′λmjt + η
m
jt )
1 +
∑
h∈Jm exp(f
m
it
′λmht + η
m
ht)
. (4.6)
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The overall market share, denoted by smjt, of product j and time t in market m, measured over
the entire population, is obtained by integrating smijt(f
m
it
′Λmt , η
m
t ) over the individual-speciﬁc
parameters in fmit . Therefore we have that
smjt =
∫
exp(fmit
′λmjt + η
m
jt )
1 +
∑
h∈Jm exp(f
m
it
′λmht + η
m
ht)
φ(fmit ; f¯
m
t , A
mΨAm′)dfmit (4.7)
If we use fmit = f¯
m
t + υ
m
i and υ
m
i ∼ φ(0, A
mΨAm′) we can write equation (4.7) as
smjt =
∫
exp(μmjt + λ
m
jt
′υmi )
1 +
∑
h∈Jm exp(μ
m
ht + λ
m
ht
′υmi )
φ(υmi ; 0, A
mΨAm′)dυmi , (4.8)
where μmjt = (f¯
m
t )
′λmjt + η
m
jt . Note that the share s
m
jt inherits randomness only from the term η
m
jt
as we integrate over υmi .
Following Jiang et al. (2009) we denote the relationship between the shares vector smt =
{smjt}j∈Jm and the vector with aggregate demand shocks η
m
t in (4.7) as
smt = h(η
m
t |Λ
m
t , f¯
m
t ,Ψ). (4.9)
Based on the relation in (4.9) and the distribution of ηmt , the joint density of the shares at time
t is
π(smt |Λ
m
t , f¯
m
t ,Ψ, τ
2
m) = φ(h
−1(smt |Λ
m
t , f¯
m
t ,Ψ)|0, τ
2
m)|Jsmt →ηmt |
−1, (4.10)
for t = 0, . . . , T and m = 1, . . . ,M and where we use π(.) to denote a generic density and π(y|x)
the density of y given x. In addition, the Jacobian Jsmt →ηmt is deﬁned as the (J
m × Jm) matrix
with elements
∂smjt/∂η
m
kt =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
−
∫
smijts
m
iktφ(υ
m
i ; 0, A
mΨA′m)dυ
m
i if k = j∫
smijt(1− s
m
ikt)φ(υ
m
i ; 0, A
mΨA′m)dυ
m
i if k = j,
(4.11)
where the arguments of the functions smijt and s
m
ikt are dropped for convenience, see (4.8) and
j, k ∈ Jm. Given equation (4.10) the joint conditional density for the shares, or the likelihood,
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for market m is given by
π(sm|Λm, f¯m,Ψ, τ2m) =
T∏
t=1
π(smt |λ
m
t , f¯
m
t ,Ψ, τ
2
m), (4.12)
where Λm = (Λm1 , . . . ,Λ
m
T ), s
m = (sm1 , . . . , s
m
T ) and f¯
m = (f¯m1 , . . . , f¯
m
T ).
Two diﬃculties in this model are the inversion of the share function h() in equation (4.9) and
the evaluation of the integrals in equations (4.8) and (4.11). The inversion and the integration
are required to obtain the aggregate shocks ηmt and hence to evaluate the density in equation
(4.10). We discuss these two issues next.
4.2.2 Share inversion method and integral approximation
To calculate the joint density in (4.12) we need to take two hurdles. First we need to solve the
integrals in (4.8) and (4.11). Next, we need to obtain the inverse of the function h() in (4.9).
We apply the contraction mapping of Berry et al. (1995) to obtain the inverse in terms of
μmjt for all necessary m, j and t. Within this procedure we need to calculate the market shares
given μmjt, Λ
m
t and Ψ, j ∈ J
m, t = 1, . . . , T and m = 1, . . . ,M by integrating equation (4.8) with
respect to υi. We numerically approximate this integral by averaging over H draws from the
distribution of υi that is N(0, A
mΨAm′). Jiang et al. (2009) report that H ranges from 20 to
50 in previous literature and they show that their Bayesian estimator has the same performance
for H = 50 and H = 200. However, in our case we may need more draws as we develop the
model for many more parameters.
A common approach to obtain each of the H draws of υi is based on the product of
the Cholesky decomposition of AmΨAm′ and draws from a standard normal, that is υdi =
(AmΨAm′)1/2ζd where Σ1/2 denotes the Cholesky decomposition of Σ and ζd ∼ N(0, I) for
d = 1, . . . ,H, where I denotes an identity matrix. A more eﬃcient approximation of the integral
may be obtained by using a quasi-random scheme to generate the ζd. Train (2003, chap. 9, page
236) suggests scrambled Halton sequences for integrals of large dimensions and his suggestion,
we believe, is motivated by the same family of logit models that we are concerned with here.
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In Figure 4.1 we compare the integration results based on scrambled Halton sequences ver-
sus the integration results based on regular normal draws. We consider the scenario where the
parameters are known and we use the approximation method discussed above to obtain the
market shares. In the top panel we report the performance when the integral has only three
dimensions and in the lower panel we report the performance when the integral has 30 dimen-
sions. In both panels we report the market share for only one of the products. This simple
exercise suggests that the market shares are much better approximated by integrating with Hal-
ton draws regardless of the dimension of the integral. For large dimensions the approximation of
the normal draws seems to converge to the approximation of the Halton draws after the number
of draws (H) is higher than 400 while the approximation based on Halton draws performs well
for H > 100.
4.3 Bayesian Inference
In this section we discuss the priors we choose to complete the model speciﬁcation. Speciﬁcally,
we present in subsection 4.3.1 a prior for the matrix Ψ that is simple to calibrate when analyzing
many products and markets and at the same time the prior will let us treat the scale and the
correlation structure of Ψ separately. Next in subsection 4.3.2, we discuss the market-speciﬁc
priors. Finally in subsection 4.3.3, we discuss the MCMC sampling scheme.
4.3.1 Prior and Structure for Ψ
Jiang et al. (2009) specify the covariance matrix Σm in terms of the unique elements of its
Cholesky root. They set Σm = U ′U where
U =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
er11 r12 r13 . . . r1J
0 er22 r23 . . . r2J
0 0
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . . eeJ−1,J−1 rJ−1,J
0 0 . . . 0 erJJ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (4.13)
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and they choose to set separate normal priors for the diagonal and oﬀ-diagonal elements of U.
That is, Jiang et al. (2009) set rjj ∼ N(0, σ
2
j ) for the diagonal elements j = 1, . . . , J and
rjk ∼ N(0, σ
2
od) for the oﬀ-diagonal elements j = k. Note that Jiang et al. (2009) deal with
only one market m and that in our approach we model the heterogeneity through Ψ (that is a
K ×K matrix) and not through Σm (that is a J × J matrix) where K is the number of factors
while J is the number of products.
This prior speciﬁcation enforces the positive-deﬁnitiveness of Σm and in addition the priors
on the rjk elements used by Jiang et al. (2009) are symmetric and this matched well with
the random walk Metropolis Hastings [MH] sampling scheme they propose to sample the r-
parameters. A second advantage of Jiang et al. (2009) prior is that it can be set to be relatively
uniform on the correlation range (−1, 1). Overall, this speciﬁcation is attractive and simple but
it also has a number of shortcomings. First, Jiang et al. (2009) note that to obtain a plausible
(implied) prior on the variances in Σm the prior variances σ2j should be decreasing with j and
they provide a particular relation between σ2j and j. However, the prior in one of the elements
of (4.13) may aﬀect many of the elements in Σm and this complicates the prior interpretation,
specially when J is large. Second, this prior imposes a correlation structure simultaneously with
the overall scale of the heterogeneity. Other studies point out that it may be relatively hard
to identify the heterogeneity (Bodapati and Gupta, 2004) and the uncertainty related to the
Σm elements is therefore usually large, see for example Jiang et al. (2009) and Musalem et al.
(2006). However, we do not know if the large uncertainty reported in previous studies is due
to the uncertainty on the overall scale of Σm or if it is due to the correlation structure in Σm.
Finally, it is well known that the correlation structure of Σm is very important in order to obtain
diﬀerent substitution patterns far from the IIA assumption of the logit. Therefore, we would
like to use a prior that can let us deal with the scale and correlations separately.
Finally, changing one element of U may lead to a very diﬀerent Σm. This fact makes the
implementation of an eﬃcient MH sampler diﬃcult if J is large. More precisely, in their MH
scheme Jiang et al. (2009) choose to draw the candidate elements of U from a multivariate
normal that is calibrated based on a short chain of their model MCMC output. The length
of the chain needed for the calibration of the multivariate normal needs to be longer when
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the number of dimensions is large. When dealing with large dimensions, the step size in the
random walk MH sampling, for each of the rjk elements, needs to be set smaller as the dimension
increases in order to keep a good acceptance rate in the estimation algorithm. Although this last
issue always arises whenever many elements are updated simultaneously, here it can be more
dramatic as “local” changes in U lead to “global” changes in Σm.
Summarizing, we would like to use a prior speciﬁcation that is simpler to calibrate when
dealing with large dimensions and at the same time we like to treat the scale and the correlation
structure of the heterogeneity separately.
We choose to use the prior speciﬁcation of Barnard et al. (2000) for Ψ. We deﬁne Ψ = DRD
whereD is a diagonal matrix with K elements (standard deviations) and R is a K×K correlation
matrix. For the variances in D we set the prior log(diag(D)) ∼ N(0,Δ). Formulating a prior on
R is not straightforward because we need a prior that deals with all the elements of R and the
restrictions on them. We need to assure the positive deﬁnitiveness of R, the range of its elements
must be (−1, 1) and all the elements together should satisfy triangularity restriction inherent
to any correlation matrix. In addition, we need to update all the elements of R simultaneously
to ease the computational burden. However, based on any variance matrix Σ one can obtain
the corresponding correlation matrix by standardization. Hence, we assume R = fc(S) and we
specify an Inverted Wishart prior for S with parameters (G, v). The function fc() transforms a
covariance matrix to a correlation matrix. The location matrix G is set such that the expected
value of S is an identity matrix; that is G = (v −K − 1)× I, v is the degrees of freedom of the
Inverted Wishart and I is an identity matrix of size K. Note that our variance matrix Ψ is now
actually a function of D and S. In the MCMC sampling below we will actually sample these
two matrices.
Barnard et al. (2000) set a prior directly on R while we set a prior on R implicitly by the
prior on S. The main reason why we deviate from them is that evaluation of the posterior
is very costly in our application and hence we need to use a proposal for S that updates all
the correlations in R in a single step. In contrast, the computation time of the application in
Barnard et al. (2000) allows for a relatively fast element by element update of the matrix R.
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In Figure 4.2 we report the implied correlation distributions for two diﬀerent degrees of
freedom and for two elements of a Ψ matrix of size 10× 10. The implied correlations can be set
to be roughly uniform on the (−1, 1) interval depending on the degrees of freedom set on the
Wishart distribution. Therefore, the implied correlations of this prior are very similar to the
implied correlations of the speciﬁcation used by Jiang et al. (2009). However, the parameters
in our suggested priors are easier to interpret.
4.3.2 Market-Speciﬁc Priors and Joint Posterior
We presented the likelihood for each of the m markets in equation (4.12) and we presented the
structure and prior for Ψ in the previous section. This variance matrix applies to all markets.
What is left to specify are the priors for τ2m, Ω
m and the initial state distributions for all common
dynamic factors fmt . In addition the matrix Γ
m
t needs to be deﬁned. We deﬁne f
m
1 ∼ N(0, P
m)
where we set Pm reasonably large and non-informative, Pm = 100I for all m. We assume
Ωm = σ2mHm where Hm is a diagonal matrix of size J
m and σ2m ∼ vos
2
o/χ
2
vo . The diagonal
elements of Hm are equal to one for the factors f
m
t that are time-varying and equal to zero for
the factors that are ﬁxed over time. We set Γmt equal to an identity matrix Im of size J
m and
for τ2m we do not set any prior.
The joint posterior is proportional to the product of the likelihood and priors for each market
times the prior distribution of Ψ that apply to all markets. Note that the factor loadings are
assumed to be given, as they represent observed product characteristics. The posterior becomes
π(f¯∗, τ2∗ , σ
2
∗ ,D, S|s
∗,Λ) ∝ π(log(diag(D)); 0,Δ)π(S;G, v)×(∏
m
π(sm|f¯m,Ψ, τ2m)πm(f¯
m
1 ; 0, P
m)
[
T−1∏
t=1
π(f¯mt+1|f¯
m
t , σ
2
mIm)
]
π(σ2m; vo, s
2
o)
)
, (4.14)
where s∗ = (s1, . . . , sM ), f¯∗ = (f¯
1, . . . , f¯M ), τ2∗ = (τ
2
1 , . . . , τ
2
M ), σ
2
∗ = (σ
2
1 , . . . , σ
2
M ), Ψ =
Dfc(S)D.
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In addition, the priors for fm1 , σ
2
m, D and S are deﬁned as follows
π(f¯m1 ; 0, P
m) ∼ N(f¯m1 ; 0, P
m)
π(σ2m; vo, s
2
o) = (σ
2)−(vo/2+1)e−vos
2
o/2σ
2
log(diag(D)) ∼ N(0,Δ)
π(S;G, v) ∝ |G|
v/2
|S|(v+K+1)/2
e−1/2tr(S
−1G)
. (4.15)
4.3.3 MCMC algorithm
The approach we follow is a combination of the sampler proposed in Jiang et al. (2009) with
simulation smoother of Durbin and Koopman (2002) and a Metropolis Hastings sampler for
Ψ. We use the following steps: (i) conditional on Ψ we use the contraction mapping to obtain
the (implied) μmjt , for m = 1, . . . ,M , j ∈ J
m, t = 1, . . . , T ; (ii) conditional on Ψ (and μmjt) we
use the simulation smoother to sample f¯∗, the μmjt values appear as dependent variables in this
smoother; (iii) conditional on f¯∗ and all μmjt we sample τ
2
∗ and σ
2
∗ ; (iv) ﬁnally we use a Metropolis
Hastings sampler to draw the elements of D and S which determine Ψ.
More speciﬁcally, we use the following three set of conditionals
f¯∗|Ψ, σ2∗ , τ
2
∗ , s
∗,Λ
σ2∗, τ
2
∗ |Ψ, f¯
∗, s∗,Λ
D,S|σ2∗ , τ
2
∗ , f¯
∗, s∗,Λ.
(4.16)
We draw the ﬁrst set of conditionals using the simulation smoother of Durbin and Koopman
(2002). That is, given μmjt for all m, j and t we can draw the parameters of the following
measurement and state equations
μmt = Λ
m
t
′f¯mt + η
m
t with η
m
jt ∼ N(0, τ
2
m)
f¯mt+1 = Γ
m
t f¯
m
t +Π
m
t ω
m
t with ω
m
t ∼ N(0, σ
2
mIm),
(4.17)
where μmt is deﬁned as the (Jm × 1) vector with elements μ
m
jt , j ∈ J
m. This speciﬁcation is
attractive because we can set some of the common factors f¯mt to be ﬁxed in time while others can
remain time-varying. This is done simply by setting some of the elements in the diagonal matrix
130 Random Coeﬃcient Logit Models for Large Datasets
Πmt equal to zero. The simulation smoother of Durbin and Koopman (2002) gives a draw from
the joint posterior of f¯mt , for t = 1, . . . , T . For details we refer to their paper. Conditional on μ
m
t
and f¯m sampling the variances is straightforward. Given our priors they can be sampled from
Inverted Gamma distributions. That is, τ2m ∼ IG(n
m
τ , s
2
τ ) and σm ∼ IG((υo + n
m
σ ), (s
2
σ + s
2
o).
The nmτ are the number of observations available for the measurement equation at market m
for m = 1, . . . ,M and s2τ is the sum of squared residuals of the measurement equation. The n
m
σ
is the number of observations available in the state equation at market m and s2σ is the sum of
squared residuals of the measurement equation. The υo and s
2
o are the parameters of the prior
for the variance of the state equation, see the priors in equation (4.15).
For the third set of conditionals we use a Metropolis Hastings algorithm. For the (log of
the) elements of D we use a standard random walk as candidate distribution. For comparison
with the second part of this step we write the proposal as
log(diag(Dcandidate)) ∼ N(log(diag(Dcurrent)), ζ2I). (4.18)
For S we also propose a random walk candidate distribution. However, for eﬃciency in the total
sampler we which to have a candidate that can generate matrices close to the current value. As
a candidate distribution we use an inverted Wishart distribution which has the current value as
expected value, that is,
Scandidate ∼ IW ((v1 −K − 1)S
current, v1). (4.19)
We choose v1 and ζ
2 to achieve between 20% and 50% acceptance rate in the Metropolis steps.
In the MCMC we use two Metropolis steps to update D and S separately.
To sample D and S we evaluate the model posterior in equation (4.14) in two Metropolis
steps, the ﬁrst for D and the second for S. We set
Dnew = Dcand with probability min{p
∗(Dcand|S,f¯∗,τ2
∗
,σ2
∗
,s∗,Λ)
p∗(Dprev |S,f¯∗,τ2
∗
,σ2
∗
,s∗,Λ)
, 1}, (4.20)
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and we set
Snew = Scand with probability min{p
∗(Scand|D,f¯∗,τ2
∗
,σ2
∗
,s∗,Λ)
p∗(Sprev |D,f¯∗,τ2
∗
,σ2
∗
,s∗,Λ)
, 1}. (4.21)
The candidate and previous posterior density in equation (4.20) are given by
p∗(Dcand|S, f¯∗, τ2∗ , σ
2
∗ , s
∗,Λ) =
π(log(diag(Dcand)); 0,Δ) ×
∏
m
π(sm|Λm, f¯m,Ψcand, τ2m), (4.22)
and by
p∗(Dprev|S, f¯∗, τ2∗ , σ
2
∗ , s
∗,Λ) =
π(log(diag(Dprev)); 0,Δ) ×
∏
m
π(sm|Λm, f¯m,Ψprev, τ2m). (4.23)
where Ψcand = Dcandfc(S)D
cand and Ψprev = Dprevfc(S)D
prev while the terms in the Metropolis
step in equation (4.21) are given by
p∗(Scand|D, f¯∗, τ2∗ , σ
2
∗ , s
∗,Λ) =
π(Scand;G, v) × π(Sprev;Scand, v1)×
∏
m
π(sm|Λm, f¯m,Ψcand, τ2m), (4.24)
and by
p∗(Sprev|D, f¯∗, τ2∗ , σ
2
∗ , s
∗,Λ) =
π(Sprev;G, v) × π(Scand;Sprev, v1)×
∏
m
π(sm|Λm, f¯m,Ψprev, τ2m), (4.25)
where now Ψcand = Dfc(S
cand)D, Ψprev = Dfc(S
prev)D and π(sm|Λm, f¯m,Ψ, τ2m) is deﬁned
in equation (4.12). Note that the proposal distribution for S is not symmetric and hence its
distribution (π(S;S′, v1)) also appears in the acceptance probability. We use the proposal distri-
butions in equation (4.18) and equation (4.19) to draw the candidate matrices Dcand and Scand
based on their previous values Dprev and Sprev, respectively.
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The Metropolis steps are very costly in terms of computation time in the MCMC algorithm.
This is the only step in the algorithm where we need to use the BLP contraction mapping and
where we need to evaluate the Jacobian in equations (4.10) and (4.11). Some time may be saved
by jointly updating these matrices. However, the joint updating of D and S will not let us
distinguish what is driving the acceptance rate in the Metropolis steps. Moreover, the separate
updating of these matrices let us distinguish if a candidate matrix Ψcand (Ψ = Dfc(S)D) is
rejected because of its correlation structure or because of its overall scale.
4.4 Simulation Experiment
We test our modeling approach on simulated data and in this section we discuss the data
generation process and the results of the MCMC estimation procedure.
4.4.1 Data Simulation
In this section we describe how we create synthetic data and we consider a setting where we
have data for many products and markets. This setting is not typical in the literature but it
that corresponds with the setting that we deal with in the application.
We assume products are sold in 10 markets and we simulate 4 years of monthly data for
each market. Each market will be assigned a speciﬁc number of products and these products
will be assigned to 10 diﬀerent brands.
All 10 brands are available in each market and we assign 5, 6, 8 or 10 products to each brand
at each market. Hence, the number of products assigned to a brand varies per market and each
market consists of a speciﬁc number of products. The probability of a brand to be assigned
5 or 6 products at each speciﬁc market is 90% while the probability of being assigned 8 or 10
products is 10%. That is, the expected number of products per brand is 5.85 and the expected
number of products per market is 58.5. This is a large number of products relative to previous
studies. For example, Jiang et al. (2009) and Yang et al. (2003) study one market that consists
of 3 products and one outside good while Musalem et al. (2006) apply their model to a setting
with four products and one outside good.
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The mean utilities (the μmjt) for products are market-speciﬁc. The mean products’ utilities
are assumed to depend on the products’ brands, the products’ attributes and the products’
prices and promotions. We deﬁne 5 attributes and we assign only one attribute per product and
all attributes are equally likely per product. Note that this last assumption implies that each
brand may have a certain number of products that share the same attributes. We set one of
the attribute coeﬃcients as the base and equal to 0 while the rest is generated from a normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance 5.
Next, we deﬁne the price and promotion coeﬃcients and these are −5 and −2, respectively,
and these coeﬃcients are the same across markets. The price series for each product follows a
sine curve (with a very long cycle) plus normal noise with mean 2 and variance 1. To create the
promotional series we use a uniform distribution with range (0, 1). We assume that there is a
30% chance of a promotion and the range of promotions is between 0 and 30%. That is, when
we draw a promotional index value (from the uniform) lower than 0.70 then the promotional
index is equal to 1 otherwise the promotion index is equal to the drawn value.
Attribute, price and promotions coeﬃcients will be ﬁxed in time while the brand coeﬃcients
will be time-varying. We generate 10 brand coeﬃcients using the recursion in equation (4.17)
and we set σm to be equal to 0.40. We set the initial values for the brand coeﬃcients f
m
1 based on
a normal distribution with mean −3 and variance 0.16. We use the same recursion to generate
the attribute, price and promotion coeﬃcients and their initial value is assigned as we discussed
in the previous paragraph. We further need to set Πmt to be a diagonal matrix with the ﬁrst
10 elements equal to 1 and the remainder 6 elements of the diagonal are equal to 0. The Γmt is
equal to an identity matrix of size 16.
The factor loadings Λmt will consist of brand and attribute dummies for all products at time
t plus the products prices and promotions at time t. That is, Λmt is a J × K matrix, J is the
number of products and K is equal to 16 (the number of brands, attribute, price and promotion
coeﬃcients). Finally, we assume that the variance of product demand shocks τ2m are equal to
0.8 for all m.
We use the speciﬁcation of Ψ = DRD to draw the random coeﬃcients υmi . We ﬁrst draw a
matrix P based on a IW (I16, 21) and we set R = fc(P ). The implied range of the correlations
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in R goes from −1 to 1 but the extremes of the range are not common. Further, we assume
the scale of the heterogeneity depends on both small and large elements with the purpose of
checking whether their size aﬀects their retrieval from the synthetic data. That is, we set D2 =
(2, 2, 2, 2, 8, 8, 8, 8, 4, 4, 4, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2). Finally, we use 3000 draws to approximate the integral in
equation (4.8) and we generate the draws of the random coeﬃcients based on the Cholesky
decomposition of Ψ and normal draws generated with scrambled Halton sequences. The 16
factors in Ψ are available at every market and therefore the Am matrix is the same for all
markets and it is equal to I16.
4.4.2 MCMC Setup
We use a hybrid Metropolis Gibbs sampler to estimate the parameters of the model in equation
(4.7). The sampler iterates over the conditionals in equation (4.16). The ﬁrst set of conditionals
concerns the f¯∗. We set the prior on the initial values as fm1 ∼ N(0, 100I) for all m and we use
the simulation smoother of Durbin and Koopman (2002) to sample all elements of f¯∗.
The second set of conditionals samples the variances of equation (4.17). We did not set any
prior information on σ2m and τ
2
m for all m. Hence, τ
2
m ∼ IG(nm, sm) where nm are the number
of observations in the measurement equation in (4.17) and sm are the sum of squared residuals
in the same equation. In a similar fashion, σ2m ∼ IG(n
s
m, s
s
m) where n
s
m are the number of
observations and ssm are the sum of squared residuals of the state equation in (4.17).
The third set of conditionals concerns the sampling of the D and S matrices. We set the v
parameter in the prior π(S; I, v) equal to 21 and we use Δ = 10I in the normal prior of the log
of the diagonal elements of D.
We use the proposal distributions in equation (4.18) and equation (4.19) to draw the can-
didate matrices Dcand and Scand, respectively. In these proposals we set ζ2 equal to 0.01 and
υ1 equal to 10000. The large number in υ1 corresponds to steps of approximately 0.05 in the
elements of the correlation matrix R where R = fc(S). We calibrated ζ
2 and υ1 to achieve an
acceptance rate between 20% and 50% for both Metropolis steps.
We let the Gibbs-Metropolis sampler to run for 20 thousand iterations. However, we do
oversampling of Ψ. We use 4 updates of S and one of D at every iteration. That is, we
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generate 100 thousand candidates for the matrix Ψ. The matrix Ψ contains 136 unique elements
and our purpose with the oversampling is to let all these elements to move at larger steps at
every iteration and let them adjust better to the rest of the model parameters drawn at every
iteration. In this way, the oversampling may compensate for the small moving steps that we need
to achieve a good acceptance rate in the Metropolis algorithm. Haran et al. (2003) also consider
the oversampling of parameters to accelerate their computation in the MCMC algorithm.
4.4.3 Results of the Simulation Experiment
In Table 4.1 we present the posterior mean and the 99% Highest Posterior Density Region
(HPDR) of the demand shocks for every market. The true value of τ2m is equal to 0.66 for all
markets. Note that we generated data for 10 markets. In most cases, the posterior mean is very
close to its true value. The maximum absolute deviation of the posterior mean from the true
value is approximately 0.06, see the τ2m=6 that is equal to 0.580.
In Table 4.2 we present the posterior mean and HPDR of the variance term in the state
equation (4.17), that is σ2m. The true value of this parameter is 0.16 while in most cases the
posterior mean is close to 0.12. That is, we are ﬁnding a small negative bias that is close to 0.04
for most cases.
In Figure 4.3 we present the estimates of the ﬁxed coeﬃcients (in circles) and the box-plots
of their posterior distribution. Note that we speciﬁed 4 attribute coeﬃcients and one price and
promotion coeﬃcient that vary across markets. That is a total of 50 coeﬃcients in all markets.
We see that for 30 out of the 50 coeﬃcients the circles (true values) overlap with the position of
their distribution in the box-plot. In the same ﬁgure, we see that there is a systematic positive
bias in the posterior distribution of the price coeﬃcients. The true value of the price coeﬃcient
is equal to −5 while the posterior distribution is higher than −5. In contrast, the posterior
distribution of the promotion coeﬃcients overlap with its true value (−2) for all markets.
In Figure 4.4 we present the distribution of the time-varying brand coeﬃcients for the 5th
market. We see that the overall time proﬁle is well retrieved by the estimation algorithm. In
most cases the true value is inside the 99% HPDR. The results for the other markets are very
similar.
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In Table 4.3 we report the posterior mean and HPDR for the elements of the D2 matrix. We
see that the 99% HPDR contains the true value for 7 out of the 16 elements. The deviation of
the posterior mean from its true value, when the true value is not contained in the HPDR, may
be as small as 1 or as large as 6 variance points. That is, we ﬁnd large uncertainty regarding
the scale of the heterogeneity driven by the random coeﬃcients. Jiang et al. (2009), Musalem
et al. (2006) and Yang et al. (2003) ﬁnd similar levels of uncertainty.
In Figure 4.5 we report the 99% HPDR (in dashed lines) and the true value (solid line) of
the 120 unique elements of the correlation matrix R (fc(S)). We ﬁnd that the HPDR contains
the true value for 57 out of 120 elements, that is 47.5% of the elements. However, we ﬁnd that
the posterior mean of the correlations is on average 0.16 points far from its true level. Hence,
our results suggest that the uncertainty regarding the scale of the heterogeneity (the elements
of D) is much larger than the uncertainty in the elements of the correlation matrix R.
4.5 Empirical Application
In this section we apply our estimation approach to a real dataset and we analyze the substi-
tution patterns between a large number of products. Next we provide a description of the data
(in subsection 4.5.1), the modeling details (in subsection 4.5.1) and the estimation results (in
subsection 4.5.3).
4.5.1 Data
Our dataset contains sales, price and promotion data for all the products of one supermarket
food category. The data is monthly and it covers a period of four years and 18 diﬀerent regions.
Consumers at each region may have available a minimum of 25 up to a maximum of 65 products
of 20 diﬀerent brands. Each brand has its own positioning in terms of calories, taste and labeling
while each brand may oﬀer products of the same size and packaging. Therefore, we can describe
each product in terms of its brand, size and packaging attributes and its price and promotion
data. There are brands with similar attributes both in terms of calories and taste and in terms
of packaging and size and these brands are usually produced by diﬀerent companies. Our data
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contains products sold by all major companies at each market and very few ﬁrms compose the
market.1 Depending on the market, the size of the outside good varies from 20 up to a maximum
of 50%. The calculation of the outside good share is region-speciﬁc and it varies according to
the share of the closest and competing food categories.
4.5.2 Modeling Details and MCMC Setup
The MCMC setup for the application is very similar to the MCMC setup we use for the simulated
data. An important distinguishing feature is that the matrix Ψ consists of 32 rows and columns.
This number corresponds to 20 brands, 11 size and packaging attributes, one price and one
promotion factor. We leave one attribute as reference and this results in 32 random coeﬃcients.
In the application the Am matrices select the appropriate elements of the Ψ matrix relevant for
the market m. That is, some attributes or brands may not be available in all markets.
We will assume that all coeﬃcients are ﬁxed with the exception of the brand coeﬃcients that
will be speciﬁed as time-varying. We use the priors in equation (4.15) where we set Pm = 100I
for all m, υo = 1 and so = 0.01. The Δ matrix is equal to 25I and v = 35. We did not set a
prior on τ2m parameters. The proposal distributions in equation (4.18) and equation (4.19) have
the parameters v1 = 30000 and ζ
2 = 1/200. This conﬁguration achieves between 30% and 50%
of acceptance rate in the Metropolis updates of S and D. We sample D and S separately in the
same way as we did in the simulation experiment.
The matrix Πmt in equation (4.17) is set equal to an identity matrix of size K
m (Km is the
number of factors at each m) and we set some of its diagonal elements equal to 0 and these zeros
correspond to the factors related to size, packaging and to price and promotions. The matrix
Γmt is of size J
m (the number of products available at market m) times Km and it is also set to
be an identity matrix.
We ran the MCMC chain for 50 thousand iterations and we discarded the ﬁrst 10 thousand
with a thin value of 20. The computation time was of approximately ﬁve days. The number of
1Because of our conﬁdentiality agreement we can not reveal the companies names, brands or any other product or
market information in the chapter.
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draws that we used for approximating integrals was 200 and we use draws based on scrambled
Halton sequences.
4.5.3 Estimation Results
We present the posterior mean and HPDR of the τ2m parameters in Table 4.4. The uncertainty
of the demand shocks is very large for six of the eighteen markets, see the τ2m for m equal to 1,
2, 12, 13 and 17. The uncertainty in the demand shock for the remaining markets seems small
relative to these six markets.
The posterior mean of HPDR of the σ2m parameters can be read in Table 4.5. These are the
variances of the time-varying coeﬃcients and we see that they are very small as we expected.
The variance of time-varying parameters in state space models is usually small (Fruhwirth-
Schnatter, 2004) and this indicates slowly evolving factors.
In Table 4.6 we present the posterior mean and HPDR for the ﬁxed coeﬃcients at three
markets. We notice that price and promotion coeﬃcients have the expected negative signs. The
promotional index is a number that takes a value between 0 and 1 and it indicates the percentage
of the regular price level that is observed. We notice that the uncertainty related to the price
coeﬃcients varies across markets while at the same time they remain negative. The preference
for size also varies per market and we ﬁnd that for each market there are only two sizes with a
positive posterior mean that may be larger than the base category. In Figure 4.6 we report the
evolution of the time-varying brand coeﬃcients. We report the time proﬁles of the time-varying
factors relative to their starting point and their corresponding 99% HPDR. This transformation
is useful to illustrate how some brands’ preferences (measured by the time-varying factors) face
large variations relative to their starting position, like brands C, E, F or L, while we see other
brands like J or B with much smaller time variation. Note that this ﬁgure does not show the
level uncertainty around the time-varying brand coeﬃcients. Their level uncertainty, however, is
similar to the uncertainty of the ﬁxed coeﬃcients. We see also that the coeﬃcients for diﬀerent
types of packaging show signiﬁcant time variation relative to their starting point, see the bottom
row in Figure 4.6.
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In Figure 4.7 we report the distribution of 60 elements of the Ψ matrix. The Ψ matrix size
is 32× 32 and therefore it contains 528 unique elements. We notice that the uncertainty varies
per element but overall the uncertainty is relative small for most correlations. The element 39
in the lower panel has the largest uncertainty and its range goes from −0.75 up to 0 while there
are other cases like the element 12 in the upper panel with very tight posterior distributions.
In Table 4.7 we present the posterior mean and the 99% HPDR of the matrix D2. Some of
the elements of the matrix are retrieved with a lot of uncertainty. For example, the posterior
mean of the D29 is 4.64 but its HPDR includes values close to 10 while the posterior mean of D
2
15
is equal to 10.625 and its HPDR includes values as high as 22. These rest of the elements in the
D2 matrix, and the mayority, show a much smaller uncertainty relative to these high values in
D29 and D
2
15. Previous studies, like Jiang et al. (2009), Musalem et al. (2006) and Yang et al.
(2003), report simular range of both the scale of the heterogeneity and its uncertainty.
Finally, in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 we present the own-price and cross price elasticities for
the products in market 2. We computed the elasticities as we describe in the Appendix 4.A.
The price elasticities have a range that goes from −1 to −3.5 while the cross-price elasticities
range goes from 0 up to 1.6. In this last ﬁgure light (white) colors represent high values while
darker (dark red) colors represent lower cross price elasticities. In Figure 4.9 we notice that
many products respond to the price changes of a relatively small set of products. For example, a
price change in the 10th product aﬀects almost all products in this market and their cross price
elasticity is close to 1.66. Finally, we notice that substitution patterns (measured by cross price
elasticities) are stronger among a small subset of products.
4.6 Conclusions
The estimation of aggregate share models based on the random coeﬃcient logit speciﬁcation
presents diﬀerent challenges. The scalability of models and estimation algorithms is one of these
main challenges. Berry and Pakes (2007) is a recent paper with a similar concern as ours
and that is the practical application of this family of models to larger and more comprehensive
datasets. In this chapter we investigate the scalability of the BBLP approach and we successfully
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applied our method to simulated data and to a relative large real dataset. It is large in terms
of the number of products, brands and markets that it includes while it is still small relative to
the time periods we have available.
Our speciﬁcation is based on the recent advances of Jiang et al. (2009), Durbin and
Koopman (2002) and Barnard et al. (2000). These advances all put together allow us to model
time variation in preferences and to separate the uncertainty of the random coeﬃcients in terms
of their scale and in terms of their correlation. In addition, our mode speciﬁcation combines
global and market speciﬁc priors and this allows us pool information across several markets.
We believe that the uncertainty related to the random coeﬃcients is a great challenge. In
contrast with previous studies we report the uncertainty related to the correlation and the scale
of the random coeﬃcients separately. Our results point that the overall scale of the covariance
matrix of the random coeﬃcients may present a larger uncertainty relative to the uncertainty
present in their correlation structure. This last result is an initial step towards the untangling
and modeling of the sources of uncertainty in the random coeﬃcients of the BBLP approach
and we consider that this is a promising area for further research.
We present an approach that is the “augmented” version of the BBLP and it should be
considered whenever there is a large dataset of market shares available for analysis. Large
datasets, particularly of shares, are rarely collected but they are becoming increasingly common
and more detailed. Therefore, approaches like ours may be needed more often in the future.
We presented our results to managers and they showed a great interest in understanding
the uncertainty regarding the correlations between a reduced number of key product factors.
Their immediate questions concerned what factors are “competing” between each other and to
what extent. Moreover, their intuition and knowledge of the market supports the idea that
preferences for key factors, like brands, are evolving in time. However, they usually measure
these time variations based on market wide “top of mind” surveys while the use of sales data for
this type of analysis is rare. Hence, the modeling of the evolution in brands-preferences based
in market shares data, they argue, is one of the key and most valuable aspects of our approach.
4.7 Tables and Figures 141
4.7 Tables and Figures
Posterior HPDR
Mean 1% 99%
τ 2m=1 0.636 0.618 0.698
τ 2m=2 0.640 0.624 0.670
τ 2m=3 0.595 0.580 0.626
τ 2m=4 0.659 0.641 0.717
τ 2m=5 0.618 0.598 0.657
τ 2m=6 0.580 0.565 0.598
τ 2m=7 0.657 0.640 0.711
τ 2m=8 0.662 0.647 0.755
τ 2m=9 0.641 0.624 0.682
τ 2m=10 0.630 0.615 0.680
Notes: The true value of τ2m is equal
to 0.64 for all m. HPDR stands for
Highest Posterior Density Region.
Table 4.1: Simulation Experiment: Posterior Distribution of the Variance of the Demand
Shocks
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Posterior HPDR
Mean 1% 99%
σ2m=1 0.107 0.082 0.148
σ2m=2 0.120 0.096 0.157
σ2m=3 0.118 0.088 0.144
σ2m=4 0.120 0.094 0.155
σ2m=5 0.136 0.104 0.182
σ2m=6 0.134 0.102 0.170
σ2m=7 0.128 0.096 0.170
σ2m=8 0.116 0.090 0.153
σ2m=9 0.121 0.090 0.160
σ2m=10 0.128 0.098 0.170
Notes: The true value of σ2m is equal
to 0.16 for all m. HPDR stands for
Highest Posterior Density Region.
Table 4.2: Simulation Experiment: Posterior Distribution of σ2m
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Posterior HPDR Real
Mean 1% 99% Value
Brand A 1.950* 1.081 4.089 2.0
Brand B 0.435* 0.209 3.446 2.0
Brand C 3.036* 1.958 3.755 2.0
Brand D 1.127* 0.890 3.514 2.0
Brand E 7.890* 5.126 8.983 8.0
Brand F 3.929 3.119 4.702 8.0
Brand G 3.066 2.421 4.500 8.0
Brand H 1.992 1.776 3.789 8.0
Brand I 2.295 1.817 3.617 4.0
Brand J 2.219 1.938 3.603 4.0
Attribute b 4.827 4.270 5.316 4.0
Attribute c 1.990 1.463 3.636 4.0
Attribute d 1.473* 0.732 3.202 2.0
Attribute e 2.988 2.693 3.490 2.0
Price 0.866 0.543 1.510 2.0
Promotion 1.533* 1.112 2.550 2.0
Note: * means that the real value is included in
the HPDR. HPDR stands for Highest Posterior
Density Region.
Table 4.3: Simulation Experiment: Posterior Distribution of the elements of D2.
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Posterior HPDR
Mean 1% 99%
τ 2m=1 5.329 0.606 53.233
τ 2m=2 7.518 4.782 11.322
τ 2m=3 0.814 0.659 1.034
τ 2m=4 0.895 0.684 1.172
τ 2m=5 1.500 1.127 2.042
τ 2m=6 1.284 0.989 1.715
τ 2m=7 0.831 0.577 1.281
τ 2m=8 0.638 0.574 0.734
τ 2m=9 0.838 0.754 1.013
τ 2m=10 0.467 0.395 0.589
τ 2m=11 1.015 0.805 1.322
τ 2m=12 5.664 1.632 65.241
τ 2m=13 2.631 1.906 3.652
τ 2m=14 0.752 0.672 0.901
τ 2m=15 1.917 1.490 2.572
τ 2m=16 1.439 1.316 1.607
τ 2m=17 4.144 0.602 44.067
τ 2m=18 1.612 1.328 2.101
Note: HPDR stands for Highest
Posterior Density Region.
Table 4.4: Application: Posterior Mean and HPDR of the τ 2m.
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Posterior HPDR
Mean 1% 99%
σ2m=1 0.0149 0.0090 0.0249
σ2m=2 0.0200 0.0102 0.0397
σ2m=3 0.0628 0.0357 0.1213
σ2m=4 0.0384 0.0206 0.0650
σ2m=5 0.0128 0.0080 0.0276
σ2m=6 0.0180 0.0101 0.0293
σ2m=7 0.0361 0.0208 0.0600
σ2m=8 0.0322 0.0190 0.0563
σ2m=9 0.0390 0.0202 0.0654
σ2m=10 0.0339 0.0196 0.0611
σ2m=11 0.0557 0.0272 0.1021
σ2m=12 0.0131 0.0072 0.0236
σ2m=13 0.0204 0.0113 0.0425
σ2m=14 0.0252 0.0150 0.0450
σ2m=15 0.0132 0.0088 0.0230
σ2m=16 0.0255 0.0139 0.0429
σ2m=17 0.0123 0.0073 0.0249
σ2m=18 0.0147 0.0087 0.0202
Note: HPDR stands for Highest
Posterior Density Region.
Table 4.5: Application: Posterior Mean and HPDR of the σ2m.
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Posterior HPDR
Mean 1% 99%
Market 1 Size A 0.811 -0.098 1.766
Size B -1.835 -3.025 -0.577
Size C 0.268 -0.643 1.164
Size D -0.513 -2.131 1.174
Size E -2.042 -3.053 -1.017
Price -2.684 -3.925 -1.529
Promotion -2.380 -6.455 1.856
Market 2 Size A 0.120 -0.207 0.438
Size B -0.934 -1.204 -0.669
Size D 0.414 0.059 0.739
Size E -0.218 -0.660 0.191
Price -0.904 -1.472 -0.309
Promotion -2.714 -4.229 -0.894
Market 3 Size A 0.749 0.397 1.093
Size B 0.237 -0.087 0.430
Size C -0.594 -1.015 -0.224
Size D -0.641 -0.877 -0.367
Size E -0.545 -0.821 -0.271
Price -0.593 -0.924 -0.211
Promotion -3.388 -4.764 -2.079
Note: HPDR stands for Highest Posterior Density Region.
Table 4.6: Application: Posterior Mean and HPDR of the Fixed Elements of fm (size and
price and promotion coeﬃcients) for 3 out 18 markets
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Posterior HPDR
Mean 1% 99%
D21 1.436 0.801 2.493
D22 0.798 0.653 0.896
D23 1.341 1.184 1.619
D24 0.831 0.628 1.461
D25 0.293 0.249 0.335
D26 0.874 0.739 1.022
D27 1.853 0.970 4.412
D28 0.500 0.443 0.575
D29 4.648 1.509 9.801
D210 0.395 0.327 0.457
D211 1.197 0.787 1.718
D212 0.569 0.466 0.727
D213 0.556 0.478 0.603
D214 0.628 0.522 0.700
D215 10.625 3.911 21.916
D216 0.432 0.329 0.502
D217 0.195 0.160 0.238
D218 0.990 0.750 1.257
D219 3.249 1.824 5.073
D220 0.221 0.182 0.276
D221 0.337 0.248 0.378
D222 0.602 0.540 0.698
D223 7.294 5.028 12.136
D224 0.700 0.623 0.794
D225 2.361 1.697 2.710
D226 0.754 0.654 0.955
D227 0.643 0.522 0.732
D228 0.558 0.472 0.667
D229 0.579 0.468 0.672
D230 0.587 0.474 0.797
D231 0.590 0.443 0.777
D232 0.624 0.490 0.811
Note: HPDR stands for Highest
Posterior Density Region.
Table 4.7: Application: Posterior Distribution of the Elements of the D2 matrix, where
Ψ = DSD.
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Figure 4.1: Performance of Halton Based Normal Draws versus Normal Draws
4.7 Tables and Figures 149
Correlation Implied by IW(G,v=11)
Correlation Element [2,8]
D
en
si
ty
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
Correlation Element [4,6]
D
en
si
ty
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
Correlation Implied by IW(G,v=20)
Correlation Element [2,8]
D
en
si
ty
−0.5 0.0 0.5
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
1.
2
Correlation Element [4,6]
D
en
si
ty
−0.5 0.0 0.5
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
1.
2
Figure 4.2: Prior Correlations for Diﬀerent Elements of Ψ. The degrees of freedom for
the Wishart Distribution v are set to 11 for the left panel and 20 for the right panel.
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Figure 4.4: Simulation Experiment: Real (Solid Line) versus Posterior Mean (Dots) and
the 99% HPDR (Dashed Lines) of the Time-Varying Brand Coeﬃcients at Market 5
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Figure 4.9: Cross-Price Elasticities at Market 2
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4.A Appendix
Iterative BLP Procedure
We use the iterative procedure proposed in BLP to obtain the μt = (μ1t, . . . , μJt). Note that,
for convenience, we omit the market indicators m here. The procedure consists of the following
steps. First we obtain H draws of υi. To this end we write the d-th draw as υ
d
i = Ψ
1/2ζd where
ζd is draw from a joint normal distribution which we obtain using scrambled Halton draws.
Given these draws and some initial value for μt we can compute the implied market shares sˆt.
Given the shares, both real st and implied sˆt, we can use the contraction mapping
μnewt = μ
old
t + log(st)− log(sˆt) (4.26)
to obtain a new value for μt. We repeat the contraction mapping computing the implied shares
sˆjt as (
H∑
i=1
exp(μoldjt + λ
′
jtυi)
exp(μ0t) +
∑
k exp(μ
old
kt + λ
′
ktυi)
)
/H (4.27)
for j = 1, . . . , J and t = 1, . . . , T and we stop the contraction mapping when the values of μnewt
and μoldt converge.
Note that we include and solve for the outside good utility μ0t in the contraction mapping
iterations. We discovered that the precision of the contraction mapping is higher when we iterate
over the utilities of all products together with the utility of the outside good.
Computing Elasticities
We use the following deﬁnition to compute the price elasticities ϕmjl between product j and l in
market m conditional on all model parameters:
ϕmjl =
pmlt
E[smjt ]
∂E[smjt ]
∂pmlt
=
pmlt∫
smjtπ(ηt; 0, τ
2
mI)dη
m
t
×
∫
∂
∂pmlt
smjtπ(ηt|τ
2
m)dη
m
t (4.28)
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where smjt is deﬁned in (4.7) and
∂
∂pmlt
smjt =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
−βm
∫
smijts
m
iktφ(υ
m
i ; 0, A
mΨA′m)dυ
m
i if k = j
βm
∫
smijt(1− s
m
ikt)φ(υ
m
i ; 0, A
mΨA′m)dυ
m
i if k = j,
(4.29)
and βm is the price coeﬃcient in market m. Finally, to obtain the posterior distribution of the
price elasticities we average (4.28) over the posterior draws for all parameters.
Chapter 5
Finding the Inﬂuentials that Drive
the Diﬀusion of New Technologies
In this chapter we consider the diﬀusion of similar technologies in a single market composed of
many locations. We address the identiﬁcation of the inﬂuential locations that drive the aggregate
sales of these new technologies based on aggregate sales data and location speciﬁc online search
data.
In this chapter we put forward a model where aggregate sales are a function of the online
search of potential consumers at many locations. We argue that a location may be inﬂuential
because of its power to drive aggregate sales and this power may be dynamic and evolving in time.
Second, the inﬂuential locations may produce spillover eﬀects over their neighbors and hence
we may observe clusters of inﬂuence. We apply Bayesian Variable Selection (BVS) techniques
and we use Multivariate Conditional Autoregressive Models (MCAR) to identify inﬂuentials
locations and their clustering.
We apply our methodology to the video-game consoles market and to new search data of
Google Insight. More precisely, we study the inﬂuential locations that drive the sales growth of
the Nintendo Wii, the Sony PS3 and Microsoft Xbox 360. Speciﬁcally, we study the diﬀusion
of these technologies at four diﬀerent stages of their life-cycle. In this way, we can identify the
group of inﬂuential locations and its composition in diﬀerent sub-periods.
Our results indicate that the inﬂuential locations and their economic value (measured by
search elasticities) vary over time. Moreover, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant geographical clusters of inﬂuen-
tial locations and the clusters composition varies during the life-cycle of the consoles. Finally, we
ﬁnd weak evidence that demographics explain the probability of a location to be inﬂuential. The
main managerial implication of our results is the notion that the group of inﬂuential locations
and their clustering varies during the life-cycle of a technology. Hence, managers should aim to
identify the identity plus the locations and the dynamics of inﬂuentials.
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5.1 Introduction
An important topic related to the diﬀusion of new technologies is the identiﬁcation of inﬂuentials.
Inﬂuentials play an important role as opinion leaders and trend setters and they critically aﬀect
the speed of adoption of new technologies (van den Bulte and Joshi, 2007).
Recent attention is being given to the identiﬁcation of the location and identities of these
inﬂuentials. In the literature, inﬂuentials are deﬁned as individuals or groups of individuals that
inﬂuence the behavior of others in a signiﬁcant way. Their inﬂuence has been studied at the
individual level (Trusov et al., 2010), at the ﬁrm level (Albuquerque et al., 2007) and at the
country level (van Everdingen et al., 2009). Inﬂuentials may have a speciﬁc location in a social
network (Trusov et al., 2010; Christakis and Fowler, 2009; Cho and Fowler, 2007) or a speciﬁc
physical location (Choi et al., 2009; Goldenberg et al., 2009). Their inﬂuence can be limited to
a few others (Christakis and Fowler, 2009, page 28) but their impact may also exceed national
boundaries (van Everdingen et al., 2009).
In this article we study the diﬀusion of a number of similar and competing technologies
and we address the identiﬁcation of the inﬂuential locations that drive the aggregate sales of
these new technologies. We put forward a model where sales are a function of the online search
registered at many diﬀerent locations. We will refer to this model as the sales-search model.
We know that consumers search for technologies (or products) online and we posit that online
search should be a good predictor of sales. However, people in many diﬀerent locations search
for products while only the consumers living in a subset of these locations may be the key groups
driving the sales of new technologies. Moreover, the inﬂuential locations may not always be the
same. And, the cross-inﬂuence among locations may be important and time-varying or ﬁxed in
time.
We present an approach that is new to the marketing literature and we study new search
data obtained from Google Insight. Our novelty is that we use the sales-search model together
with Bayesian Variable Selection techniques to select the locations that are most likely driving
the aggregate sales of these three new technologies. We use this methodology because there are
many possible important locations and a straightforward choice between them is not possible. In
addition, we present a second model with Multivariate Conditional Autoregressive priors (known
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as MCAR priors) to study the cross-location inﬂuence, the signiﬁcance of spatial clustering of
inﬂuential locations and the competing relationships between technologies. We will refer to this
model as the spatial model.
Our data consists of the aggregate weekly sales of the Nintendo Wii, the PlayStation 3
and the Microsoft Xbox 360 for the entire US market and online search data for each of these
products. The online search data were obtained from Google Insight and these data consist of
weekly indicators of online search for each of these technologies in each US state. The data
cover a period from the launch time of each technology up to February 2010 (approximately
four years) for both the sales and the online search data. This dataset is attractive because it
allows us study three very successful technologies that receive worldwide interest. These three
products were marketed simultaneously in all US states and this fact allows us to discard the
explanation that a region may become inﬂuential because its products were available at an earlier
introduction date relative to other regions.1 Moreover, these technologies have unique names
and they have kept these unique names for long periods of time and therefore we can obtain
reliable online search data for all US states.2 The sales data we observe can be easily classiﬁed
in diﬀerent periods of the products’ life-cycle and we will identify the inﬂuential locations at
these product life-cycle stages. We base these life-cycle stages on Rogers (2003) who suggests
that innovations are characterized by ﬁve periods when diﬀerent groups of people (innovators,
early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards) adopt an innovation. In this way we
will be able to uncover the location of inﬂuential groups of adopters at diﬀerent life-cycle phases
of the products. Our results suggest that the inﬂuential regions driving aggregate sales diﬀer
across the life-cycle of a technology. Moreover, our approach uncovers geographical clustering
of both inﬂuential and not inﬂuential regions. Inﬂuential regions seem to be close to each other
but we ﬁnd that their inﬂuence and the geographical clustering varies over time. In addition, we
ﬁnd only a weak association between demographic information and the probability that a region
is inﬂuential. Finally, our results indicate that a 10% increase in local online search translates
1For example, the launch time of the products studied by van Everdingen et al. (2009) diﬀers across
countries.
2Note that it is impossible to obtain state level sales data. We made inquiries at diﬀerent market
research ﬁrms, including NPD group, and to our knowledge there are no ﬁrms collecting these data.
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on average into a 1.5% percent increase in global sales but this number varies across regions and
diﬀusion periods and its range goes from 0 up to 3%.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2 we discuss previous literature and its
relationship to our work. In Section 5.3 we present our methodology. Later in Section 5.4 we give
details about our data and some speciﬁc details regarding our model. In Section 5.5 we present
our results and ﬁnally in Section 5.6 we conclude the chapter. The statistical methodology that
we use is presented in detail in Section 5.A and Section 5.A.
5.2 Literature Review
The literature related to our work can be classiﬁed into micro-studies of adoption, like Choi
et al. (2009), Goldenberg et al. (2009), Trusov et al. (2010), Garber et al. (2004) and Jank
and Kannan (2005), and into macro-studies of technology diﬀusion, like van Everdingen et al.
(2009), Albuquerque et al. (2007) and Putsis Jr et al. (1997).
van Everdingen et al. (2009) examine the global spillover eﬀects of product introductions
and take-oﬀs. They ﬁnd that the product take-oﬀ in a country can help to predict the take-
oﬀ of the same product in diﬀerent countries. In addition, they report asymmetric patterns
of inﬂuence and foreign susceptibility. The heterogeneity in the spill-over eﬀects is signiﬁcantly
explained by economic and demographic characteristics. Moreover, van Everdingen et al. (2009)
discuss brieﬂy the time dimension of inﬂuence. Their results suggest that there are countries
that have a large impact on others late in the diﬀusion process, while other countries may have
a smaller inﬂuence but sooner. Albuquerque et al. (2007) study the global adoption of two ISO
certiﬁcation standards and their results indicate that cross-country inﬂuence is important and
it improves the ﬁt of their model. They ﬁnd that the role of culture, geography and trade in the
adoption process is diﬀerent across the ISO standards. They use a multi-country diﬀusion model
and therefore they assume that a ﬁrm’s adoption is inﬂuenced by previous cumulative number
of adoptions by other ﬁrms in diﬀerent countries. Therefore, the global cumulative adoptions
of ISO standards foster more adoptions. Albuquerque et al. (2007) also ﬁnd that the inﬂuence
of cumulative past adoptions is stronger among ﬁrms close to each other or between ﬁrms in
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neighboring countries. Finally, Putsis Jr et al. (1997) study cross-country and inter-country
diﬀusion patterns and they report important cross-country inﬂuence on diﬀusion. Their ﬁndings
suggest that each country’s inﬂuence varies from product to product.
The micro diﬀusion studies have documented the role and economic value of inﬂuential
people in a social network (Trusov et al., 2010; Goldenberg et al., 2009) and the formation of
spatial clusters (Garber et al., 2004; Choi et al., 2009; Jank and Kannan, 2005). The study
of Garber et al. (2004) deals with the spatial distribution of adoption. They discovered that
the spatial pattern at early stages of the diﬀusion of a technology is an accurate predictor of
new product success. They argue that spatial clustering is a sign of imitation and therefore if
the spatial distribution of adoption shows clusters it is very likely that the diﬀusion process will
continue and sales will eventually take oﬀ. They compare the spatial distribution of adoption
against a uniform distribution of adoption and they ﬁnd that successful products show an early
spike of divergence between these two distributions (cross-entropy) while the cross-entropy of
product failures remains relatively constant and low.
More recently, Choi et al. (2009) studied the temporal and spatial patterns of adoption in
Pennsylvania and they discovered that the spatial clusters of adoption change over time and that
the cross-region (cross zip code) inﬂuence decays over time. In the same way, Jank and Kannan
(2005) report spatial clusters of customers with the same price sensitivity and preferences and
they use spatial random eﬀects to capture the geographical variation in preferences. The study
of Hofstede et al. (2002) is focused in identifying spatial country and cross-country segments
and they ﬁnd evidence of contiguous and spatial clustering of consumer preferences. They argue
that the spatial dependence in preferences should be useful to deﬁne distribution and marketing
decisions across countries. Bradlow et al. (2005) provide an overview of spatial models and
their relationship to marketing models. Finally, Trusov et al. (2010) and Goldenberg et al.
(2009) suggest that inﬂuentials can have a signiﬁcant economic value and they may foster the
diﬀusion of new technologies.
In this chapter we explore the time dimension and the spatial structure of inﬂuence at the
level between micro and macro, that is at the regional level within a country. The objective
of van Everdingen et al. (2009) and Albuquerque et al. (2007) is to identify the cross-country
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inﬂuence while our objective is to discover whether a region is inﬂuential and when it is in-
ﬂuential. In contrast with previous research, in our study a region may be inﬂuential initially
while later it may exert no inﬂuence at all or the other way around. That is, we consider the
inﬂuence across the life-cycle of the products’ diﬀusion while previous research has not focused
particularly on this aspect. Moreover, the Bayesian Variable Selection technique that we use
to detect inﬂuentials also distinguishes our study from previous work at a technical level. Fi-
nally, the visual inspection of our results suggests important geographical clusters of inﬂuential
regions and we study whether these geographical clusters of inﬂuence are statistically relevant.
For this latter purpose, we ﬁt a spatial model with MCAR priors and perform tests to detect
spatial clusters. It is the univariate version of this prior that has recently been applied in some
marketing studies, an example is Duan and Mela (2009). The MCAR prior can incorporate
both the spatial structure of the data as well as the relationship between technologies. To our
knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to use an MCAR prior on a marketing application while it must be
mentioned that this prior is frequently used in bio-statistics and environmental studies.
5.3 Methodology
The approach we use consists of two main parts. First, in Section 5.3.1 we describe how we use
Bayesian Variable Selection techniques to identify the regions and the sub-periods during which
each region is likely to drive aggregate sales. The Bayesian Variable Selection technique will
let us compute the posterior probability that a region is inﬂuential for any given sub-period.
In Section 5.3.2 we specify a second model to study these posterior probabilities and our main
objective in this section is to test whether there are important spatial clusters or demographic
variables explaining these inclusion probabilities.
5.3.1 The Sales-Search Model
We observe the aggregate sales yit of i = 1, . . . ,M technologies at time t = 1, . . . , T . We
also observe the online search sijt for each of these i technologies at J diﬀerent locations for
j = 1, . . . , J and time periods t = 1, . . . , T . In addition, sijtn will refer to the search observed
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at location j at a time t that is included in sub-period n, for n = 1, . . . , N . We deﬁne sub-
periods of diﬀusion because we are interested in studying the early, mid and late diﬀusion of the
technologies.
The sales equation is speciﬁed as
yit =
∑
j
∑
n
βijnsijtn + it where it ∼ N(0, σ
2
i ). (5.1)
where both yit and sijtn are in logs; sales are measured in hundred thousands and search is
measured as an “interest indicator” and its range goes from 10 to 110. We give more details
about the data in Section 5.4. We specify a technology i, sub-period n (for n = 1, . . . , N) and
region j speciﬁc coeﬃcient βijn and the error term jt is assumed to be normal with zero mean
and variance σ2i .
This speciﬁcation sums over all sub-periods n and locations j but estimating such a model
may be impossible when the total number of regressors J ×N is large relative to T . Note that
in practice J ×N can be even much larger than T . Moreover, it is very likely that many of the
βijn = 0 because of the likely correlation among the sijn and the fact that some locations may
simply do not drive sales. Hence, we need to select a subset location speciﬁc regressors that
consists of the best set of all possible regressors. We will call the set of all possible regressors X
and we will use Xγ to refer to the subset of best regressors. We will call qγ to the total number
of elements in Xγ and p to the total number of elements in X. That is, Xγ ⊂ X and X is a set
containing sijn for j = 1, . . . , J and n = 1, . . . , N . The purpose is to select a model that sums
only over this subset. Therefore we specify
yit =
∑
j
∑
n
γijnβijnsijn + it where it ∼ N(0, σ
2) (5.2)
as the sales equation where γijn is a technology and region sub-period speciﬁc indicator that
takes the value of 1 if sijn is in the subset Xγ and zero otherwise. Note that JN potential
regressors result in 2JN possible subsets and vectors γi where γi = (γi11, . . . , γiJN )
′.
One could suggest for equation (5.2) that we could also sum over i on the right hand side
and not only j and n. That is, the sales of a technology could be a function of the search for
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all technologies in the market. However, in our application there are over 2.57 × 1061 (that is
251×4 where 51 is the number of locations and 4 is the number of sub-periods) possible subsets of
regressors and if we were to sum over i there would be more than 1.69× 10184 (that is 23×52×4)
subsets of models. That is 6.61 × 10122 more subsets. Therefore, we study the relationship
between technologies with a diﬀerent model and we discuss this second model later in this
section. A second issue is that sales are a function of search while at the same time search may
be a function of sales. We are aware of this possible endogeneity of sales and search but as we
are using local indicators for search and aggregate measures for sales we believe the endogeneity
between them should be relatively weak. Finally, the right hand side could contain lags of the
search indicators. However, the inclusion of lags forbids us to compare the inclusion reason across
locations. For example, a location may be selected because it has an important lagged eﬀect
while another location because of its contemporaneous eﬀect on sales. We restrict the model to
a contemporaneous relationship between sales and search to be able to use the probability of a
location regressor to be in Xγ at a later stage in the spatial model.
We use Bayesian Variable Selection (BVS) as presented in George and McCulloch (1997) and
Chipman et al. (2001) to select the best subset of regressors. To use BVS we need proper priors,
we specify π(βi|σi, γi) as in Equation (5.5) and π(σ
2
i |γi) as in equation (5.7); these are the prior
distributions of βi coeﬃcients and the variance σ
2
i where βi = (βi11, . . . , βiJN ) and we specify
the prior distribution of the indicators π(γi). We use equations (5.9) and (5.10) to deﬁne the
prior on γ. BVS is an attractive technique because we can draw inferences on the probability
of inclusion for each potential regressor in model (5.2). That is, we can draw inferences on
the posterior distribution of the indicators given the data π(γi|yi) where yi = (yit, . . . , yiT )
′.
We estimate model (5.2) for each of the technologies separately and details of our estimation
approach are presented in the Appendix. In the Appendix we drop the sub-index i because we
use the same prior speciﬁcation for all technologies.
5.3.2 The Spatial Model
The indicator vector γi is composed of location and sub-period indicators and based on BVS
we can compute for each element of the vector γi the probability that it equals one. That is,
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we can compute each region’s posterior probability to be included at any sub-period and this
posterior is available for each of the technologies. We will refer to the logit transformation3 of
this posterior probability as p¯ijn where as before i refers to the technology, j to the location and
n is the sub-period index.
Our objective is to test whether the variation in inclusion probabilities is explained by demo-
graphic variables and whether there are signiﬁcant spatial eﬀects in these inclusion probabilities.
Hence, we propose a model where the posterior probabilities of inclusion depend on a set of co-
variates Zn and their corresponding coeﬃcients δn plus spatial eﬀects Φn and some noise εn.
We propose that
P¯n = Znθn +Φn + εn (5.3)
where P¯n = (p¯
′
1n, . . . , p¯
′
Mn), p¯
′
in = (p¯i1n, . . . , p¯iJn). That is, P¯n is a J × M matrix with the
inclusion probabilities of each of the J locations for each technology in M columns. Zn are
covariates available for period n where Zn is a J×K matrix where K is the number of covariates.
We assume θn = ι ⊗ δn is a K ×M matrix with coeﬃcients where ι is a row vector of ones of
size M and δn is a K × 1 vector of coeﬃcients. Φn = (φ
′
1n, . . . , φ
′
Mn), φ
′
in = (φi1n, . . . , φiJn) and
εn = (ε
′
1n, . . . , ε
′
Mn) with ε
′
in = (εi1n, . . . , εiJn). Both Φn and εn are J ×M matrices.
The spatial eﬀects Φ are a function of the relationships between technologies and the neigh-
borhood structure of the market. The Φ matrix is composed of one spatial eﬀect for each
location and technology. Each spatial eﬀect, in general terms, depends on the spatial eﬀects
of all technologies at neighboring locations. Hence, the spatial eﬀects reﬂect spatial clustering
but they do not detect the direction of inﬂuence between locations. This property of the spatial
eﬀects is speciﬁed in a prior distribution that depends on Λ, Ψ and ρ where Λ is a M×M matrix
with the covariance structure between the technologies, Ψ is a J × J matrix that measures the
neighborhood or the spatial structure of the market and ρ is a parameter that measures spatial
auto-correlation. The element Ψkl is either a ﬁxed distance between location k and l or an
indicator that takes a value of 1 if the location k is a neighbor of l and zero otherwise. In the
Appendix we provide details on how we draw inference about ρ, Λ, δn and the covariance matrix
3The function is log(p/(1-p)). A second transformation may be log(-log(p)). We tested both trans-
formations and our results are similar.
168 Finding the Inﬂuentials that Drive the Diﬀusion of New Technologies
associated with εn. Note that Ψ is a ﬁxed matrix with the neighborhood structure and hence
we do not estimate it. We give more details about Ψ in the next section.
Next, we use this speciﬁcation to explore if there are signiﬁcant spatial eﬀects Φ in the
posterior probabilities of inclusion for each region during each sub-period n and if there is a
relationship between the inclusion probabilities between technologies after controlling for the
covariates in Zn. Note that in the equation (5.3) we are pooling all technologies i = 1, . . . ,M
together. The reason we pool technologies together is that their inclusion probabilities may be
related to each other. For example, Texas could be the driver of growth for one technology but
not for all technologies. That is, technologies may be competing against each other when the
sign of the covariance terms in the Λ matrix are negative.
5.4 Data and Modeling Details
Weekly search indicators are available online from Google Insight for all US states and the
weekly series of sales data for the video-game consoles were obtained from VGchartz.com. The
data of VGchartz follows very closely the monthly ﬁgures of the NPD group. We use the latest
(year 2000) demographic information of the US Census Bureau for all US states.
In Figure 5.1 we present a printed screen with the exact keywords that we used to retrieve the
search data from Google Insights for Search (http://www.google.com/insights/search/). In
Table 5.1 we provide the R code to automatically retrieve the data from http://www.vgchartz.
com/.
To estimate the parameters of equation (5.2) we used MCMC and the chain ran for 210
thousand iterations and we discarded the ﬁrst 10 thousand. The equation that we used includes
a spline term that captures the seasonal ﬂuctuation of yi and its overall level. We ﬁt a smoothing
spline of yi as a function of time and we use 10 degrees of freedom as the smoothing parameter;
we refer to Hastie et al. (2001, page 127-137) for mode details on ﬁtting smoothing splines.
Sloot et al. (2006) also use spline terms to capture seasonal ﬂuctuations. The spline term is
always included on the right-hand side of the model and we do not use BVS on this term.
Finally, note that we used the logs of yi and the sijn and that yit are the sales of the technology
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i at the end of week t and sijt is the online search index for the technology i at state j during
the week t.
Next, we use MCMC to estimate the parameters of equation (5.3) and the chain ran for
2000 iterations and we discarded the ﬁrst 1000. We used much less draws than before because
convergence for a linear model is quite fast. We run the estimation for each sub-period separately
and therefore we estimated the parameters of equation (5.3) for each period.
We divide the sales data of each consoles in four periods of equal length. These periods
roughly correspond with the ﬁrst four stages of adoption proposed by Rogers (2003). It is likely
that in practice the length of each period varies per product or industries. For example, we know
that the time to take-oﬀ is diﬀerent across countries while within a country the take oﬀs tend to
occur at a systematic time diﬀerence relative to other countries (van Everdingen et al., 2009;
Golder and Tellis, 1997; Tellis et al., 2003). Additionally, we choose periods of equal length to
be able to compare the inﬂuential locations across products for exactly the same period of time.
In this way we can naturally make cross-product comparisons.
We estimate equation (5.2) and equation (5.3) separately because we prefer not to impose
any spatial structure on the prior probability of including regressors in the prior for the indicator
variables, that is π(γ). We estimate equation (5.3) for each life-cycle stage. The disadvantage
of treating equations (5.2) and (5.3) separately is that the uncertainty of the ﬁrst model is not
taken into account in the second model. A technical reason to keep the estimation of these
equations separately is that the posterior probabilities of inclusion are computed using the full
MCMC chain and therefore we know them only at the end of the estimation. However, the most
important reason to keep the estimation in two steps is not to impose a priori a spatial structure
in the inclusion probabilities. In this way, we leave the task of testing for spatial clustering as
a second step and we may be able to provide stronger evidence of any spatial structure.
We checked for convergence of the MCMC chains visually. We give more details about the
estimation approach and about the MCAR models in the Appendix.
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5.5 Results
In this section we ﬁrst discuss the results for the sales-search model in equation (5.2) and then
for the spatial model in equation (5.3).
5.5.1 Sales-Search Model Results
In Figure 5.2 we report the posterior distribution of the number of regressors included in the
model, that is qγ . The average number of regressors included in the model is around 17 with a
minimum near 5 and a maximum of 35 regressors. If the regressors were uniformly distributed
among diﬀusion periods this would mean an average of 4 regressors per diﬀusion period.4
In Figure 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 we graphically report the posterior means of the inclusion proba-
bilities for all US states and for the Nintendo Wii, the Sony PS3 and the Xbox 360, respectively.
All these probabilities are also reported in Table 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. In Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 the
lighter (green) colors represent high posterior probabilities while the darker (red) colors repre-
sent low inclusion probabilities. We include a map of the USA including state names in Figure
5.17 to facilitate the reading of these ﬁgures.
In Figure 5.3 we can observe that the states with the higher inclusion probabilities during the
ﬁrst diﬀusion period of the Nintendo Wii are Washington, Texas, Alabama, Wyoming, Kansas
and New Hampshire. So, this means that these states are more likely to drive the sales of the
Wii at an early stage of the Wii’s life-cycle. It is noticeable too that the Western states are
more likely to be included in the ﬁrst diﬀusion period while the North-Eastern states have very
low probability of inclusion. However, during the third diﬀusion period the Western states are
not likely to be included in the model while it is more likely to include states in the center
and North-East of the US. In the last diﬀusion period we ﬁnd that very few states have high
probabilities and these are Montana, North Dakota and New Hampshire. That is, there are
many locations driving the growth of the Wii at early life-cycle stages and relatively few engines
of growth at the end.
4Note that we chose υ1 = 7 and a = 50 and b = 100 (the parameters of the distribution of the prior
inclusion probability w, see equations (5.9) and (5.10)) and this set-up results in a relatively small number
of selected regressors qγ .
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The geographical pattern for the Sony PS3 is slightly similar to the pattern of the Nintendo
Wii. However, we ﬁnd that during the ﬁrst diﬀusion period there are many more states (relative
to the Wii) with high probability of inclusion. Again, all states in the West (California, Nevada,
Oregon and Washington) have higher inclusion probabilities but for the PS3 many states in
the East and North-East also have high probabilities during this ﬁrst period. In fact, there are
very few states with low probability of inclusion during the ﬁrst period and these are North and
South Dakota and Minnesota together with Kentucky and West Virginia. The opposite happens
during the last diﬀusion period where many states have low probability of being included in the
model. The probability of the West Coast states is high at the beginning and their inﬂuence
seems to diminish in subsequent periods. The maps seem to be revealing a boom bust pattern.
That is, many states may be inﬂuential during the ﬁrst diﬀusion period but of this ﬁrst set
of countries very few remain inﬂuential in the last diﬀusion period and other states take the
inﬂuential position.
The geographical pattern for the Microsoft Xbox 360 is very diﬀerent from the other two
consoles. The states with higher probabilities at each diﬀusion period are fewer than for the
other two consoles and the inﬂuential states seem to be far from each other. However, for all
regions, with the exception of Washington and Oregon, the states that seem more likely to be
included in the model are in the North and North-East of the US.
An immediate question about these results is whether there is evidence of geographical
clusters. At ﬁrst glance, inﬂuential regions seem to be neighbors of other inﬂuential regions
while not inﬂuential regions seem to be clustered together too. However, we may have some
bias when judging probability distributions (Kahneman et al., 1982, page 32) and therefore we
need some formal way to measure spatial association. Two statistics that can measure spatial
association in aereal data are the Moran’s I and the Geary’s C (Banerjee et al., 2004, page 71).
We computed both the Moran’s I and Geary’s C for all sub-periods and technologies and we
compared these two statistics, computed with the estimated inclusion probabilities, against the
distribution of these two statistics when we assume that the probability of inclusion is uniformly
distributed. Garber et al. (2004) also compare the observed spatial distribution of adoption
against the uniform distribution. High spatial association is indicated by high Moran’s I or by
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low Geary’s C statistics. In Figure 5.6 we report the statistics computed with the real inclusion
probabilities (in vertical dashed lines) and the distribution of both statistics (in the histograms)
assuming the inclusion probabilities follow a uniform distribution.5 As we can observe in Figure
5.6, when the inclusion probabilities are uniformly distributed the chances are very low to
obtain the statistics in the extremes where the Moran’s I and Geary’s C based on the estimated
inclusion probabilities appear. In the next section we discuss the results regarding the spatial
model (equation (5.3)) where we further investigate the signiﬁcance of the spatial clustering.
In the left panel of Figure 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 we report the histogram of the posterior mean of
the β coeﬃcients for all sub-periods of the Nintendo Wii, the PS3 and Xbox 360, respectively.
We report the distribution of the β|γ = 1 coeﬃcients. That is, we report their distribution given
that their corresponding regressor was included in the selected subset of regressors Xγ and we
refer to these coeﬃcients simply as β. In the right hand panel of the same ﬁgures we report
the distribution of the posterior mean of the β coeﬃcients divided by their posterior standard
deviation. As we can see, the size of the β coeﬃcients seems to be centered around 0.15 for the
Nintendo Wii and the Xbox 360 and around 0.12 for the PS3. This means that on average a local
(state) increase of 10% in search translates into a 1.5% or 1.2% increase in the global (nation)
sales. The signiﬁcance of the β coeﬃcients varies from 1 up to 2 and there are approximately 25
regressors with a ratio (posterior mean over posterior standard deviation) higher than 1.5 and
this number is quite satisfactory for a model with an average number of 17 regressors included.
In Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 we noticed that the probability of inclusion of diﬀerent regions
varies depending on the time period. In Figures 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 we draw a scatter plot
between the posterior mean of the search elasticity (the β coeﬃcients) for each state and their
probability of inclusion for the Nintendo Wii, the PS3 and Xbox 360, respectively. The vertical
and horizontal lines correspond with the average inclusion probability and the average search
elasticity, respectively. What we see in all three ﬁgures is that the place where states appear
varies not only relative to their inclusion probabilities but also relative to the search elasticities.
For example, in Figure 5.10 we see that the states with above average search elasticity and above
5We assume that the inclusion probability of each state is independent and identically distributed
from other states and they follow a uniform with range [0,1]. We draw the probability for every state
from the uniform and then we compute the Moran’s I and Geary’s C for L number of draws to obtain
the probability distribution of these two statistics.
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average inclusion probability (upper right quadrant) during the ﬁrst period are Kansas, New
Hampshire, Delaware, New Mexico, Nebraska, Arizona, New Jersey and California. However,
the upper right quadrant states that appear in the following periods are diﬀerent. For example,
during the forth period the upper-quadrant states are North Dakota, Montana, Maine and New
Hampshire. The Figures 5.11 and 5.12 for the PS3 and Xbox 360 conﬁrm the same pattern,
diﬀerent groups of states appear at each quadrant of the scatter plots at each sub-period. These
results point that some states may be important earlier in the diﬀusion of a technology while
other states become important during later states of the diﬀusion. Note that this result is not
explained by diﬀerent introduction dates as the three consoles were launched simultaneously in
all US states.
The sales-search model takes into account the relationship between aggregate sales and the
online search at many diﬀerent locations. This provides with interesting inclusion probabilities
and we can rank the states according to their power to drive the aggregate sales. If we were to
ignore all these details and we run a simple regression between aggregate sales and aggregate
online search we obtain the results reported in Table 5.13. The overall sensitivity of sales to
aggregate search (an indicator of search for all US) is larger than the sensitivity of sales to
state-speciﬁc search. The estimates range from 0.17 up to 0.46, see the coeﬃcient of search in
this table. These last results seem intuitive but we miss the detailed region-speciﬁc analysis and
a possible spatial story behind the results of the sales search model.
5.5.2 Results of the Spatial Model
In Table 5.5 we report the posterior mean and the posterior standard deviation of the δ coef-
ﬁcients of the spatial model (5.3). In the Table we report the δ coeﬃcients for a set of seven
variables. We tested other demographic variables measuring the ethnic origin and age distri-
bution but we did not ﬁnd them as signiﬁcant and they were highly correlated with the set of
seven variables that we kept in the model.
As we can observe, our results indicate that there is not a very strong association between
demographic variables and the inclusion probabilities at each state. The reason why the posterior
standard deviations might be large is because we have only 48 states in the probability model
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and therefore we have very few observations to estimate the coeﬃcients. A second reason may
be that we observe a relatively small variation in our dependent variable. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd
some interesting features in the δn coeﬃcients.
The variables that seem to be relevant are the percentage of the population in college dorms
and the percentage of the population that is married (percentage of households with married
couples). Both of these variables are somewhat signiﬁcant during the ﬁrst and second diﬀusion
periods. The eﬀect of travel time to work is not signiﬁcant but it is most of the time negative,
as we would expect given than longer commuting time reduces leisure time to play video games
or to search for consoles. Population density and income per capita seem to be slightly more
important in the last diﬀusion stage while in the ﬁrst stages of diﬀusion they are not. A last
important feature to notice is that in many cases the size and sign of the δn coeﬃcients may
vary according to the diﬀusion stage of the products. For example, it may be that students and
married couples tend to buy more video-game consoles at an early stage, as a high proportion of
these groups increases the chance of a state being inﬂuential, while these groups may not buy at
the end of the diﬀusion when we see that other parameters like population density and income
per capita are slightly more important.
We estimate the spatial random eﬀects Φn along side with the δn coeﬃcients and we report
their posterior mean and their posterior mean divided by their posterior standard deviation in
Tables 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 for the ﬁrst, second, third and fourth diﬀusion periods, respectively.
In contrast with the δn coeﬃcients, several of the spatial eﬀects are signiﬁcant. For example, in
Table 5.6 we see that the spatial eﬀect of Texas is signiﬁcant both for the Nintendo Wii and the
PS3 while it is not for the Xbox 360. This means that Texas is more likely to be driving the
sales of the Wii and PS3 relative to the Xbox 360 during the ﬁrst diﬀusion period. In the same
table we notice that Ohio, South Dakota and Washington are positive and signiﬁcant for the
Xbox 360. The spatial eﬀect of Washington is signiﬁcant for all three technologies. Tables 5.7,
5.8 and 5.9 show similar many signiﬁcant spatial eﬀects during the rest of the diﬀusion periods.
In Figures 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 we report the distribution of the spatial eﬀects for the
Nintendo Wii and the ﬁrst, second, third and fourth diﬀusion periods, respectively. In Figure
5.13 we can observe that for the ﬁrst diﬀusion period the states with higher posterior spatial
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eﬀects are Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Texas, Washington and Wyoming. The states with
the lowest spatial eﬀects are Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri and Rhode Island. Texas and
Wyoming continue to have a high spatial eﬀect in the next diﬀusion period, see Figure 5.14 but
the other states that had a high spatial eﬀect in the ﬁrst period no longer continue to be high in
the second. In general, the spatial eﬀect for each state varies according to the diﬀusion time of
the technologies. For example, according to our results Texas is very inﬂuential for the Nintendo
Wii at an early stage of its life-cycle while this state is not inﬂuential at the end of the life-cycle
of the Wii.
We are ﬁnding signiﬁcant spatial random eﬀects for several states and all diﬀusion periods.
However, a natural concern is whether the δn coeﬃcients may have a diﬀerent level of signiﬁcance
if we were to exclude the spatial eﬀects from equation (5.3). In Table 5.10 we report the same δn
coeﬃcients estimated with ordinary least squares and their level of signiﬁcance is relatively the
same as before. Again, the population in college dorms and the percentage of households with
married couples seem to be the more important variables. That is, the spatial eﬀects explain
geographical variation without aﬀecting the inference we draw from the posteriors of the δn
coeﬃcients.
In Table 5.11 we present the posterior distribution of the correlations derived from the
matrix Λ. The matrix Λ is a 3 × 3 covariance matrix and it measures the covariance between
the spatial eﬀects of diﬀerent technologies. In the ﬁrst diﬀusion period, for example, we ﬁnd
that the correlation of the spatial eﬀects of the Xbox 360 are negatively correlated with the
spatial eﬀects of the PS3. The posterior mean of the correlation is −0.257 and the association
is signiﬁcant (zero is almost excluded from the 95% highest posterior density region). This
negative correlation implies that if a state is likely to drive the sales of the Xbox 360 then it is
not likely to drive the sales of the PS3. The association between the spatial eﬀects of the Wii and
those of the Xbox and PS3 are not diﬀerent from zero (in these cases 0 is almost in the middle
of the highest posterior density region) during the ﬁrst diﬀusion period. We ﬁnd some other
signiﬁcant associations during the third and fourth periods while in the second period we ﬁnd no
association between the spatial eﬀects of the diﬀerent technologies. The variation in correlation
structure shows that at an early stage there is some degree of competition only between the
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PS3 and Xbox 360 (because of the negative correlation in their spatial eﬀects) while at later
stages technologies seem to nurture each other (because we ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive correlations
in their spatial eﬀects).
Finally, in Table 5.12 we report the highest posterior density region for the ρ coeﬃcients.
We ﬁnd roughly the same spatial decay (or spatial correlation) during all diﬀusion periods.
The posterior mean of the ρn for all n is around 0.82. This number should be between 0 and
1 and numbers close to 1 indicate high spatial correlation between a state and its neighbors.
The estimate of the ρ coeﬃcient together with the Φn spatial eﬀects are evidence of signiﬁcant
clusters of spillover eﬀects between states. We do not know the direction of inﬂuence between
the states but the model parameters capture signiﬁcant spatial dependence among neighboring
states.
5.6 Conclusions
We applied Bayesian variable selection methods to identify the inﬂuential locations for the
diﬀusion of new technologies. We deﬁne inﬂuential locations as those that are more likely to
drive the aggregate sales of the technologies. For our particular data on game consoles, we ﬁnd
that the inﬂuential locations change over time and that there is geographical clustering that is
signiﬁcantly captured by the spatial random eﬀects in the probability model and by diﬀerent
measures of spatial association.
Moreover, we ﬁnd variation in the groups of inﬂuential locations over time and the size of
their associated search elasticity varies over time too. The search elasticity for the technologies
at inﬂuential locations is on average 0.15. That is, an increase of 10% in local (state) search
translates into a 1.5% increase in country level sales. Finally, we ﬁnd some evidence of time
variation in the association between spatial aﬀects. Our results suggest that the geographical
clustering is not driven by demographic heterogeneity and we ﬁnd some evidence that suggests
that the demographic eﬀects vary over time.
In summary, our results suggest that inﬂuential locations may change over time together with
the relationship between technologies and the relevance of demographics. The main managerial
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implications of this research is the notion that the group of inﬂuential locations is not ﬁxed and
therefore when a manager is looking to identify inﬂuentials, she or he should expect inﬂuentials
to play a role at diﬀerent locations and at diﬀerent times. If managers were to ignore the spatial
heterogeneity they will miss the valuable insights of how to allocate their marketing eﬀorts based
on the important locations for their products. The relevant question is not only who is inﬂuential
but where and when and for how long a consumer or a group of consumers is inﬂuential.
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5.7 Tables and Figures
library(RCurl)
library(XML)
wii_sales<-rep(0,416)
week.numbers<-seq((39838)-2184,40358,by=7)
for(i in 1:416)
{
part1<-"http://vgchartz.com/hwtable.php?cons[]=Wii&reg[]=America&start="
part2<-"&end="
week<-week.numbers[i]
url.dir<-paste(part1,week,part2,week,sep="")
url.text <- getURL(url.dir)
doc <- htmlParse(url.text,useInternalNodes=TRUE, error=function(...){})
x = xpathSApply(doc, "//table//td|//table//th", xmlValue)
wii_sales[i]<-as.numeric(gsub(",", ".", x[12]))
}
write.csv(wii_sales,file="wii_data.csv")
Note that the keyword Wii should be changed to PS3 or X360
to retrieve the data for each of these consoles.
Table 5.1: R Code to Retrieve Data from VGChartz.com
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Posterior Inclusion Probabilities
1st Period 2nd Period 3rd Period 4th Period
Alabama 0.111 0.083 0.080 0.117
Alaska 0.074 0.069 0.091 0.115
Arizona 0.092 0.110 0.070 0.075
Arkansas 0.091 0.093 0.103 0.089
California 0.093 0.093 0.081 0.116
Colorado 0.076 0.069 0.098 0.079
Connecticut 0.074 0.057 0.103 0.071
Delaware 0.105 0.058 0.079 0.103
District of Columbia 0.076 0.108 0.077 0.083
Florida 0.096 0.061 0.090 0.077
Georgia 0.056 0.079 0.089 0.076
Hawaii 0.072 0.096 0.077 0.099
Idaho 0.086 0.082 0.075 0.112
Illinois 0.073 0.092 0.080 0.066
Indiana 0.079 0.059 0.065 0.082
Iowa 0.077 0.077 0.083 0.125
Kansas 0.108 0.085 0.088 0.083
Kentucky 0.075 0.091 0.093 0.099
Louisiana 0.102 0.122 0.081 0.065
Maine 0.079 0.080 0.090 0.137
Maryland 0.059 0.088 0.057 0.079
Massachusetts 0.084 0.119 0.096 0.074
Michigan 0.070 0.079 0.086 0.086
Minnesota 0.078 0.098 0.088 0.074
Mississippi 0.058 0.092 0.105 0.060
Missouri 0.086 0.075 0.088 0.093
Montana 0.095 0.084 0.099 0.173
Nebraska 0.092 0.073 0.093 0.090
Nevada 0.096 0.096 0.068 0.094
New Hampshire 0.105 0.097 0.076 0.154
New Jersey 0.095 0.127 0.103 0.073
New Mexico 0.099 0.096 0.113 0.105
New York 0.078 0.068 0.080 0.054
North Carolina 0.096 0.071 0.083 0.066
North Dakota 0.081 0.086 0.082 0.190
Ohio 0.078 0.090 0.102 0.089
Oklahoma 0.082 0.098 0.081 0.078
Oregon 0.098 0.144 0.063 0.055
Pennsylvania 0.064 0.081 0.065 0.062
Rhode Island 0.086 0.074 0.082 0.101
South Carolina 0.090 0.075 0.083 0.097
South Dakota 0.098 0.079 0.070 0.098
Tennessee 0.092 0.073 0.119 0.068
Texas 0.129 0.075 0.086 0.094
Utah 0.097 0.097 0.089 0.097
Vermont 0.076 0.073 0.136 0.091
Virginia 0.100 0.070 0.079 0.086
Washington 0.126 0.073 0.065 0.095
West Virginia 0.073 0.062 0.108 0.119
Wisconsin 0.072 0.076 0.131 0.060
Wyoming 0.107 0.115 0.107 0.119
Note: In bold probabilities larger than 0.10
Table 5.2: State Inclusion Probabilities for Each Diﬀusion Period for the Nintendo Wii
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Posterior Inclusion Probabilities
1st Period 2nd Period 3rd Period 4th Period
Alabama 0.088 0.073 0.094 0.086
Alaska 0.081 0.094 0.084 0.185
Arizona 0.081 0.063 0.091 0.057
Arkansas 0.101 0.090 0.098 0.093
California 0.096 0.096 0.088 0.080
Colorado 0.106 0.092 0.092 0.099
Connecticut 0.104 0.102 0.093 0.076
Delaware 0.086 0.078 0.118 0.090
District of Columbia 0.088 0.099 0.098 0.075
Florida 0.100 0.079 0.091 0.083
Georgia 0.095 0.097 0.103 0.067
Hawaii 0.098 0.080 0.094 0.088
Idaho 0.092 0.085 0.080 0.076
Illinois 0.091 0.107 0.082 0.088
Indiana 0.085 0.081 0.104 0.085
Iowa 0.087 0.102 0.087 0.093
Kansas 0.079 0.094 0.083 0.080
Kentucky 0.070 0.098 0.084 0.085
Louisiana 0.087 0.093 0.091 0.076
Maine 0.086 0.071 0.073 0.115
Maryland 0.095 0.119 0.085 0.093
Massachusetts 0.095 0.093 0.082 0.071
Michigan 0.089 0.109 0.081 0.086
Minnesota 0.073 0.068 0.081 0.086
Mississippi 0.086 0.085 0.087 0.078
Missouri 0.084 0.093 0.087 0.084
Montana 0.091 0.089 0.089 0.103
Nebraska 0.092 0.109 0.089 0.093
Nevada 0.096 0.087 0.090 0.072
New Hampshire 0.091 0.087 0.090 0.140
New Jersey 0.090 0.094 0.072 0.071
New Mexico 0.083 0.097 0.069 0.105
New York 0.096 0.089 0.093 0.064
North Carolina 0.103 0.083 0.082 0.071
North Dakota 0.070 0.076 0.084 0.094
Ohio 0.088 0.097 0.105 0.073
Oklahoma 0.080 0.091 0.091 0.084
Oregon 0.104 0.077 0.101 0.102
Pennsylvania 0.089 0.091 0.079 0.074
Rhode Island 0.081 0.087 0.082 0.130
South Carolina 0.090 0.092 0.076 0.090
South Dakota 0.066 0.068 0.079 0.094
Tennessee 0.089 0.087 0.095 0.091
Texas 0.108 0.093 0.113 0.065
Utah 0.101 0.072 0.109 0.097
Vermont 0.090 0.086 0.100 0.141
Virginia 0.096 0.083 0.062 0.073
Washington 0.101 0.081 0.095 0.069
West Virginia 0.074 0.083 0.106 0.097
Wisconsin 0.089 0.087 0.092 0.095
Wyoming 0.092 0.086 0.094 0.090
Note: In bold probabilities larger than 0.10
Table 5.3: State Inclusion Probabilities for Each Diﬀusion Period for the Sony PS3
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Posterior Inclusion Probabilities
1st Period 2nd Period 3rd Period 4th Period
Alabama 0.085 0.091 0.090 0.079
Alaska 0.104 0.188 0.080 0.199
Arizona 0.077 0.074 0.080 0.054
Arkansas 0.098 0.082 0.087 0.075
California 0.099 0.082 0.075 0.074
Colorado 0.078 0.088 0.087 0.084
Connecticut 0.078 0.081 0.091 0.101
Delaware 0.116 0.136 0.075 0.204
District of Columbia 0.091 0.096 0.097 0.071
Florida 0.102 0.066 0.100 0.065
Georgia 0.084 0.073 0.115 0.092
Hawaii 0.089 0.115 0.055 0.076
Idaho 0.087 0.109 0.076 0.137
Illinois 0.086 0.075 0.105 0.100
Indiana 0.086 0.087 0.074 0.064
Iowa 0.097 0.126 0.083 0.100
Kansas 0.114 0.082 0.087 0.081
Kentucky 0.103 0.078 0.101 0.109
Louisiana 0.067 0.074 0.082 0.058
Maine 0.097 0.113 0.097 0.095
Maryland 0.087 0.066 0.085 0.087
Massachusetts 0.095 0.100 0.085 0.079
Michigan 0.092 0.076 0.096 0.082
Minnesota 0.097 0.092 0.073 0.095
Mississippi 0.096 0.062 0.131 0.080
Missouri 0.079 0.087 0.098 0.073
Montana 0.071 0.059 0.087 0.096
Nebraska 0.084 0.067 0.071 0.095
Nevada 0.093 0.074 0.071 0.084
New Hampshire 0.089 0.098 0.089 0.119
New Jersey 0.085 0.110 0.095 0.071
New Mexico 0.091 0.112 0.071 0.100
New York 0.083 0.106 0.101 0.093
North Carolina 0.091 0.103 0.090 0.066
North Dakota 0.129 0.082 0.113 0.113
Ohio 0.099 0.094 0.083 0.079
Oklahoma 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.094
Oregon 0.116 0.081 0.087 0.081
Pennsylvania 0.096 0.087 0.093 0.085
Rhode Island 0.102 0.113 0.092 0.127
South Carolina 0.090 0.081 0.082 0.073
South Dakota 0.132 0.097 0.118 0.102
Tennessee 0.084 0.096 0.134 0.089
Texas 0.093 0.073 0.078 0.063
Utah 0.085 0.088 0.077 0.059
Vermont 0.082 0.110 0.152 0.082
Virginia 0.103 0.074 0.078 0.064
Washington 0.111 0.101 0.100 0.079
West Virginia 0.085 0.065 0.140 0.114
Wisconsin 0.090 0.087 0.093 0.086
Wyoming 0.070 0.125 0.105 0.084
Note: In bold probabilities larger than 0.10
Table 5.4: State Inclusion Probabilities for Each Diﬀusion Period for the Microsoft Xbox
360
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MCAR First Diﬀusion Period
Coeﬃcient St. Dev. t-value
Intercept -2.3684 0.0163 -145.2131
Male Female Ratio 0.0103 0.0326 0.3152
Population Density 0.0042 0.0270 0.1569
Population in College Dorms 0.0337 0.0200 1.6820
Married Couple 0.0236 0.0171 1.3834
Travel Time to Work -0.0015 0.0194 -0.0751
Income per Capita 0.0106 0.0157 0.6723
MCAR Second Diﬀusion Period
Coeﬃcient St. Dev. t-value
Intercept -2.4029 0.0177 -135.4291
Male Female Ratio 0.0345 0.0361 0.9561
Population Density 0.0357 0.0285 1.2506
Population in College Dorms 0.0304 0.0232 1.3138
Married Couple -0.0208 0.0202 -1.0332
Travel Time to Work -0.0183 0.0221 -0.8307
Income per Capita -0.0185 0.0185 -1.0007
MCAR Third Diﬀusion Period
Coeﬃcient St. Dev. t-value
Intercept -2.3715 0.0214 -110.8737
Male Female Ratio -0.0192 0.0409 -0.4694
Population Density -0.0294 0.0343 -0.8562
Population in College Dorms -0.0245 0.0251 -0.9758
Married Couple 0.0231 0.0251 0.9208
Travel Time to Work 0.0163 0.0258 0.6329
Income per Capita -0.0103 0.0199 -0.5181
MCAR Fourth Diﬀusion Period
Coeﬃcient St. Dev. t-value
Intercept -2.3987 0.0283 -84.6213
Male Female Ratio -0.0305 0.0589 -0.5171
Population Density 0.0464 0.0474 0.9795
Population in College Dorms -0.0218 0.0339 -0.6436
Married Couple -0.0013 0.0324 -0.0402
Travel Time to Work -0.0157 0.0352 -0.4457
Income per Capita 0.0191 0.0267 0.7141
Note: The ﬁrst column reports the posterior mean of the coeﬃcient.
The second column reports the posterior standard deviation and the
third column reports the ratio of the posterior mean over the posterior
standard deviation, called here t-value.
Table 5.5: Posterior of MCAR δ coeﬃcients
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MCAR First Diﬀusion Period
Wii t-value PS3 t-value Xbox360 t-value
Alabama 0.260 3.990 0.025 0.380 -0.011 -0.196
Arizona 0.053 0.780 -0.066 -1.203 -0.131 -2.336
Arkansas 0.041 0.770 0.141 2.329 0.110 2.093
California -0.038 -0.481 -0.001 -0.035 0.023 0.356
Colorado -0.164 -2.412 0.154 2.322 -0.141 -2.268
Connecticut -0.213 -2.762 0.135 1.903 -0.155 -2.167
Delaware 0.201 3.464 -0.005 -0.103 0.302 5.033
Florida 0.081 1.306 0.132 2.304 0.150 2.406
Georgia -0.462 -6.174 0.063 1.322 -0.055 -1.172
Idaho -0.243 -3.420 0.053 0.952 -0.034 -0.525
Illinois -0.070 -1.349 -0.007 -0.261 -0.053 -1.149
Indiana -0.232 -4.463 -0.014 -0.237 -0.066 -1.417
Iowa -0.138 -2.370 -0.058 -1.276 -0.051 -0.861
Kansas -0.162 -3.003 -0.037 -0.728 0.074 1.578
Kentucky 0.205 3.492 -0.101 -2.010 0.255 4.228
Louisiana -0.097 -1.705 -0.174 -2.826 0.218 3.517
Maine 0.183 2.815 0.010 0.151 -0.254 -4.285
Maryland -0.099 -1.467 -0.020 -0.460 0.105 1.764
Massachusetts -0.443 -5.272 0.027 0.278 -0.064 -0.882
Michigan -0.078 -1.512 0.041 0.791 0.047 0.952
Minnesota -0.264 -4.806 -0.037 -0.761 0.009 0.107
Mississippi -0.068 -0.913 -0.137 -2.282 0.152 2.150
Missouri -0.409 -5.690 -0.020 -0.524 0.080 1.520
Montana -0.013 -0.253 -0.037 -0.700 -0.095 -1.832
Nebraska 0.069 1.258 0.026 0.548 -0.217 -3.822
Nevada 0.056 0.629 0.055 0.717 -0.030 -0.324
New Hampshire 0.060 0.952 0.060 1.082 0.027 0.455
New Jersey 0.134 1.442 -0.011 -0.131 -0.034 -0.400
New Mexico 0.129 2.338 0.066 1.228 0.012 0.143
New York 0.052 0.622 -0.116 -1.556 -0.029 -0.410
North Carolina -0.160 -3.347 0.046 0.966 -0.099 -1.794
North Dakota 0.089 1.459 0.153 2.331 0.037 0.568
Ohio -0.126 -2.172 -0.266 -3.950 0.342 5.245
Oklahoma -0.125 -2.507 0.003 0.129 0.118 2.365
Oregon -0.065 -1.420 -0.081 -1.685 -0.020 -0.365
Pennsylvania 0.027 0.433 0.075 1.114 0.187 2.729
Rhode Island -0.289 -3.190 0.059 0.587 0.133 1.393
South Carolina 0.035 0.472 0.044 0.780 0.043 0.771
South Dakota 0.108 2.093 -0.276 -4.334 0.409 6.168
Tennessee 0.034 0.688 0.006 0.111 -0.054 -1.247
Texas 0.314 4.926 0.128 2.476 -0.020 -0.262
Utah 0.009 0.147 0.047 0.716 -0.124 -1.475
Vermont -0.139 -2.786 0.037 0.498 -0.057 -1.164
Virginia 0.082 1.547 0.038 0.831 0.109 2.372
Washington 0.353 6.191 0.121 2.318 0.224 4.035
West Virginia -0.160 -2.826 -0.142 -2.508 -0.011 -0.243
Wisconsin -0.242 -4.815 -0.024 -0.626 -0.013 -0.288
Wyoming 0.180 2.908 0.033 0.611 -0.239 -3.781
Note: The numbers correspond to the Φ parameters of the MCAR model for the ﬁrst
diﬀusion period. We report the posterior mean of the spatial eﬀects for the Wii, PS3
and X360 and the ratio of the posterior mean over the posterior standard deviation.
Table 5.6: Posterior of MCAR Spatial Eﬀects
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MCAR Second Diﬀusion Period
Wii t-value PS3 t-value Xbox360 t-value
Alabama 0.005 0.082 -0.106 -1.394 0.096 1.139
Arizona 0.231 2.843 -0.278 -2.827 -0.148 -1.867
Arkansas 0.096 1.393 0.061 0.972 -0.024 -0.365
California -0.004 -0.039 0.019 0.185 -0.134 -1.459
Colorado -0.211 -2.324 0.053 0.683 0.005 0.091
Connecticut -0.392 -4.157 0.172 1.713 -0.061 -0.599
Delaware -0.365 -4.093 -0.080 -0.950 0.482 5.568
Florida -0.350 -4.939 -0.090 -1.367 -0.284 -3.924
Georgia -0.072 -1.085 0.118 1.746 -0.153 -2.014
Idaho 0.113 1.363 -0.057 -0.792 0.288 3.083
Illinois -0.063 -0.859 -0.020 -0.334 0.217 2.850
Indiana 0.046 0.592 0.180 2.409 -0.152 -2.212
Iowa -0.349 -4.061 -0.047 -0.740 0.017 0.274
Kansas -0.100 -1.419 0.159 2.145 0.382 4.606
Kentucky 0.005 0.129 0.095 1.494 -0.030 -0.495
Louisiana 0.072 0.934 0.127 1.718 -0.089 -1.073
Maine 0.406 5.404 0.123 1.628 -0.104 -1.115
Maryland -0.035 -0.398 -0.140 -1.670 0.305 3.512
Massachusetts -0.054 -0.581 0.232 2.550 -0.321 -3.198
Michigan 0.306 4.063 0.053 0.796 0.129 1.833
Minnesota -0.084 -1.101 0.223 2.738 -0.111 -1.645
Mississippi 0.139 1.745 -0.203 -2.384 0.085 1.070
Missouri 0.082 1.156 0.018 0.254 -0.278 -3.091
Montana -0.163 -2.117 0.044 0.563 -0.017 -0.213
Nebraska -0.020 -0.301 0.034 0.612 -0.351 -3.717
Nevada -0.212 -1.893 0.161 1.571 -0.299 -2.607
New Hampshire 0.176 2.273 0.074 0.955 -0.086 -1.124
New Jersey 0.091 0.830 -0.013 -0.146 0.108 1.013
New Mexico 0.372 4.661 0.069 1.076 0.234 2.975
New York 0.029 0.272 0.032 0.391 0.182 1.950
North Carolina -0.259 -3.558 0.010 0.128 0.177 2.434
North Dakota -0.237 -2.899 -0.075 -1.059 0.134 1.736
Ohio -0.036 -0.403 -0.137 -1.909 -0.087 -1.222
Oklahoma 0.052 0.714 0.102 1.671 0.087 1.135
Oregon 0.128 1.746 0.050 0.816 -0.012 -0.202
Pennsylvania 0.442 4.291 -0.143 -1.726 -0.105 -1.268
Rhode Island -0.139 -1.234 -0.022 -0.172 -0.079 -0.691
South Carolina -0.133 -1.663 0.080 1.223 -0.055 -0.710
South Dakota -0.102 -1.486 -0.216 -2.726 0.096 1.267
Tennessee -0.137 -1.954 0.027 0.502 0.108 1.570
Texas -0.171 -2.121 0.043 0.518 -0.207 -2.642
Utah 0.160 1.554 -0.118 -1.298 0.078 0.766
Vermont -0.137 -1.648 0.025 0.432 0.269 3.278
Virginia -0.181 -2.476 -0.013 -0.137 -0.125 -1.923
Washington -0.156 -1.911 -0.051 -0.760 0.164 1.966
West Virginia -0.251 -2.873 0.018 0.230 -0.211 -2.454
Wisconsin -0.143 -1.858 0.000 -0.016 -0.011 -0.187
Wyoming 0.254 2.904 -0.031 -0.453 0.333 3.692
Note: The numbers correspond to the Φ parameters of the MCAR model for the
second diﬀusion period. We report the posterior mean of the spatial eﬀects for the
Wii, PS3 and X360 and the ratio of the posterior mean over the posterior standard
deviation.
Table 5.7: Posterior of MCAR Spatial Eﬀects
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MCAR Third Diﬀusion Period
Wii t-value PS3 t-value Xbox360 t-value
Alabama -0.155 -2.445 0.003 0.000 -0.045 -0.739
Arizona -0.247 -4.132 0.003 0.112 -0.122 -2.098
Arkansas 0.085 1.788 0.038 0.831 -0.075 -1.489
California -0.016 -0.192 0.060 0.748 -0.093 -1.187
Colorado 0.111 1.571 0.056 0.795 0.002 0.000
Connecticut 0.216 2.797 0.107 1.416 0.093 1.206
Delaware -0.120 -2.013 0.292 4.726 -0.169 -2.349
Florida 0.033 0.730 0.040 0.932 0.141 3.158
Georgia -0.003 -0.161 0.134 2.776 0.256 5.227
Idaho -0.209 -2.808 -0.011 -0.166 -0.548 -5.979
Illinois -0.143 -3.097 -0.077 -1.455 -0.135 -2.773
Indiana -0.104 -2.571 -0.069 -1.580 0.176 3.609
Iowa -0.343 -5.740 0.131 2.517 -0.213 -3.606
Kansas -0.089 -1.768 -0.039 -0.748 -0.090 -1.730
Kentucky -0.055 -1.379 -0.114 -2.935 -0.068 -1.564
Louisiana 0.013 0.159 -0.083 -1.145 0.102 1.350
Maine -0.147 -2.509 -0.026 -0.453 -0.136 -2.225
Maryland 0.029 0.381 -0.183 -2.747 0.101 1.594
Massachusetts -0.336 -3.908 0.069 0.842 0.068 0.830
Michigan 0.107 2.373 -0.049 -1.242 -0.023 -0.579
Minnesota -0.028 -0.632 -0.086 -1.840 0.081 1.874
Mississippi -0.049 -0.737 -0.129 -1.942 -0.244 -3.254
Missouri 0.149 2.612 -0.041 -0.930 0.369 5.740
Montana -0.035 -0.683 -0.039 -0.789 0.084 1.485
Nebraska 0.081 1.574 -0.028 -0.577 -0.045 -0.986
Nevada 0.074 0.727 0.034 0.368 -0.194 -1.727
New Hampshire -0.316 -5.361 -0.027 -0.516 -0.273 -4.767
New Jersey -0.079 -0.704 0.090 0.850 0.074 0.646
New Mexico 0.118 2.261 -0.233 -3.983 0.036 0.626
New York 0.340 3.580 -0.147 -1.705 -0.120 -1.397
North Carolina -0.092 -2.102 0.059 1.387 0.142 3.221
North Dakota -0.079 -1.263 -0.082 -1.350 0.007 0.153
Ohio -0.046 -0.761 -0.010 -0.245 0.280 4.138
Oklahoma 0.106 2.612 0.127 3.062 -0.109 -2.295
Oregon -0.098 -2.227 0.018 0.431 -0.061 -1.229
Pennsylvania -0.286 -3.265 0.176 2.233 0.033 0.389
Rhode Island -0.222 -1.949 -0.023 -0.192 0.144 1.246
South Carolina -0.089 -1.493 -0.176 -2.974 -0.105 -2.070
South Dakota -0.252 -4.378 -0.132 -2.261 0.261 4.083
Tennessee 0.276 5.944 0.047 1.130 0.396 6.843
Texas -0.020 -0.361 0.250 4.013 -0.115 -1.882
Utah -0.094 -0.951 0.098 0.941 -0.242 -2.204
Vermont 0.411 7.663 0.088 1.529 0.530 9.155
Virginia -0.113 -2.047 -0.343 -6.009 -0.124 -2.607
Washington -0.321 -5.615 0.069 1.359 0.119 2.074
West Virginia 0.117 1.873 0.100 1.595 0.386 5.353
Wisconsin 0.404 7.422 0.040 0.977 0.056 1.251
Wyoming 0.180 2.606 0.042 0.677 0.154 2.353
Note: The numbers correspond to the Φ parameters of the MCAR model for the third
diﬀusion period. We report the posterior mean of the spatial eﬀects for the Wii, PS3
and X360 and the ratio of the posterior mean over the posterior standard deviation.
Table 5.8: Posterior of MCAR Spatial Eﬀects
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MCAR Fourth Diﬀusion Period
Wii t-value PS3 t-value Xbox360 t-value
Alabama 0.311 3.294 -0.008 -0.171 -0.092 -1.108
Arizona -0.092 -1.076 -0.367 -4.305 -0.412 -4.807
Arkansas 0.044 0.613 0.078 1.217 -0.123 -1.864
California 0.377 3.187 -0.005 -0.083 -0.080 -0.759
Colorado -0.040 -0.449 0.178 1.738 0.022 0.201
Connecticut -0.386 -3.484 -0.306 -2.844 -0.017 -0.144
Delaware 0.079 0.999 -0.045 -0.631 0.806 9.027
Florida -0.136 -2.313 -0.065 -1.059 -0.313 -5.411
Georgia -0.103 -1.827 -0.228 -3.586 0.088 1.323
Idaho 0.197 1.842 0.072 0.719 -0.077 -0.745
Illinois 0.277 4.295 -0.109 -1.978 0.485 7.363
Indiana -0.258 -4.541 0.022 0.413 0.158 3.015
Iowa -0.063 -0.839 -0.021 -0.271 -0.293 -4.108
Kansas 0.395 6.189 0.079 1.320 0.156 2.558
Kentucky -0.027 -0.567 -0.062 -1.127 -0.049 -0.780
Louisiana 0.155 1.626 -0.006 -0.162 0.254 2.682
Maine -0.307 -3.621 -0.149 -1.864 -0.412 -4.844
Maryland 0.372 3.837 0.191 2.154 0.002 -0.065
Massachusetts -0.233 -2.048 -0.065 -0.597 -0.140 -1.277
Michigan -0.155 -2.323 -0.191 -3.465 -0.089 -1.414
Minnesota 0.006 0.061 0.007 0.110 -0.038 -0.671
Mississippi -0.137 -1.491 0.007 -0.006 0.113 1.163
Missouri -0.374 -4.820 -0.103 -1.523 -0.076 -1.138
Montana 0.118 1.436 0.006 0.001 -0.132 -1.815
Nebraska 0.729 8.505 0.187 2.936 0.118 1.865
Nevada 0.132 0.819 0.160 1.043 0.180 1.101
New Hampshire 0.066 0.846 -0.196 -2.587 -0.054 -0.703
New Jersey 0.394 2.581 0.285 1.962 0.124 0.840
New Mexico -0.151 -2.031 -0.168 -2.577 -0.181 -2.489
New York 0.219 1.758 0.203 1.710 0.162 1.303
North Carolina -0.462 -7.091 -0.277 -4.951 0.081 1.415
North Dakota -0.247 -3.025 -0.166 -1.989 -0.251 -3.191
Ohio 0.805 8.115 0.075 0.965 0.260 3.472
Oklahoma 0.050 1.012 -0.146 -2.722 -0.071 -1.272
Oregon -0.073 -1.372 -0.004 -0.084 0.109 1.615
Pennsylvania -0.443 -3.824 0.165 1.630 -0.056 -0.544
Rhode Island -0.566 -3.806 -0.380 -2.586 -0.243 -1.660
South Carolina 0.121 1.680 0.038 0.472 -0.175 -2.585
South Dakota 0.149 2.292 0.100 1.566 0.191 2.710
Tennessee -0.235 -3.317 0.053 0.929 0.029 0.457
Texas 0.163 1.913 -0.198 -2.502 -0.239 -3.037
Utah 0.178 1.235 0.169 1.186 -0.324 -2.171
Vermont 0.052 0.736 0.489 6.011 -0.060 -0.965
Virginia -0.011 -0.171 -0.166 -2.960 -0.304 -5.075
Washington 0.133 1.688 -0.188 -2.728 -0.060 -0.839
West Virginia 0.355 3.908 0.144 1.711 0.302 3.604
Wisconsin -0.351 -5.133 0.099 1.862 0.008 0.121
Wyoming 0.375 3.677 0.088 0.941 0.018 0.213
Note: The numbers correspond to the Φ parameters of the MCAR model for the
fourth diﬀusion period. We report the posterior mean of the spatial eﬀects for the
Wii, PS3 and X360 and the ratio of the posterior mean over the posterior standard
deviation.
Table 5.9: Posterior of MCAR Spatial Eﬀects
5.7 Tables and Figures 187
OLS First Diﬀusion Period
Coeﬃcient St. Dev. t-value
Intercept -2.3730 0.0131 -180.7930
Male Female Ratio 0.0185 0.0195 0.9480
Population Density 0.0039 0.0228 0.1720
Population in College Dorms 0.0263 0.0164 1.6040
Married Couple 0.0198 0.0161 1.2250
Travel Time to Work 0.0131 0.0194 0.6740
Income per Capita -0.0028 0.0217 -0.1300
OLS Second Diﬀusion Period
Coeﬃcient St. Dev. t-value
Intercept -2.4053 0.0159 -151.0310
Male Female Ratio 0.0218 0.0237 0.9230
Population Density 0.0239 0.0277 0.8620
Population in College Dorms 0.0257 0.0199 1.2910
Married Couple -0.0092 0.0196 -0.4710
Travel Time to Work -0.0136 0.0235 -0.5780
Income per Capita -0.0194 0.0263 -0.7390
OLS Third Diﬀusion Period
Coeﬃcient St. Dev. t-value
Intercept -2.3730 0.0131 -180.7930
Male Female Ratio 0.0185 0.0195 0.9480
Population Density 0.0039 0.0228 0.1720
Population in College Dorms 0.0263 0.0164 1.6040
Married Couple 0.0198 0.0161 1.2250
Travel Time to Work 0.0131 0.0194 0.6740
Income per Capita -0.0028 0.0217 -0.1300
OLS Fourth Diﬀusion Period
Coeﬃcient St. Dev. t-value
Intercept -2.4008 0.0203 -118.0540
Male Female Ratio -0.0197 0.0302 -0.6520
Population Density 0.0355 0.0354 1.0030
Population in College Dorms -0.0237 0.0254 -0.9310
Married Couple 0.0210 0.0250 0.8400
Travel Time to Work 0.0189 0.0300 0.6290
Income per Capita 0.0182 0.0336 0.5410
Note: These are parameter estimates of the model in equation (5.3)
obtained by OLS and with no spatial eﬀects.
Table 5.10: OLS δ coeﬃcients
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MCAR First Period
Mean 5% 95%
Λ12 (Wii-PS3) 0.075 -0.185 0.337
Λ13 (Wii-Xbox) 0.115 -0.139 0.352
Λ23 (PS3-Xbox) -0.257 -0.488 0.036
MCAR Second Period
Mean 5% 95%
Λ12 (Wii-PS3) -0.082 -0.344 0.210
Λ13 (Wii-Xbox) 0.096 -0.156 0.354
Λ23 (PS3-Xbox) -0.103 -0.377 0.179
MCAR Third Period
Mean 5% 95%
Λ12 (Wii-PS3) 0.061 -0.204 0.302
Λ13 (Wii-Xbox) 0.401 0.145 0.600
Λ23 (PS3-Xbox) 0.117 -0.137 0.368
MCAR Fourth Period
Mean 5% 95%
Λ12 (Wii-PS3) 0.409 0.156 0.601
Λ13 (Wii-Xbox) 0.349 0.090 0.552
Λ23 (PS3-Xbox) 0.311 0.058 0.534
Note: We present the posterior mean and the
posterior 95% highest density region of the cor-
relation matrix obtained from the Λ matrix.
The Λ matrix measures the covariance between
the spatial eﬀects of the three products.
Table 5.11: Posterior of MCAR Λ correlations
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HPDR
95% 50% 5%
MCAR 1st period ρ 0.975 0.805 0.150
MCAR 2nd period ρ 0.975 0.825 0.150
MCAR 3rd period ρ 0.975 0.825 0.150
MCAR 4th period ρ 0.975 0.815 0.200
Note:
Table 5.12: Highest Posterior Density Region (HPDR) for the ρ coeﬃcient.
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Aggregate Model for the Wii
Variable Estimate Std. Error t-value
spline 0.663 0.088 7.554
Search Wii 0.468 0.121 3.862
Aggregate Model for the PS3
Variable Estimate Std. Error t-value
spline 0.862 0.108 7.974
Search PS3 0.171 0.133 1.287
Aggregate Model for the X360
Variable Estimate Std. Error t-value
spline 0.722 0.122 5.916
Search X360 0.375 0.163 2.304
Note: The dependent variable is aggregate sales for
each of the consoles (in logs). The right hand side
includes a spline term and the logs of the search index
for the console. The R2 is higher than 0.95 for all
three regressions.
Table 5.13: OLS Regressions between Aggregate Sales Data and Aggregate Online Search
Data
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Figure 5.1: Google Insights for Search
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Figure 5.2: Model Size: Posterior Distribution of the Number of Regressors Included in
the Model for the Nintendo Wii
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Figure 5.6: Moran’s I and Geary’s C for Uniform Probabilities (Histogram) and Moran’s
I and Geary’s C for all Diﬀusion Periods and Technologies (Vertical Lines)
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Figure 5.7: Nintendo Wii Model: Histogram of the Posterior Mean of the Regression
Coeﬃcient for all US States and All Time Periods (Left Panel) and Posterior Mean Over
Posterior Standard Deviation (Right Panel)
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Figure 5.8: Sony PS3 Model: Histogram of the Posterior Mean of the Regression Co-
eﬃcient for all US States and All Time Periods (Left Panel) and Posterior Mean Over
Posterior Standard Deviation (Right Panel)
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Figure 5.9: Microsoft Xbox Model: Histogram of the Posterior Mean of the Regression
Coeﬃcient for all US States and All Time Periods (Left Panel) and Posterior Mean Over
Posterior Standard Deviation (Right Panel)
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5.A Methodology
In this appendix we discuss the BVS method and the MCAR model estimation we use to study
the probabilities of inclusion of the diﬀerent regions and locations.
Bayesian Variable Selection
In what follows we follow closely the presentation of George and McCulloch (1997) section 4.
In Section 4 they discuss the speciﬁcation of conjugate priors for β and σ. We chose to use
conjugate priors because it facilitates the integration of β and σ out of the posterior distribution
of the indicators γ and hence the computation of the posterior of γ becomes simple and fast.
The likelihood is speciﬁed as
f(Y |β, σ) = φ(Y ;Xγβγ , σ
2I) (5.4)
where Y = yi = (yi1, . . . , yiT ), Xγ is a subset of potential regressors for which γ = 1, I is an
identity and φ(y;x,Σ) is the Normal distribution density with mean x and variance Σ evaluated
at y. The prior for β is
π(β|σ, γ) = φ(β; 0, σ2DγRDγ), (5.5)
where Dγ is a diagonal matrix with elements
Dkkγ =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ υ0 when γk = 0υ1 when γk = 1, (5.6)
and R is a correlation matrix. R ∝ I or R ∝ (X ′γXγ)
−1 are attractive choices when υ0 = 0. The
scalars υ0 and υ1 are chosen according to the objectives of the modeler. The choice of υ0 and
υ1 aﬀect the number of regressors included in the subset Xγ and the threshold after which an
element of β is distinguished from zero. See George and McCulloch (1997, page 346-347) for
more details.
George and McCulloch (1997) discuss how diﬀerent choices of υ0 and υ1 aﬀect the selection
of variables and the size of the β coeﬃcients that are included in the model. The suggestion is
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to set υ0 small and υ1 large such that when the posterior supports that γk = 0 then the prior
speciﬁcation is narrow enough to keep βk close to zero. A popular choice in the literature is
to set υ0 = 0 and to specify π(β|γ) = π(βγ |γ) × π(βγ¯ |γ) where π(βγ |γ) = φ(βγ ; 0, σ
2Σγ) and
π(βγ¯ |γ) = 1 being βγ and βγ¯ the coeﬃcients included and excluded in the model, respectively.
The attractiveness of this last speciﬁcation is that we can select βk depending on how signiﬁcantly
they are diﬀerent from zero rather than selecting them depending on their relative size when
υ0 = 0.
The prior for σ2 is
π(σ2) = IG(ν/2, νλ/2) (5.7)
where ν are the degrees of freedom and λ is the scale of the inverse gamma (IG) distribution.
What is left to specify is the prior for the indicators γ. They are usually speciﬁed as
π(γ) =
∏
k
wγkk (1−wk)
1−γk , (5.8)
where wk is the probability of including the k regressor in the model. A popular choice in the
literature is to use wk = w and therefore
π(γ) = wqγ (1− w)p−qγ , (5.9)
where qγ is the number of regressors included out of a total set of size p. This last prior can be
combined with a conjugate prior on w and set w ∼ Beta(a, b) and the prior becomes
π(γ) =
B(a+ qγ , b + p− qγ)
B(a, b)
, (5.10)
where B(x, y) is the beta function with x and y parameters. See Chipman et al. (2001) for
other choices of π(γ). Careful selection should be given to the scalars υ1 and w (or a and b)
as they directly aﬀect model size. Large υ1 and small w concentrate the prior on parsimonious
models with large coeﬃcients while large w and small υ1 concentrate the prior on saturated
models with small coeﬃcients (Clyde and George, 2004, page 86).
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The joint density π(Y, β, σ2|γ) = π(Y |β, σ2, γ)π(β|σ, γ)π(σ2 |γ) has a closed form expression
when υ0 = 0 and after integrating over β and σ
2 and that is
π(Y |γ) ∝ |X ′γXγ +Σ
−1
γ |
−1/2|Σγ |
−1/2(νλ+ S2γ)
−(T+ν)/2, (5.11)
where
S2γ = Y
′Y − Y ′Xγ(X
′
γXγ +Σ
−1
γ )X
′
γY, (5.12)
and Σγ = DγRDγ . The posterior of the indicators is straightforward to compute as π(γ|Y ) ∝
π(Y |γ)π(γ) and the Metropolis-Gibbs sampler is straightforward and it proceeds by sampling
π(γ|Y ), π(βγ |Y, σ
2, γ) and π(σ2|Y, βγ , γ) sequentially.
We use a = 50 and b = 100 for the prior on w (in equation (5.10)). The prior of σ2 has
ν = 1000 and λ = 0.30. We follow the recommendation of George and McCulloch (1997, page
341) who suggest to set λ such that the posterior of σ2 assigns substantial probability to an
interval close to the sample variance of Y and the variance of the residual of a saturated model.
The prior on β in equation (5.5) and (5.6) has υ0 = 0 and υ1 = 7 and we use R = (X
′
γXγ)
−1.
A short review of aereal data models
Aereal data usually refers to cross sectional or panel data collected across diﬀerent regions or
areas with well deﬁned boundaries. Therefore aereal data consists of aggregate or summary
measures at diﬀerent locations. The CAR and SAR models are among the most popular models
applied to aereal data but there are many other popular approaches like kriging or spatial
interpolation. In this review we focus on the CAR model and its multivariate extensions.
CAR stands for Conditional Autoregressors and SAR stands for Simultaneous Autoregressors
and hence CAR models are usually referred as Conditionally Autoregressive models and the SAR
as Simultaneous Autoregressive models.
The CAR and SAR models are discussed in several sources. A basic reference is Cressie
(1992). Cressie covers topics that range from model speciﬁcation, classical and Bayesian estima-
tion to the theoretical foundations of the CAR and SAR models. Many other topics in spatial
analysis are discussed in Cressie (1992). Banerjee et al. (2004) focus on Bayesian analysis and
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estimation of spatial models. Held and Rue (2002) review many of the computational methods
and sampling techniques usually applied to the Bayesian analysis of CAR models and to more
general spatial models referred to as Gaussian Markov Random Fields.
Wall (2004) compares the CAR and SAR models and oﬀers some insights about the diﬀerent
correlation between locations implied by these two models. The CAR and SAR models might be
equivalent under certain conditions, for example see Assunc¸ao (2003) or Banerjee et al. (2004,
page 86). We intend to apply spatial priors to the distribution of model parameters. Therefore,
in what follows we focus on the CAR model as it is better suited than the SAR both as a
hierarchical prior speciﬁcation on a model’s parameters and for Bayesian modeling (Banerjee
et al., 2004, page 86).
The main assumption of the CAR model is that a measurement at a location has a condi-
tional distribution with a mean that is proportional to a weighted sum of the measurement at
neighboring locations. Both the joint distribution and the conditional distribution of the spatial
eﬀects given all other spatial parameters can be derived in closed form and they are presented
in Banerjee et al. (2004, page 79) and in the references therein. However, there are alternative
speciﬁcations to the joint distribution of the spatial eﬀects and a common approach is to use the
pairwise diﬀerence speciﬁcation (Besag et al., 1991). Haran et al. (2003) present how to use
block updating when some of the coeﬃcients in a linear regression follow the pairwise diﬀerence
prior.
The CAR is suited for univariate aereal data and Mardia (1988) presents an extension to
the multivariate case, usually referred to as multivariate CAR or simply as MCAR. It is common
to have more than one measurement at each location and the MCAR allows to model both the
correlation among measurements of neighboring sites and the correlation among the diﬀerent
measures across sites. Gelfand and Vounatsou (2003) and Carlin and Banerjee (2003) apply
Bayesian analysis to the MCAR of Mardia (1988) and present applications with two and up
to ﬁve dimensional data. On the other hand, Gamerman et al. (2003) present a multivariate
version of the pairwise diﬀerence speciﬁcation (used as a prior) and its sampling schemes.
Other extensions of the CARmodel incorporate dynamics into its spatial coeﬃcients. Waller
et al. (1997), Nobre et al. (2005) and Gelfand et al. (2005) propose models that use a random
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walk speciﬁcation for the mean or for the variance of the spatial eﬀects. Gelfand et al. (2005)
provide a review of spatio-temporal models.
Linear Model with CAR Prior
Next we work out the speciﬁcation and sampling for the model
yi = xiβ + φi + i, (5.13)
where yi is measured at i locations for i = 1, . . . , p, xi is a set of k covariates at i and β is
a coeﬃcient column vector k × 1 while i and φi are random eﬀects meant to capture overall
variability and spatial heterogeneity, respectively. We deﬁne y
′
= (y1, . . . , yp), φ
′
= (φ1, . . . , φp)
and X = (x1, . . . , xk). The distribution of i is
 ∼ N(0,Σ), (5.14)
where 
′
= (1, . . . , p), Σ = σ
2I and σ2 is the variance of . N(μ,Σ) refers to a normal
distribution with mean μ and covariance matrix Σ. We deﬁne λ = 1/σ
2. The prior distribution
of the spatial eﬀects φi follows
φi|φj∼i ∼ N
(∑
j∼i
cijφj , τ
2
i
)
. (5.15)
This form states that the distribution of φi given its j neighbors, denoted as j ∼ i, has a normal
distribution with a mean that is a weighted sum (using weights cij) of the neighboring values
and variance τ2i . Besag (1974) shows that the joint distribution of the spatial eﬀects in (5.15)
can we written in the form
φ ∼ N(0,Ω), (5.16)
where φ = (φ1, . . . , φp) and Ω is a p× p symmetric and positive semi-deﬁnite or positive deﬁnite
matrix. In the literature it is common to deﬁne the elements of Ω−1 directly instead of specifying
Ω. For example, Banerjee et al. (2004, page 79) assume that τ2i = τ
2/wi+ and that cij = wij/wi+
where wij takes the value of 1 if j ∼ i and zero otherwise and where wi+ is the total number
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of neighbors of i. Given these assumptions Ω−1 = T−1(I − C) and given that T is a diagonal
matrix with elements Tii = τ
2/wi+ and Cij = cij then Ω
−1 can be written as
Ω−1 =
1
τ2
(Iwi+ −W ), (5.17)
where Iwi+ is a diagonal matrix with elements wi+ and Wij = wij. This last speciﬁcation for Ω
results in an improper distribution given that the rows of (Iwi+ −W ) sum to zero. A solution
to this issue is to specify Ω as
Ω−1 =
1
τ2
(Iwi+ − ρW ), (5.18)
where ρ takes a value (between 0 and 1) that makes Ω−1 positive deﬁnite and consequently the
distribution of φ becomes proper. For a discussion on the impropriety of the CAR distribution
and the role of the ρ parameter see Banerjee et al. (2004, page 163), Eberly and Carlin (2000),
Sahu and Gelfand (1999) or Best et al. (1999). This latter form implies that
φi|φj∼i ∼ N
(
ρ
∑
j∼i
cijφj, τ
2
i
)
. (5.19)
The distribution of φ is usually referred as CAR(τ2) when the conditional distributions of
the spatial eﬀects are deﬁned as in equation (5.15) and it is referred as CAR(ρ, τ2) when its
conditional distribution follows (5.19). In what follows we use Ω−1 = λφQ with Q = Iwi+ − ρW
and λφ = 1/τ
2. To carry out Bayesian inference and to complete the model speciﬁcation we
need to deﬁne the priors for β, λy, λφ and ρ. We specify them as
p(β) ∝ 1
p(λy) ∝ λy
aye−byλy
p(λφ) ∝ λ
aφ
φ e
−bφλφ
p(ρ) ∝ discretized prior
(5.20)
We use p(·) generically to denote a probability density. That is, the prior for β is non-
informative, the priors for λy and λφ have the form of a Gamma distribution. Finally, for ρ we
give probability mass to a discrete set of values with a high proportion of them near 1. Gelfand
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and Vounatsou (2003) suggest the use of discretized priors for ρ. The model speciﬁcation is now
complete and next we describe the sampling steps to estimate equation (5.13).
Sampling Steps for the CAR
To sample the parameters of the model in equation (5.13) we can apply the Gibbs sampler and
MCMC. To derive the posterior of β we can write the likelihood of equation (5.13) as
L(y|β, λy) ∝ |M |
−1/2e−
1
2
(y−Xβ)′M−1(y−Xβ), (5.21)
where M = ( 1λφQ
−1 + 1λ I). The posterior of β is then
p(β|y, λy, λφ) ∝ |M |
−1/2e−
1
2
(β−b)
′
(X′M−1X)−1(β−b), (5.22)
with b = (X ′M−1X)−1X ′M−1y. Therefore β can be sampled from N(b, (X ′M−1X)−1).
Next we derive the posterior distribution of the spatial eﬀects φ. To do so we write the
density of y conditional on β. That is
L(y|β, φ, λy) ∝ λ
p/2
y e
−
λy
2
(y˜−φ)
′
(y˜−φ), (5.23)
with y˜ = y −Xβ. Therefore, the posterior of φ is
p(φ|y˜, λy, λφ) ∝ λ
p/2
y e
− 1
2
((φ−a)
′
R−1(φ−a)), (5.24)
where a = (λyI + λφQ)
−1λy y˜ and R
−1 = (λyI + λφQ). That is φ can be sampled form N(a,R).
The posterior of λy and λφ are
p(λφ|y˜, φ, λy) ∝ λ
p/2+aφ
φ e
−λφ(
1
2
φ
′
Qφ+bφ)
p(λy|y˜, φ, λφ) ∝ λ
p/2+ay
y e
−λy(
1
2
(y˜−φ)
′
(y˜−φ)+by).
(5.25)
That is λφ ∼ Γ(p/2 + ay, by + 1/2φ
′
Qφ) and λy ∼ Γ(p/2 + aφ, bφ + 1/2(y˜ − φ)
′
(y˜ − φ)).
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Finally we need to sample the ρ in the Q matrix. We know that
p(ρ|φ, y, λy , λφ) ∝ |Q|
1/2e−
1
2
φ
′
Qφp(ρ). (5.26)
A common method to sample ρ is to assume that p(ρ) is a uniform distribution with range
(0, 1) and to sample it with the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. A second popular choice is to
discretize ρ in a set of values and to draw them proportional to their posterior probability. We
use the following set 0.01, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, . . . , 0.70, 0.71, 0.72, . . . , 0.99.
In summary we use the next steps in the Gibbs sampler
1. β ∼ N((X ′M−1X)−1X ′M−1y, (X ′M−1X)−1)
2. φ ∼ N((λyI + λφQ)
−1λy y˜, (λyI + λφQ))
3. λy ∼ Γ(p/2 + ay, by + 1/2φ
′
Qφ)
4. λφ ∼ Γ(p/2 + aφ, bφ + 1/2(y˜ − φ)
′
(y˜ − φ))
5. ρ ∼ p(ρ|φ, y, λy , λφ)
where x ∼ Γ(a, b) means that x follows a Gamma distribution with the form cxae−bx where c
is a constant. At the end of the sampling step 2 we center the φ vector around its own mean
following Eberly and Carlin (2000) and Best et al. (1999). The re-centering is equivalent to
sampling with the restriction
∑
φi = 0. Rue and Held (2005) show a general form to sample
with linear restrictions and that is equivalent to centering around a mean.
Multivariate Linear Model with MCAR Prior
Next we expand the linear model of Section 5.A to a multivariate setting. The exposition follows
Carlin and Banerjee (2003) and Gelfand and Vounatsou (2003).
In this setting we observe J diﬀerent measurements at each location. That is we use the no-
tation yji to refer to the j
th measurement at location i. We use the notation yj for (yj1, . . . , yjp)
′
and Y is a p × J matrix with columns (y1, . . . , yJ). The same notation is used for the spatial
eﬀects φij and the error terms ij. That is φj = (φj1, . . . , φjp)
′
, Φ = (φ1, . . . , φJ ) and ﬁnally
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j = (j1, . . . , jp)
′
, E = (1, . . . , J). We observe a common group of N covariates X where
X = (x1, . . . , xN ) and xi = (xi1, . . . , xip)
′
. Hence we can write
Y
(p×J)
= X
(p×N)
· B
(N×J)
+ Φ
p×J
+ E
(p×J)
(5.27)
To carry out Bayesian inference we deﬁne the following priors
p(B) ∝ 1
p(Σ) ∝ |Σ|−
v
2 e−
1
2
trΣ−1VΣ
p(Φ|Λ,Ψ) ∝ |Ψ|−J/2|Λ|−p/2e−
1
2
tr(ΨΦΛΦ
′
)
p(Λ) ∝ |Λ|−
v0
2 e−
1
2
trΛVΛ
(5.28)
Above Σ is a J × J covariance matrix of E and (E) ∼ N(0,Σ ⊗ I); Λ is J × J and it is the
inverse of the covariance matrix between the columns of Φ while Ψ is p× p and it is the inverse
covariance matrix between the rows of Φ. That is, (Φ) ∼ N(0,Λ−1 ⊗Ψ−1).
The form of Ψ might be identical to the form of the Q matrix in the CAR prior. That is
Ψ = (Iwi+ − ρW ) where W and Iwi+ are deﬁned as before. A second choice for Ψ might be
Ψ = (Iwi+ − W ). Carlin and Banerjee (2003) and Gelfand and Vounatsou (2003) use the
ﬁrst form while Gamerman et al. (2003) use the second. A third choice is to deﬁne a general
form for Λ ⊗ Ψ as Gelfand and Vounatsou (2003) propose. Gelfand and Vounatsou (2003)
propose a form of Q that allows an item (J items) speciﬁc ρ parameters. They ﬁrst deﬁne
Qj = (Iwi+ − ρjW ) and its Choleski factorization Qj = P
′
jPj . Then they deﬁne
Λ⊗Ψ = P
′
(Λ⊗ Ip×p)P, (5.29)
where P is a diagonal matrix with Pj blocks. This last form may allow for a more ﬂexible
correlation structure of the Φ parameters. In the application we assume ρj = ρ for all j.
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Sampling the Multivariate Linear Model with MCAR Prior
If we condition on Φ and deﬁne Y¯ = Y − Φ we obtain the traditional multivariate regression
model
Y¯ = X · B +E. (5.30)
Given this last expression we can write the density of the model as
p(Y¯ |X,B,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−p/2e−
1
2
tr(Y¯ −XB)′(Y¯−XB)Σ−1 . (5.31)
The joint posterior of B and Σ can be written as
p(B,Σ|X,Y ) = p(Y |X,B,Σ)p(B)p(Σ)
∝ |Σ|−
p+v
2 e−
1
2
trΣ−1G,
(5.32)
where G = (Y¯ −XB)′(Y¯ −XB)+VΣ. Furthermore, we can write G = S+V +(B−B˜)
′
(X
′
X)(B−
B˜) where S = (Y¯ − XB˜)′(Y¯ −XB˜) and B˜ = (X
′
X)−1X
′
Y¯ . This last form of G allows us to
easily integrate out either B or Σ in the last equation and to obtain the posteriors of B and Σ
respectively. Therefore
p(B|X,Y,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−
p+v
2 eΣ
−1(B−B˜)
′
(X
′
X)(B−B˜)
p(Σ|X,Y ) ∝ |Σ|−
p+v
2 e−
1
2
trΣ−1(VΣ+S),
(5.33)
and we can sample B and Σ using these last forms for a matric-variate normal for B and a
Inverse Wishart for Σ.
If we condition equation (5.27) on B and we take Y˜ = Y −XB then we have a multivariate
regression model
Y˜
(p×J)
= Φ
(p×J)
+ E
(p×J)
, (5.34)
and given equation (5.34) we can write the density of Y˜ as
p(Y˜ |Φ,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−p/2e−
1
2
tr(Y˜ −Φ)′(Y˜−Φ)Σ−1 . (5.35)
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If we use φ =(Φ), y =(Y˜ ) then equation (5.35) can be expressed as
p(y|φ,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−p/2e−
1
2
(y−φ)
′
(Σ−1⊗Ip×p)(y−φ). (5.36)
In the same way the prior for Φ can be expressed in vectorized form as
p(φ) ∝ |Ψ|−J/2|Λ|−p/2e−
1
2
φ′(Ψ⊗Λ)φ. (5.37)
We use the vectorized forms to derive the posterior of φ. That is p(φ|y,Σ,Ψ) ∝ p(y|φ,Σ)× p(φ)
and therefore
p(φ|y,Σ,Ψ) ∝ |Λ|−
(2p+v0)
2 |Σ|−p/2e−
1
2
((φ−a)′M−1(φ−a)+Sφ) (5.38)
where Sφ = y
′Hy + a′M−1a, M−1 = (H + F ), H = Σ−1 × I, F = Ψ⊗ Λ and a = MHy.
The posterior of Λ can be derived from the third and fourth line of equation (5.28) as follows
p(Λ|Φ, Y,Σ,Ψ) ∝ |Λ|−
(p+v0)
2 e−
1
2
trΛ(VΛ+Φ
′
ΨΦ). (5.39)
If the form of Ψ contains a ρ or ρj parameters Gelfand and Vounatsou (2003) suggest to sample
them from a discretized prior. The posterior of the ρ parameters is
p(ρ|Φ, Y,Σ,Λ) ∝ |Ψ|−J/2e−
1
2
tr(ΨΦ
′
ΛΦ). (5.40)
In summary we use the following Gibbs steps
1. β|X, Y¯ ,Φ,Λ,Ψ ∼ N(((X ′X)−1X ′Y¯ ),Σ⊗ (X ′X)−1)
2. φ|B,X, Y,Λ,Ψ ∼ N((Σ−1 ⊗ I +Ψ⊗ Λ)−1(Σ−1 ⊗ I)y, (Σ−1 ⊗ I +Ψ⊗ Λ))
3. Σ|Y,B,Φ,Λ,Ψ ∼ IW ((p + v)/2, VΣ + S)
4. Λ|Ψ, B,X, Y,Σ ∼ IW ((p+ v0)/2, VΛ +Φ
′
ΨΦ)
5. ρ|Φ,Λ, B,X, Y,Σ ∼ p(ρ|Φ, Y,Σ,Λ)
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In the chapter we set VΣ = I3 and VΛ = I3 and υ0 = 5 while υ = 3 and p = 48. We
use 48 states because we leave out Hawaii and Alaska. The matrix Ψ is deﬁned based on the
neighborhood structure of the US states where the element Ψkj takes the value of one when the
state k is neighbor of the state j and zero otherwise. We further assume that ρj = ρ and we
sample this parameter based on the discretized prior described above. Finally, we assume that
Σ = σ2I and the β coeﬃcients are equal across technologies.

Nederlandse Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Dit proefschrift richt zich op de analyse van nieuwe of zeer recente marketing gegevens. Hiertoe
introduceren we een aantal nieuwe econometrische modellen. We presenteren modellen die nut-
tig zijn om het volgende te analyseren: (1) het optimale tijdstip voor de lancering van nieuwe en
dominante technologiee¨n, (2) de triggers, snelheid en de timing van een substantie¨le prijsverla-
ging voor nieuwe producten, (3) de heterogeniteit in preferenties van consumenten die leidt tot
speciﬁeke substitutiepatronen in geaggregeerde verkoopgegevens, en (4) locaties die een grote
invloed hebben op de verspreiding van nieuwe technologiee¨n. De econometrische technieken die
we toepassen zijn divers, maar ze zijn voornamelijk gebaseerd op Bayesiaanse methoden. We
maken gebruik van Bayesiaanse mixture modellen, Bayesiaanse variabele selectie technieken,
Bayesiaanse spatial modellen en we introduceren een nieuwe Bayesiaanse benadering voor het
random coe¨ﬃcie¨nten logit model. De gegevens die we analyseren bestaan uit unieke en grote
datasets. We bestuderen de prijzen van video-games, de verkopen van video-game consoles, de
totale omzet voor speciﬁeke consumentenproducten en online zoekgegevens van Google.

Resumen en Espan˜ol
(Summary in Spanish)
En esta tesis se analizan nuevas bases de datos de mercadotecnia y se presentan nuevos modelos
econometricos. Estos nuevos modelos son u´tiles para analizar (1) el tiempo de lanzamiento o´pti-
mo de nuevas tecnolog´ıas, (2) los factores que provocan cortes dra´sticos en los precios de nuevos
productos y a la vez la velocidad y el momento en el que ocurren los cortes, (3) la heterogenei-
dad de los consumidores que determina los patrones de sustitucio´n presentes en datos de ventas
agregados, y (4) los mercados inﬂuyentes que determinan la difusio´n de nuevas tecnolog´ıas. Los
me´todos econome´tricos que se utilizan en esta tesis son diversos pero en su mayor´ıa son me´todos
Bayesianos. Usamos modelos de mezcla de distribuciones, te´cnicas Bayesianas de seleccio´n de
variables, modelos Bayesianos para datos geogra´ﬁcos y proponemos un nuevo enfoque Bayesiano
para el modelo logit con coeﬁcientes aleatorios. Los datos que se analizan son precios de video-
juegos, ventas de consolas de videojuegos, datos agregados de ventas de productos de consumo
y datos de bu´squeda en l´ınea de Google.
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This thesis addresses the analysis of new or very recent marketing data and the intro -
duction of new marketing models. We present a collection of models that are useful to
analyze (1) the optimal launch time of new and dominant technologies, (2) the triggers,
speed and timing of new products’ price landings, (3) the consumer heterogeneity that
drives substitution patterns present in aggregate data, and (4) the influential locations that
drive the diffusion of new technologies. The econometric approaches that we apply are
diverse but they are predominantly Bayesian methods. We use Bayesian mixture modelling,
Bayesian variable selection techniques, Bayesian spatial models and we put forward a new
Bayesian approach for the random coefficient logit model. The data that we analyze
consist of unique and large datasets of video-game prices, video-game consoles’ sales,
aggregate sales data for consumer products and Google’s online search data. 
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